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Patterns of Individualization and their Implications for Liberalism in East Asia *

Han, Sang-Jin

Professor Emeritus, Seoul National University

Shim, Young-Hee

Chair Professor, Hanyang University

Introduction

This study is aimed at investigating the concrete pathways to individualization in East Asia with a specific focus on the relationship between individuals and community networks. We argue that East Asia is distinctive by its cultural emphasis on the value of flourishing community, including the family, and therefore consider this relationship to be of paramount significance for understanding individualization. We begin by raising a question of whether the theory of individualization based on the Western tradition of individualism can be reasonably extended to East Asia. The aim of this research is then to demonstrate how individualization as a structural transformation tends to be combined with cultural traditions in multiple ways, making East Asia quite different from the West.

More specifically, this research will first compare the pathways to individualization in East Asia and the West and then examine variations within Korea by formulating a clear-cut analytic framework. The study will treat individualization as a structural process of transformation significantly affected by the relationship between modernity and tradition, on the one hand, and the interaction between the push and pull factors of individualization, on the other. The push factor means a structural force compelling large numbers of people in a society to change their patterns of behavior. More often than not, this is socioeconomic in nature, whereas the pull factor is deeply associated with the cultural and discursive process of social construction. We would like to argue that individualization as a structural transformation can be adequately understood only when both the push and pull factors and hence both socioeconomic and cultural-discursive dimensions are properly understood in close interactions.

In the West, among others, Beck (1992), Beck and Beck-Gernsheim (2002) have carried out pioneering research on the problems of individualization. However, we think that such a theory of individualization has, in fact, unfolded with the tacit historical assumption of the individualist tradition. Thus it is debatable whether we can take this as a self-evident reference and apply it to non-Western countries such as those in East Asia where the individual has been considered not as a socially isolated, atomized, independent subject, but rather as deeply interwoven with the community as a person is with his or her family. Thus it is important to pay full attention to

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the relationship between individuals and community and better understand significant variations and complexities involved. It is hoped that this investigation may lead us to understand better why and how East Asia differs from the West while comprehending common characteristics of individualization.

The Western Theory of Individualization

Individualization is a complex process related to as diverse conditions as cultural changes, legal entitlement, political participation, and internet communication, among others. The concept of individualization indicates a categorical shift in relations between an individual and the society (Beck 1992: 127). First, it is related with cultural democracy. Individualization presupposes that individuals get liberated step by step from the taken-for-granted constraints exercised by collectives of various kinds. An outcome of this historical process is human rights or individual sovereignty. Second, individualization involves the emergence of an individual as subject of legal rights. It is an individual, not any collectivity that is legally entitled to make a claim for right. Third, individualization means the emergence of an individual citizen as the subject of political participation whose mode of action differs significantly from collective actors. Fourth, the process of individualization tends to be further facilitated by the development of the communication and digital revolution.

Another line of exploring the meaning of individualization today is how to manage risks and dangers that citizens may face in their life. In the Western countries, responsibility for risk management is shifting more and more to individuals. With respect to the economic life the concept of individualization assumes that individuals get unleashed from the previous frameworks of welfare financed by either the state or business firms or the family. In other words, individuals have to take care of their life by their own means, as seen in personal insurance packages.

According to Beck-Gernsheim (2008), Westerners left their traditional way of life, pushed not only by detraditionalization but also by legal development and the emergence of welfare state. Divorce, for example, which was extremely difficult for women, became possible through changes in social mores expresses through changes in the law and the emergence of the welfare state (Beck-Gernsheim 2002). The rise of the “post-familial family” (Beck-Gernsheim 2002; Shim 2011) is a case in point. Different from the nuclear family, the “post-familial family” refers to diversified forms of family: (1) based on confluent love, (2) characterized by gender equality, and neither assuming (3) heterosexual relationship only, nor (4) people from the same nation (Giddens 1992). Thus the family in the Western countries today is characterized by “marriage and divorce chains,” “conjugal succession,” “multi-parent families,” “patchwork families,” and “elective family relationship” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 96). It is a change from “living for others” to “a life of one’s own” (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002: 54), which is based not only on individualization, but also on individualism. It is a historical process that tends to break up people’s traditional rhythm of life, that is, so-called “the standard biography,” and to give way to “do-it-yourself” life history (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002). The basic idea that everything depends on individual free choices we would like to call a “libertarian individualization” of the West.

An Overall Analytic Framework

The relationship of individuals and community in East Asia differs significantly from the salient characteristics of libertarian individualization. This can be shown clearly by examining individualization within the context of the family. The extent to which individuals in East Asia get unleashed from previous social bondages in industrial society, such as family, kinship, gender, and class and become responsible for their survival will be examined. An assumption of this research is that individualization, as a historical process of transformation, can work well as in the West when the action-oriented, cultural-discursive dimension of individualism is strong and effective. However, the cultural-discursive factor in East Asia is significantly different from the West. This is why we need to investigate the concrete pathways to individualization in East Asia which differ from the West.

For such an analysis of the process of individualization we will use the model we have developed (Shim and Han 2010) utilizing Beck (1992) and Beck and Beck-Gernsheim's (2002) theory of individualization. In order to better reveal the dynamic aspects of individualization as a three-dimensional process of "disembedding," "disenchantment," and "reembedding" (Beck 1992: 128),¹ we combined the structural-objective dimension and cultural-discursive dimension on the one hand, and push and pull factors of transformation on the other, to make the following model (Shim and Han 2010).

Table 1 Conceptual framework of individualization

	Objective-structural	Cultural-discursive
Push factors	Global risks Disembedding	Breaking-away energy Survival uncertainty
Pull factors	New institutions Reembedding	Forward-looking energy Justification

Source: Shim and Han, 2010: 240.

To clarify, the process of disembedding unfolds under the objective-structural conditions such as global risks, which, as a push factor, unleash individuals from traditional and modern welfare arrangements. This objective-structural tendency gives rise to the collective experience of fear, anxiety, and disillusionment, which originates from survival uncertainty. In other words, the cultural-discursive stream of disenchantment (Beck) works as a push factor. Reembedding, in turn, can be made possible in reality when a new institutional arrangement is formulated and backed up by public policies and laws. Yet the process of reembedding cannot

¹ Beck's original explanation of individualization shows the following three-dimensional process:

"[D]isembedding, removal from historically prescribed social forms and commitments in the sense of traditional contexts of dominance and support (the "liberating dimension"); *the loss of traditional security* with respect to practical knowledge, faith and guiding norms (the "disenchantment dimension"); and—here the meaning of the world is virtually turned into its opposite—*re-embedding*, a new type of social commitment (the "control" or "reintegration dimension")" (Beck 1992: 128; italics original).

The first axis of distinction refers to the two deep layers of reality with equally substantive consequences. The objective-structural layer is mostly, if not exclusively, about economic conditions on which institutions are formed. The cultural-discursive layer is about the practical field of actions in which "dispositive" and "habitus" manifests itself. Beck and Beck-Gernsheim seem to have paid more attention to the objective-structural dimension, although they refer to the problem of reembedding.

stop here since it requires a forward-looking perspective or motivational support from cultures, ideologies, and collective aspiration. Otherwise, the process of reembedding may face serious misunderstanding, conflict, and tension. Therefore, individualization can move well only when the culture-based pull factors operate reasonably well leading individuals to accepting and, if needed, justifying a new institution offered (Shim and Han 2010). Seen from this conceptual framework, reembedding is as crucially important as disembedding for individualization.²

The relationship between individuals and community is an important factor that distinguishes East Asia from the West. With regard to this, this research attempts to show the difference between East Asia and the West by suggesting a typology. The difference is more about the function of the pull factor, that is, the cultural-discursive factor, than the push factor. The push factor works as structural pressure toward individualization in all countries. The extent of pressure may vary depending on the circumstances of the given country. Yet the tendency of economic crisis and polarization yields structural pressures to discharge individuals from the given welfare institutional frameworks. What is decisive in this context is the pull factor. The concrete pathway of individualization is shaped by the cultural-discursive pull factor.

Individualization in East Asia: Japan

There is considerable research on individualization in Japan within the context of the family. Japan seems to be somewhat ahead of Korea and China in this field of study (Suzuki et al. 2010; Ishida et al. 2010). As to individualization as a structural transformation, Suzuki et al.'s (2010) work is representative. They argue that two mechanisms were responsible for risk management in the first modernity: first, Japanese management/company-centrism (private corporations that guaranteed long-term stability for employees and their families), and second, land development policies implemented under the guidance of bureaucrats. This means that company-centered society and the developmental state functioned as a buffer. However, from the 1990s these systems were fundamentally destroyed by globalization and neoliberal policies. Japanese company-centrism broke down, paving the road to individualization of employment. Since then individuals in Japan had to rely on themselves and find their own way. Now, individualization within the context of the family has advanced as the rate of unmarried people and the divorce rate have climbed.

Suzuki et al. (2010) have demonstrated the tendency of disconnecting individuals from the first-modern institutions and placing the burden of survival on the shoulders of individuals. In this neoliberal context, individuals are encouraged to be independent and autonomous. Yet individualization involves not only disembedding but also reembedding. However, their discussion remains largely tied to the role of the push factor and not well extended to the pull factor. Thus there is a further need for a research.

The relationship between individuals and community has been touched upon by Ochiai's (2004), Morita's (2009), and Yui's (2009) works. First of all, Ochiai's (2004) book is about the new family model of the twenty-

² We see no problem with the issue of disembedding since it is exactly what is going on almost everywhere in the global risk regime today. The analyses of Japan (Suzuki et al. 2010), China (Yan 2010), and Korea (Chang and Song 2010) clearly demonstrate this. We have no intent to dispute about it. However, we perceive that this is only half of the story to be investigated. What remains to be seen is where and how reembedding is proceeding, and with what kinds of consequences.

first century from the feminist perspective. She criticizes the so-called “the crisis of the family” discourse, claiming that it is nothing but an official view of the Economic Planning Bureau of Japan. She also claims the model of woman as a house wife was a postwar ideology based on the change of industrial structure from agriculture to employee-centered society. As the characteristics of the family of the 1990s, she points out *both* independence of women *and* the reemergence of “*ie*,” that is, the family. As a new type of the family, she discusses the “neighborhood network” and “single unit society” as salient characteristics of the Japanese pathway to individualization. She thinks the trend from the “family unit society” to “single unit society” will continue, but she does not consider it as the “collapse of the family.”

Morita (2009) shows an interesting contrast between Japan and the West in terms of an ideal-typical self. In line with Charles Taylor, he contrasts the typical self in the West as “buffered” while the Japanese case is “porous.” The “buffered” self has developed discipline and self-control and seen him/herself more and more as an independent and sovereign individual not subject to any external constraints. This idea emerged from the Western process of religious reform toward a transcendental existence of the individual in dialogue with god. While the Western modern self had to enclose its boundary completely, the self in Japan remains porous even after it is institutionally modernized, because in Japan where collective rituals are not considered negatively, the “porous” self did not feel it necessary to close itself against the world completely. Consequently, the Japanese self is more vulnerable to intervention from the outside world in the form of collective rituals.

Yui (2009) makes a similar argument, claiming that the history of Japan shows the world of “habitat segregation.” Many different “religions” could coexist simultaneously, which is different from the West where the drama of an “all or nothing” type of alteration between orthodoxy and heterodoxy prevailed through a long history of cutthroat battles. Presenting Kafu (the name of a man in a novel who lived in two worlds of habitat segregation), who lived in two separated spaces and ran away to downtown to hide himself there temporarily, as an example of Japanese modern man, Yui argues that this type of separation/fragmentation of time and space accelerated so drastically that members of the young generations are now running away in the contemporary configuration of time and space in this world. Differentiating the “habitat segregation” of time and space into minute details has given rise to a “transitional” identity as a self (subject), forming “polygamic” networks with different places. The logic and the psychology of “habitat segregation” make it possible for instrumental rationality and irrational world of “free and easy going (let joy be unconfined)” to coexist side by side.

Ochiai’s, Morita’s, and Yui’s accounts are insightful in revealing the characteristics of “run-away individualization in networks” in Japan. However, their arguments are basically conceptual. Thus there seems to be a need to be substantiated.

Individualization and Community in China

There are a few studies on individualization in China (Yan 1996, 2003, 2009, 2010). Yan’s work (2010) traces the origin of the individualization process to the Maoist era, arguing that some collectivist programs of social engineering and the socialist path of modernization under Maoism ironically resulted in a partial individualization of Chinese society. He examines profound social changes during the three decades of the post-Mao reforms, discussing the contours of individualization in various aspects, such as the privatization of labor

and the economy, rural-urban migration of workers, rights awareness, politics of lifestyle, and the self and the subjective domain of individualization. As a conclusion, Yan argues that there are similarities with the individualization process in Western Europe, but also some important differences.

Yan (2010) offered a great image of the Chinese way to individualization. Individualization in China is characterized by the management of the party-state and the absence of cultural democracy, the absence of a welfare state regime, and the absence of classic individualism and political liberalism (Yan 2010). Unlike in Western Europe where individualization results from the radicalization of modernity itself, Chinese individualization remains a developmental strategy under the direction and management of the powerful party-state (Yan 2010). The Chinese individualization process remains at the stage of emancipation politics of first modernity

Yan's argument is persuasive. However, Yan (2010) focuses on the disembedding, not the reembedding process of individualization. Recent studies on the relationship between individuals and community, which focus on love, marriage, and family of the new generation of migrant workers in China, deserves careful attention. Representing about a 100 million people, they show distinctive characteristics (Liu 2007). As "double out-comers" (Tan et al. 2003), they are inclined to enjoy freedom to choose a spouse by themselves (Wu 2011). However, on the other hand, they want to choose fellow-villagers as the first choice for their spouse because fellow villagers share common language and habits. What is more striking is that 19.2 percent think they would go back to their hometown to find spouses, and they have a willingness to provide a better life for their family, especially for their children (Wu 2011).

Yan's more recent work (2012) deals with not only disembedding but also the reembedding process of individualization in China. He argues that with the individualization process a new model of individual appeared in China, which he called "the striving individual." Through his interviews with a farmer in a Chinese village, he revealed that many people in China strive hard to make money for their children's education and success. The "striving individual" is characterized as having a materialist goal in value orientation and is different from the "enterprising individual" of the West who is more oriented to expressive and postmaterialist goal.

These recent studies, including those on Chinese people's way of choosing spouse and married lives and Yan's research on the striving individual, indicate *both* an individualizing *and* a family-oriented tendency. This characteristic has also been found from our research on the transnational marriages in Korea, particularly from the women who have come to Korea for marriage from Northeast China and Southeast Asia (Shim and Han 2010). This characteristic indicates a type of individualization which may be called "communitarian individualization."

Two Salient Modes of Individualization in Korea

In the literature on the change of the family type in Korea we find two potentially conflicting perspectives. The first perspective is called "family disorganization" discourse, which considers such family problems as the increase of divorce, the decrease of marriage, and lack of communication in the family as family disintegration or family disorganization (Pyo 2000; Choi 1997). This perspective considers that these problems emerge because the traditional family norms collapsed.

The second perspective is called “a variety of families” discourse, which considers the recent change of the family type as an adaptation of the family members to the recent social structural change (Kim 2008; Kim et al. 2004; Lee 2004; Byon and Cho 2003; Lee 2003; Chang et al. 2001; Lee 1999; Yim 1999). Thus the increase of divorce, the decrease of marriage, the increase of the singles, the increase of late marriages, and the decrease of the birth rate, are considered as a matter of individual’s choice, and even the homosexual family is recognized in this perspective. This is a perspective of feminists or pluralists who explore a new family order going beyond patriarchy, positively accepting the increase of individuals’ choice.

However, neither of these perspectives focuses on the gap between the family type and family norm. They also cannot explain the macroscopic meaning contained in the recent family change. Of crucial significance in this regard is research on family values (Eun 2006; Eo 1997) and the effect of socioeconomic changes on these values (Park. 2003). Combining the concepts of compressed modernity and risk society, Chang (Chang 2009; Chang and Song 2010) considers the recent phenomenon of delaying marriage and low birth rates as risk-evasive individualization. His argument is that in this state of compressed modernity, the family, which used to be the welfare foundation for individual, has lost its functions as welfare resource or buffer zone, and that the family members have no choice but to be unleashed from the family and rely on one’s own efforts and ability, even though they are not equipped with strong individualism as in the West. Thus he calls the individualization in Korea “individualization without individualism” (Chang and Song 2010). This is a very important observation.

However, Chang’s discussion focuses mainly on the disembedding process of individualization, not on the reembedding process. In other words, he pays far more attention to the push factor than pull factor. Individualization referred to by “a variety of families’ discourse above shows the consequences of adaptation to the changing reality of the neoliberal global economy. Adaptation differs from normative value. The “family disorganization” discourse reflects the breakdown of family norms taken for granted in the past. These two contrasting perspectives, though significant in many respects, fall short of grasping the reembedding process of individualization.

In this context we have attempted to deal with the reembedding process of individualization by paying attention to women marriage migrants (Shim and Han 2010). We have examined this because it shows *both* individualizing *and* family-oriented tendencies. More specifically, women marriage migrants are individualistic in the sense that they pursue their own course even taking the risk of being separated from their family, as a determined challenge to the survival uncertainty their family faces. They are “individualistic” because they came all the way from their home despite the various anticipated difficulties. On the other hand, they are also very family-oriented, that is, “familial,” because they came for better living conditions of the family, and, with family responsibility, do their best for their new family and endure the difficulties for their families in the home country (Shim and Han 2010). This individualization was called “family-oriented individualization.” Perhaps, a similar example is the so-called “wild goose families” (Lee and Koo 2006) frequently found in Korea. This case also illustrates well both individualization and family-oriented networks, not simply in a traditional way, but innovatively. This pattern of transformation is distinctive to Korea.

Another effort to integrate both the disembedding and reembedding process of individualization is seen in Han (2007). In a recent work on the so-called the “386 generation,” that is, the postconventional generation, Han (2007) argued that the salient characteristics of individualization and the relationship between individuals and

community in Korea can be described as “postconventional networking individualization.” The term *postconventional* has specific implications for the process of disembedding as well as reembedding. To be more specific, postconventional means that one breaks away from the taken-for-granted authority, taboo, and customs, on the one hand, and reactivate flexible networks as a shared way of life, on the other. With this concept he argued that we can cover both individualization as a structural transformation and strengthening of networks including the family solidarity in an innovative way. Thus he tried to present how individualization and strengthening of the family network solidarity can go well along in Korea from the perspective of “the postconventional networking individualization” as an ideal type.

In order to grasp these two salient modes of individualization we want to pay attention to two constitutive factors of individualization, that is, the subjective factor and value orientation. The former is whether one’s way of thinking is traditional or reflexive. The latter is whether the action is oriented toward collective interests or self-interests. Thus a typology made of these two dimensions will be useful in tracing not only the change of traditional versus reflexive ways of thinking/acting but also the change of the orientation toward collective interests versus self-interests. By crossing these two dimensions of individualization as two main axes, we constructed the following four types of individualization.

Table 2 Type of individualization

		Value orientation	
		Collective interests	Self-interests
Mode of thinking	Traditional	A conventional types of collectivism	B family-oriented striving individualization
	Reflexive	C public-minded participatory individualization	D self-centered libertarian individualization

Type A is characterized by both strong collective interests and traditional way of thinking, thus it can be called “conventional types of collectivism.” This type can be typically found among those who consider collective interests to be more important than self-interest in a traditional way. Type B is characterized by traditional way of thinking (for example, family-oriented), but the Type B person tries to pursue self-interests for survival. The self-interests here can be interpreted as private interests. Thus it can be called “family-oriented striving individualization.” This type tends to be frequently found among those who strive hard to get out of poverty for the welfare of the family rather than an individual in question. The type we have called “family-oriented individualization” (Shim and Han 2010) can be classified as a category of this type. Type C is characterized by a reflexive way of thinking closely associated with the mode of action pursuing and advocating public interests. A typical example is civil movements based on individual decision to join through either online or off-line deliberation in order to pursue certain values of public significance. Thus it can be called “public-minded participatory individualization.” Han’s study on the so called the “386 generation,” or the postconventional generation, reveal this type of individualization (Han 2007). Type D is characterized by both a reflexive way of thinking and a pursuit of self-centered individualizing tastes and preferences. This type can be

typically found among the younger generations like the teenagers or those in their twenties. Libertarian individualization may develop fully when such conditions as cultural democracy, welfare state, and classical individualism are met (Baumann 2001; Beck 1992; Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2002).

According to a survey research on individualization (Han and Shim 2012), all the types above are found in Korea. And the distribution of these four types of individualization is as follows: the proportion of the type A, that is, conventional collective arrangement, is 41.9 percent; that of type B, that is, family-oriented striving individualization, is 29.9 percent; that of type C, that is, public-minded participatory individualization, is 15.5 percent; and that of type D, that is, self-centered libertarian individualization, is 12.7 percent. And the age distribution shows that while the proportion of type B is high among the age group over fifty, that of type C is high among the age group of thirties and forties, and type D is found among the younger age group between ten years of age and into the twenties (Han and Shim 2012). Han's research (2007) shows the prevalence of type C among the thirties through forties age group, even though there are some variations in them. Shim's research (2012) shows the prevalence of type B among elderly people, even though there are some variations in them. In the following we will discuss Shim's research as an example of data resisting Western theory of individualization.

“Striving Individualization” among Korean Elderly Women

Shim (2012) conducted research based on in-depth interviews to seventeen elderly women to explore the types of individualization among elderly women in Korea. The people of this study underwent “family-oriented striving individualization” while trying to overcome the risks of poverty and family conflict they encountered. This type of individualization is characterized by traditional way of thinking but oriented to self-interests (not public-minded). The people interviewed for this study can be divided into two subtypes according to the risks they had encountered: the “poverty overcoming type” and the “family conflict overcoming type.” The risk for each subtype was material risk and relational risk respectively.

These findings show that the individualization of elderly Korean women is different from the libertarian self-centered individualization of the West (type D) in that it is oriented toward the family network.

More specifically, the “striving individualization” can be found in the interviewees' life stories. Among the seventeen interviewees, six cases can be classified as “poverty overcoming type.” They suffered from extreme poverty during their childhood, thus they did not have enough to eat and could not go to school. Thus more than half of them left the parents and home and came to Seoul during their teen ages, either with or without telling their parents, like many rural young girls who left villages to make money in Seoul. In Seoul, they made all their efforts to make their own living and to succeed, working as house-maids, factory workers, or as peddlers, even though they encountered various difficulties. When they reached marriage age, many of them managed to find spouses without the help of their parents, at a time when most of the marriages were arranged by the family. Most of them met a husband who either was very poor, an orphan, or in a similar situation. After marriage they made all their efforts together with their husband, performing all kinds of low-paying dirty works “in order not to pass down poverty to their children.” Now they are better off materially, thanks not only to their industrious effort but also and mainly to the economic development of the country as a whole. They often go to the welfare

center for the elderly to attend various educational courses and to enjoy life with new friends.

As can be seen in the foregoing stories, the social constraints these “poverty-overcoming types” were unleashed from are the hometown and the parents whom they left when they were young. Thus they managed to find spouses without the help of their parents. And most of them made efforts together with their husbands with a strong determination to overcome poverty and not to pass down poverty to their children.

On the other hand, the life stories of another six interviewees of “the family conflict overcoming types” were different. Most of them grew up in well-to-do families, did not suffer from poverty, and received good educations. When they got married, most of them followed their parents’ opinions. They left their parents with the marriage. After marriage, most of them suffered from living with the in-laws, from a patriarchal husband who is violent and/or who has an affair with another woman, or a husband with no love. Most of them lived a life for others, for in-laws, husband, and/or children. Even though they suffered from the family conflict, they endured the husband’s abuses due to various circumstances such as economic dependence, their parents, and children. As the relationship with the husband did not change even as time passed, many of them wanted to have a divorce but went only as far as “domestic divorce,”³ and only two ended up in a divorce. As for those who had a divorce, they got a divorce with the support of grown-up children, not with one’s own decision alone. Even though they had a divorce with the husband, they maintained their relationship with the children and families. Now they go to the welfare center for the elderly to take courses and to enjoy life with new friends.

As can be seen in these life stories, the social constraints these “family conflict overcoming types” were unleashed from are the family, that is, the husband and the in-laws. However, their unleashing is rather late compared with the poverty overcoming type. Also their unleashing is rather limited in that most of them stayed in “domestic divorce.” This can be called individualization, because they tried to get out of the existing settings of relationship, or standard biography and dreamed of a life of one’s own.⁴

When we analyze the disembedding and reembedding process of individualization, we can see the characteristics of the individualization of Korean elderly women more clearly (Shim, 2012). The factors that influence the individualization turned out to be different according to the different subtypes. The women interviewees in the “poverty overcoming type” were forced to leave their home and parents due to poverty, and they were eager to get out of poverty and discrimination. The emergence of new job opportunities pulled them to the cities; they had aspirations to learn, to make money and succeed for the family. Thus the risks or structural-objective push factors were the Korean War, the poverty of the time, and discrimination against daughters, while the cultural-discursive push factors were aspirations to get out of poverty and discrimination. And their structural pull factors were industrialization, urbanization, and the emergence of new job opportunities in the cities, while their cultural pull factors were aspiration to learn, to make money, and succeed.

Many of the women interviewees in the “family conflict overcoming type” suffered from living with in-

³ “Domestic divorce” became a buzzword after the publication of a novel *Domestic Divorce* (1985) by Ayashi Yigyū in Japan. This novel described the collapse of a couple and family relationship. Domestic divorce refers to a situation when a couple lives together and maintains the husband-wife relationship on the surface while the husband-wife relationship has in fact broken down. A couple in this state lives together in the same house, but eats and sleeps separately and does not talk to each other. The reason why people choose a “domestic divorce” is because they cannot separate due to economic reason, children, social stigma, even though they want a divorce (Yamada 2010: 30)

⁴ Some might question whether “domestic divorce” can be considered individualization. However, it can be considered so, because it involves a couple living together in the same house, but eating and sleeping separately and not talking to each other. This can be considered as an unleashing from the husband even though they cannot separate due to economic reason, children, and social stigma.

laws and from violence and extramarital affairs of the husband. However, they endured it for a long time for their parents and children and also because of social stigma and economic dependence. Now they went out to the welfare centers to learn and to make new friends. They expressed and acted out their feelings only when they got old and when social changes such as emergence of diverse families and new welfare facilities occurred. The new opportunity and circumstances probably helped them think and decide for a life of one's own. But most of them did not get divorced, but stayed in "domestic divorce." Thus the structural push factors were stubborn patriarchy such as living with in-laws, violence, and extramarital affairs of husband, while the cultural push factors were cumulated distrust and disillusionment against the husband and in-laws. And the structural pull factors were the second modern transformation such as emergence of diverse families and change of household generation composition and emergence of new welfare facilities, while the cultural pull factors such as classical individualism were hard to find, almost nonexistent.

Despite the differences between these two types, they share a common theme that they strived hard in their life and they did it for their families. And this common theme can be called "family-oriented striving individualization."

Concluding Remark

The above discussion shows that the characteristics of the individualization of Korean elderly women are different from that of the West. They are different in three aspects (Shim, 2012). First, the risks or structural push factors are complex in that they are not only from the radicalization of the modernity but also from deficiency of modernity, that is, the mixture of the first and second modernity (Han and Shim 2010). Second, the pull factors are also complex in that the structural ones are there, but cultural ones are almost nonexistent. That is, no classical individualism is found among Korean cases as in the West. Third, in terms of the relationship between the individual and the community, the cases show a strong family-orientation even though the targets are varied, with many of them oriented toward their children, some toward their husbands, and others toward their parents. Even though they have made new friends at the welfare centers, which can be considered to have characteristics of the second modernity, the family-relationship is central to them. Even in the cases where their relationship with their husband is not good, most of them do not leave the family, but remain in it, living in the state of "domestic divorce." The individualization of Korean elderly women is different from the self-centered libertarian individualization of the Western societies in these senses. In this sense it can be said that the Western theory of individualization has difficulty in explaining individualization in Korea and that a new theory better fitting to East Asian situation is needed to explain it.

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Grammar of Confucian Publicness and its Democratic Implications: Dialectic of Confucian Enlightenment and the Paradox of Freedom

Park, Young-do

Institute of Korean Studies Yonsei University

Recently, the negative effects of neo-liberal globalization and the so-called “peaceful rise” of the People’s Republic of China are prompting multi-pronged discussions about the relationship between democracy and Confucianism¹. This paper considers some democratic implications inherent in the grammar of Confucian publicness. Here, Confucianism denotes Neo-Confucianism, a philosophy that was developed during the Sung Dynasty and later served as the political and cultural foundation of the Joseon Dynasty. There are several reasons for centering the discussion of Confucianism and democracy in the grammar of publicness. .

Firstly, one of the major challenges to democracy today is the current crisis in publicness. Social publicness is being eroded by neo-liberal globalization, resulting in extreme economic inequalities and a serious curtailment of substantive democracy. Attempts to resolve these problems simply by bolstering state publicness(國家的 公共性) seem to have forgotten the lesson taught by the failure of actual socialism. Securing democratic publicness is a task we must now grapple with, remaining mindful of both past historical failures and the failures presently unfolding before our eyes. It is in this context that the relationship between Confucianism and democracy must be discussed.

Secondly, when treating the relationship between Confucianism and democracy, two points of view may be distinguished, i.e., that of “more democracy” and “less democracy.” The less-democratic perspective seeks to overcome the flaws of Western liberalism simply through a Confucian-communitarian ethics or through elitism² which crush democracy. But the aforementioned crisis in publicness calls for “more democracy.” Embarking from this perspective, this paper reviews how democratic implications in Confucian publicness may be conceptualized and reconstructed.

Thirdly, a tendency exists when speaking of the relationship between Confucianism and democracy to assume that Confucianism requires no critical reconstruction to overcome the flaws of Western liberal democracy.³ But I hold that it will be difficult to directly challenge these flaws without first critically reconstructing Confucianism. What kind of critical reconstruction is required? Answering this question will be the important task of this paper. Owing to the trauma encountered in the course of modernization through the

¹ Baogang He, “Four Models of The Relationship Between Confucianism and Democracy”, in *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 37:1, 2010, 18-33.

² Representative examples include Daniel A. Bell, *Beyond Liberal Democracy: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context*, Princeton University Press, 2006. Jiang Qing, *A Confucian Constitutional Order*, (ed. by Daniel A. Bell, Ruiping Fan) Princeton University Press, 2013.

³ A representative example is Jiang Qing’s views on a Confucian Constitutional Order, Jiang Qing, 2013, p. 27-98.

shock from the West, two typical pathologies emerged in attitudes toward Confucianism in East Asian societies where Confucian ideology held sway; namely, Confucius is necessary to the survival of the country and Confucius is detrimental to that survival. The critical reconstruction of the grammar of Confucian publicness would be a way to overcome these contrary pathological attitudes.

The task of this reconstruction is, however, not about producing new historical information about Confucian publicness, but explaining its grammar and identifying potentials implied in that grammar. To uncover present-day implications of Confucian publicness with respect to the task of democracy in our day, I believe it is not historical facts themselves, but grammatical potentials within them --facts that have not been properly recognized or realized--that must be underscored.

From this standpoint, I will 1) present the grammar of Confucian publicness in relation to the ideals of Neo-Confucian enlightenment politics, and 2) briefly point out the democratic implications of that grammar in relation to the current crisis in publicness. Realizing these implications in the contemporary context requires a critical reconstruction of the grammar, and so I will 3) critique the association of Confucian public deliberation with elitism, and 4) review means to critically reconstruct the Neo-Confucian concepts of reason(理). And I will propose 5) that this critical reconstruction can be understood as the Confucian dialectic of enlightenment, and finally 6) explicate the significance of this dialectic in connection with the paradoxes of freedom we now face.

1) Confucian enlightenment politics and the grammar of Confucian publicness

The grammar of Confucian publicness discussed in this paper was developed in the Sung Dynasty as the essential project of Confucian enlightenment politics. The latter emerged as a synthesis of Neo-Confucian enlightenment and the traditional political concept of *Minbon* (民本). The basic character of this politics may be found in the shift from the Mandate of Heaven(天命) to the Heavenly Principle (天理), which illustrated in the Neo-Confucian interpretation of the first sentence of *The Doctrine of the Mean* : “The Mandate of Heaven is called Human Nature”(天命之謂性). The Mandate of Heaven was the principle for legitimizing and criticizing political authority in China from the time of the Zhou Dynasty. But the receiver of the Mandate was the King, and there was no real separation between political power and its justifying principle. But Sung Neo-Confucianism expanded the Mandate addressee, extending it not only to the throne but to all human beings. The Neo-Confucian interpretation of the proposition “The Mandate of Heaven is called Human Nature” sums up this change. The legitimizing principle no longer lay in a Mandate of Heaven bestowed upon the dynastic founder and passed down through the royal line, but was located in every human mind as a moral potential. Political power and moral principle were now distinct entities. At the same time, a Confucian enlightenment politics was deployed that sought to realize the moral potential of the Heavenly Principle(天理) separated from political power.⁴

Put negatively, the task of this enlightenment politics was to limit the arbitrariness of the supreme power

⁴ Park, Young-do, “The Paradox of Sovereignty and Confucian publicness”, in *A Critical Restructuring of East Asian publicness*, Collected Papers of the 24th Social Humanities Forum of the Institute for Korean Studies at Yonsei University, 2012, 5, 29. Peter. K. Bol, *Neo-Confucianism in History*, Harvard Univ. Press, 2008.

with the help of the Heavenly Principle. The central problem in Confucian politics after the Qin Dynasty, which was characterized by the merging of Confucianism and Legalism(儒法結合), was how to control the arbitrariness at the center of the state publicness organized by law.⁵ The answer of Neo-Confucian politics to this question, a question concerning a kind of Confucian Constitutional Order, was “publicness of the Heavenly Principle”

Neo-Confucian politics also had the positive task of realizing the moral potential extended equally to all human beings by the Heavenly Principle; in other words, to implement the “publicness of the Heavenly Principle” socio-politically. This task was integrated with Confucian *Minbon* politics which read the heavenly mind in people’s mind, and Confucian enlightenment politics emerged as the form of politics that sought to realize the publicness of the Heavenly Principle within two dimensions of the people, popular livelihood (民生) and popular opinion(民意).

The publicness that emerged from the realization of the Heavenly Principle within the dimension of popular livelihood was based on the political ideal that “the world belongs to the public”(天下爲公), an ideal which sought to realize the Great Harmony(大同). This publicness, combining with Confucius’ notion of justice(均平思想), which was more concerned about unevenness than about insufficiency, may be termed ‘publicness of *Minbon*’(民本的 公共性). The keystone of this publicness (‘socio-economical publicness’ in current terms) is the guarantee of material and symbolic conditions for realizing the potentials of the moral life the Heavenly Principle accords equally to all human beings.

How to realize this task? Answering this question, Confucian politics invented a Confucian deliberative politics(公論政治), which had the task of justifying and criticizing political authority based on a rational core of public opinion that was discovered through public deliberation. I will call the publicness derived from this deliberative politics ‘deliberative publicness’(熟議的 公共性). Publicness of the Heavenly Principle restricts the arbitrariness internal to state publicness by means of the dual mechanisms of *Minbon* publicness and deliberative publicness. This is the grammar of Confucian publicness.(Figure 1).

⁵ This “publicness of the Heavenly Principle” is a Confucian method for resolving the paradox of sovereignty. On the relationship of the paradox of sovereignty and Confucian politics, see Young-Do Park, “King Sejong’s Confucian Rule by Law”, in *Review of Korean Studies*, Vol.9, No. 3 (September, 2006), pp. 103-132, esp. pp. 105-110. Kim Sangjun, *Sweat of Mengzi, Blood of the Divine Kings* [Maengja eui ddam, seongwang eui pi], 2011. Arcanet, Seoul, pp. 123-171.




Figure 1) The grammar of Confucian publicness

2) Democratic implications of the grammar of Confucian publicness

Nowhere is the relationship between Confucianism and democracy revealed as clearly as in this grammar of publicness. The grammar was hindered by the limitations of the premodern social status order, but it possesses important implications for the problems in democracy we face in our time. At present, we require “more democracy” in two dimensions: First, neo-liberal globalization has deepened social inequalities throughout the world. “More democracy” is needed to resolve these issues. The Confucian publicness of *Minbon* thus may be seen in correspondence with the democratic task today. Secondly, something what must not be forgotten when pursuing this publicness of *Minbon* is the lesson taught by the historical failure of actual socialism: namely, the paradox that a project to establish the publicness of *Minbon* may serve to diminish democracy rather than enhance it. The expansion of state power required to pursue democratic publicness, when not democratically controlled, may lead, ironically, to a diminishing or effacing of democracy. This structural irony must not be lost sight of.⁶ To ensure it will not be, the pursuit of the publicness of *Minbon* must proceed in tandem with augmented democratic control over bureaucratic publicness. Augmented democratic control over political power requires the activation of civil society and democratic spaces for expressing public opinion. This second

⁶ This irony explains the dynamic nature and history of modern democracy. See Park Young-do, *Dialectic of Critique* [Bipan eui byeonjeungbeop], Saemulgyeol, Seoul, 2011.

dimension for “more democracy” is realized through the expansion of “deliberative publicness”.

Thus the democratic task we face today may be expressed in the language and grammar of “Confucian publicness”. Bureaucratic activities of state promoting the task of the publicness of *Minbon* must be regulated through deliberative publicness.

Stated in modern terms, resisting the anti-democratic power cycles in which the market controls the state and the state controls civil society, democratic power cycles must be established in which civil society regulates the state and the state regulates the market.⁷

Deliberative publicness without the publicness of *Minbon*, or the obverse, will put democracy at risk. Thus the democratic task of our time lies in the establishment of a **deliberative publicness of *Minbon*** (熟議的 民本公共性). Compared with Confucian publicness of the traditional society, this task discloses many differences in its historical contents, but nevertheless shows the same structure in terms of grammar. It thus could be said that the grammar of Confucian publicness might provide us with a normative direction and language applicable to democracy today. That is to say, we might find the democratic task of our time in the pursuit of **the principle of deliberative *Minbon***(熟議的 民本性), the core of the grammar of Confucian publicness, under the present-day social conditions. Such is the basic democratic implication of Confucian publicness this paper wishes to emphasize, couched not in its historical contents but in its grammar.

However, these democratic implications could not be automatically realized given the proper conditions alone. The grammar of Confucian publicness must first be critically reconstructed. The implications will gain feasibility only through this reconstruction. How to transform their potential so they may be implemented in reality?

3) Public deliberation, elitism, democracy:

from elitist/authoritarian deliberation to democratic deliberation

I think that the key to this transformation rests in a shift from Confucian deliberative *Minbon* to a democratic deliberative *Minbon*, or, more narrowly speaking, **from Confucian deliberation to democratic deliberation**. To explore possible conditions for this shift, let us proceed from the concept of *Gong-non*(公論), which refers to both the process of Confucian public deliberation and its result, public opinion.

The task of Confucian politics is to realize the “publicness of the Heavenly Principle” in society. But a very weighty situation of a fundamental nature exists which renders this task virtually impossible. The Heavenly Principle, which should be realized through Confucian politics, remains unspoken. And the popular mind(民心), the only possible medium for its expression, is precarious. This situation necessitates a ‘mean’(中) be adopted between the unsaid “Heavenly Principle” and the precarious popular opinion; thus *Jungyong*(中庸) emerged not only as the fundamental ethical principle but also as the fundamental requirement and principle for Confucian enlightenment politics. In other words, the principle of *Jungyong* emerged as a political-moral principle which

⁷ This is congruous with the Habermas’ project for democracy shown in his tripartite division of society. See J. Habermas, *Faktizität und Geltung, Shurkamp*, 1992, pp. 208-237; Park, Young-do, *Dialectic of Critique* [Bipan eui byeonjeunbeop], Saemulgyeol, Seoul, 2011, pp. 581-584.

made Confucian enlightenment politics possible under that weighty situation threatening to obstruct it. The success or failure of this politics depends on this principle, meaning that a Confucian enlightenment politics is fundamentally a politics of the *Jungyong*. But how to adopt the ‘mean’?

For neo-Confucian politics, the answer to this question is *Gongnon*(公論). Here, adopting the ‘mean’ does not mean simply taking a middle position. It means discerning the rational core contained in the precarious opinion and will of the public. Such is achieved through public deliberation. As the rational core both of the public deliberation and its result, *Gongnon* is a mechanism for politically realizing the principles and requirements of *Jungyong*. This is also evident in Zhu Xi’s definition of *Gongnon*, namely, “that which follows the Heavenly Principle, accords with the people’s mind, and is held as true by all.”⁸ The task of Confucian deliberative politics was to discern the Heavenly Principle, the rational core of popular will and opinion, and realize it in society. In this sense, the shift from Confucian publicness to democratic publicness is equivalent to the democratic transformation of Confucian deliberative politics.

However, effecting this transformation requires a critical reconstruction of the concept of Confucian deliberation. First and foremost to be criticized is the authoritarianism and elitism of Confucian deliberation. Elitism did not simply fade away like an historical artifact with the passing of the old social status order. Elitism not only survived under modern conditions, but was in some cases strengthened. This is shown in certain totalitarian experiences such as the disintegration of spontaneous discussions among citizens into forcibly mobilized pseudo-debates. And we can also find the threat of authoritarianism in recent trends seeking to overcome deficiencies of liberal democracy through Confucian meritocracy(賢良政治)⁹

Confucian meritocracy does not deny the equal potential of all human beings to be moral. Rather, it points to differences in individual ability to realize that equal potential, and advocates a guardian-type elitism which allows men of superior talent to make decisions for others. Here, these differences do not serve as a catalyst for reforms seeking to bridge those differences, but instead as a basis for justifying elite rule that exacerbates and reproduces those differences. Typically, elitism infringes on equality as a value, and furthermore, Confucianism, with its strong communitarian character, tends to compromise freedoms. In that sense, Confucian meritocracy threatens to violate both freedom and equality.

Of course, it is true that the complexity of modern society demands a meritocracy to effectively carry out the tasks of the publicness of *Minbon*. But if no mechanism were established to democratically control that meritocracy, public deliberation would be monopolized by the elites. Even if deliberation were extended to the common people, without democratic controls, it would be allowed only within the restraints of the guardian power. Based in the disruption and infringement of deliberative publicness, the meritocracy would become stained with authoritarianism and power-based corruption, ultimately leading to the destruction of the publicness of *Minbon* rather than its enhancement.

This relationship between public deliberation and elitism appears not only in strongly communitarian traditions like Confucianism, but also in liberalism and socialism to various degrees. All these have something in common; namely, public deliberation as mechanism for governance by reason proves incompatible with the democratic ideal of self-governance by the people. Confucian meritocracy proceeds from a disbelief in rational

⁸ “順天理 合人心 而天下之所同是者”, [朱子大全], 卷 24. <與陳侍郎書>.

⁹ See note 1).

self-governance by the people, and so reduces public deliberation to a mechanism for elite rule and severs it from popular sovereignty. In socialist tradition, popular sovereignty was consonant with the ideal of governance by reason. But this historical philosophical reason avoids public deliberation by the people. Furthermore, public deliberation carried no real guarantee of private autonomy, and so was used to mobilize and control via state power rather than flourish as an expression of political autonomy. Lastly, even in John Rawls' political liberalism which closely links public deliberation with the democratic ideal, public deliberation tends to function more to assure the individual's private autonomy than the people's political autonomy.¹⁰ Only when public deliberation, which simultaneously guarantees both types of autonomy, is combined with the ideal of self-governance by the people, can democratic implications existing in all public deliberation, including the Confucian, be realized.

4) The necessity for a critical reconstruction of the Neo-Confucian concept of reason

From the perspective of "more democracy", the shift from Confucian publicness to democratic publicness will require a severing of public deliberation from elitism and a convergence with the ideal of popular sovereignty. To this end, the first task is a critical reconstruction of the Heavenly Principle, the core ideal of Neo-Confucianism. In section 2), I said that the shift to Neo-Confucian enlightenment politics was characterized by a movement from the Mandate of Heaven to the Heavenly Principle. Effecting a shift from Confucian politics to democratic politics now requires a critical reconstruction of the ideal of the Heavenly Principle. But to deal fully with this reconstruction would require a separate treatise, and such is not the purpose of the present one. Here I limit myself to showing the necessity and possible paths of reconstructing the Heavenly Principle in the context of the democratic transformation of the grammar of Confucian publicness.¹¹

One of the most important reasons why such a reconstruction is necessary is that as long as reason is understood as substantial-metaphysical (as the Heavenly Principle was), the rule of reason will negate human autonomy. When public deliberation is regulated by a reason that does not permit human autonomy, it will serve merely as a mechanism for domination by power elites rather than for self-governance by the people. As long as reason is not an expression of human autonomy, human alienation may result, even in a kingdom of reason. To prevent this alienation, the law making up political community must have a dual character. The law, while it must be followed, **at the same time** must be understood as an expression and product of human autonomy. To this dual character of the law corresponds the **dual status of citizen** of that community as addressee and authors of the law. If the people are not the authors of the law, then the law cannot be the expression of human autonomy. As long as this duality is not achieved, the basic ideals of democracy cannot be realized. That the addressee of the law must at the same time be its authors is a basic insight of democracy. If individuals or particular groups of people are deprived of legal authorship, they exist only as an object of the law: they are not sovereign citizens but merely objects of a capricious guardianship. Structurally, their freedoms are at risk of being stripped away. This basic insight of democracy applies equally to the law of reason. Only then can an

¹⁰ See J. Habermas, *Die Einbeziehung des Anderen*, Suhrkamp, 1996, pp. 65-94.

¹¹ On the character of the ideal of the "Heavenly Principle", its problems, and the general nature of its critical reconstruction, see Park, Young-do, "Reconstructing Confucian Rationality" *Seongnihakjeok yiseong eui jaeguseong*, *Jeongshin munhwa yeongu*, vol. 24, no. 1 (Spring, 2001) pp.141-178.

internal connection be formed between reason and self-governance by the people.¹²

This means that public deliberation as the locus of self-governance by the people must be the locus of reason. It also means that the rules of reason must be reconstructed from the process of public deliberation. The rules of reason reconstructed from the inevitable premises of public deliberation possess a dual character, as mentioned above. Those rules must be followed universally, as long as they cannot be negated without self-contradiction in the process of public deliberation. But they are also the product of **our** rational reconstruction, and in this sense they are the expression of our autonomy. When the rules of reason take on this dual character, then public deliberation as a locus of reason can maintain a democratic structure, and then public deliberation as a mechanism for rational governance can establish an internal connection with the ideal of popular sovereignty.

Another condition for the formation of connectivity between rational governance, public deliberation and popular sovereignty stipulates that the “monologue” structure of reason must give way to an intersubjective structure. In fact, this requirement is one of the implications of the idea that public deliberation is the locus of reason. Here the intersubjective structure of reason means that the kingdom of reason is a space in which rights are **reciprocally acknowledged and permitted** by its members. Only when the laws of a community are formed by institutionalizing this kind of rights, can they be expressions of autonomy shared equally by all members.¹³

Furthermore, inherent in the intersubjective structure of reason is a normative demand that all members of the kingdom of reason respect one another equally as rational human beings. This means that all human beings, as rational beings, must enjoy equal opportunities for participating in public deliberation. Here public deliberation is not merely a tool or mechanism for better decision-making, but a space in which the **autonomy of all members is equally revealed and realized**.

We see here the contrast from Confucian meritocracy. As mentioned earlier, in Confucian meritocracy, differences in ability to realize equal rational-moral potential function as a rationale for justifying the power elite. But according to the normative demand of intersubjective reason reconstructed from public deliberation, differences in ability to realize rational potential are perceived as defects that need to be remedied by means of more equality. They operate as a basis for encouraging social transformation for more democracy.

5) Dialectic of Confucian enlightenment and its two paths

So far, I have pointed to the necessity of critically reconstructing the concept of Neo-Confucian reason. Without such a reconstruction, it would be difficult for Confucian deliberation to meet the present need for “more democracy”. But can the path to this critical reconstruction be supported by Confucian thought? I believe it is possible. Let us see how.

The first point to be made in this regard is that the path to the critical reconstruction proposed in this paper is not so much an actual historical path as it is a critical-rational reconstruction of a potential path latent in

¹² A representative case is found in Jiang Qing, 2012, p. 27-98.

¹³ In contrast, if reason is understood within a subject-object model, the status of “author of the rational laws” has a tendency to become subsumed under the status of “object of the rational laws”. And avoiding this subsumption compels us to appeal to the ‘other’ of reason. To overcome this dilemma requires that reason be understood not through a “monologue” model but within an intersubjective model. See, J. Habermas, *Der Philosophische Diskurs der Moderne*, Suhrkamp, 1985.

Confucian enlightenment politics. I think the possible shift from Confucian deliberation to democratic deliberation through such a critical reconstruction can be understood as a dialectic of Confucian enlightenment. This dialectic refers to the entire process in which the Heavenly Principle (in the course of its realization in society) encounters social practice, whereby the Principle is pressured to change, and the reconstructed concept of reason once again sets in motion politics of enlightenment.

This dialectic can be called Confucian because it stems from the very idea of Confucian enlightenment politics. As already pointed out, this politics saw as its task the social realization of the publicness of the Heavenly Principle. In relation to this task, the Heavenly Principle encounters social practice, and from this meeting emerges a dialectic of enlightenment that occasions a transformation of the Heavenly Principle itself. It is in this respect that the dialectic can be said to stem from Confucian enlightenment politics.

The second reason can be found in Confucius' own proposition. The Master said, 'It is the person who is able to broaden the Way, not the Way that broadens the person.'¹⁴ This means that the Way we all are obliged to follow should also be understood as the product of our autonomy. If humans are to broaden the Way, the Way must be located in human practice, not outside of it. Only when the Way can be broadened through human practice can it be understood as an expression of human autonomy. The stipulation that the Way be located within human practice also coincides with the task of Confucian enlightenment politics pushing for realization of the Heavenly Principle within the *loci* of popular opinion and popular livelihood. Therefore, if in the context of reconstruction of Confucian deliberation, reason is now located not in a transcendent heaven but in the social practice of human beings, i.e., public deliberation, then this reconstruction is faithful to Confucius' conception of the Way and the demands of Confucian enlightenment politics.

However, the path of public deliberation is not the only path through which the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment is to be deployed. There is another path, an historically more evident one.¹⁵ This is a reconstruction of the Heavenly Principle, commencing in the realm of material life in connection with the publicness of *Minbon*. Historically, the first clear emergence of this path was in the late Ming and early Qing with the affirmation of the private(私), coming to fruition in Daijin's concept of Humanity (*ren*, 仁). Daijin(戴震) said, "When in fulfilling one's own life, one also fulfills the lives of others, this is Humanity. If in fulfilling one's own life, one harms the lives of others, this is Inhumanity(不仁)."¹⁶ Humanity, understood by Neo-Confucianism as the principle of cosmological communication --that is, the sameness of things and self(物我一體) -- within the framework of a human/cosmos, was re-interpreted by Daijin as a principle for social practice.

Humanity as originally conceived by Confucius can be understood as a principle of social communication. But Neo-Confucianism grappled with the task of securing a principle of publicness which could not be provided

¹⁴ "子曰 人能弘道 費道弘人". [論語], 15, 28.

¹⁵ Viewed more broadly, a third path, the ecological path can be added to the discursive path of public deliberation and the materialistic path of material production which are discussed in this paper. Regarding this third path, see Park, Young-do, "Risk Society and the Grammar of Confucian publicness", *Can Confucianism provide answers to today's problems?* (Gangjin Institut of Dasan Shilhak) Collected papers from Academic Conference no. 12,, September 1-2, 2013). But life activities are not proper to the realm of social practice, and the life process, rather than actively promoting the dialectic, operates as a reaction to social labor and public deliberation. In this respect, the ecological path differs from the other two paths.

¹⁶ "欲遂其生 亦遂人之生 仁也. 欲遂其生 至於戕人之生而不顧者 不仁也", Daijin(戴震), [孟子字義疏證], Hongikchulpansa, Seoul. 1998, p. 218.

by the Buddhist metaphysical concept of “emptiness”(空).¹⁷ To this end, based in the human/cosmos model, Sung Neo-Confucianism revolutionized the traditional theory of “unity of heaven and man”(天人合一), and transformed Humanity as the principle of social communication into the principle of cosmological communication, i.e, the Heavenly Principle. But this reconstruction was undertaken at a price: the reduction or elimination of the social dimension. The social dimension bridging humanity and nature was eliminated, and the eliminated social dimension was instead projected onto Nature, resulting in a dualization of Nature and the emergence of the human/cosmos framework.¹⁸ The concept of Humanity, long projected onto the Heavenly Principle within a cosmological paradigm, had its social dimension restored with the advent of Daijin. It is easy to see how this concept of Humanity, reconstructed in the context of publicness of *Minbon*, could be developed into socialist projects in China. In short, the critical reconstruction of the Heavenly Principle was effected through a dialectic of Confucian enlightenment, based in social practice(in this case, social labor) and internally coupled with the task of realizing publicness of *Minbon*. But as the failure of ‘actual socialism’ shows, this path of the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment by itself is found wanting as a solution to the crisis in democracy today. What about, then, the path of public deliberation?

In this path, the Heavenly Principle encounters public deliberation in the dimension of public opinion(民意). Different from the material path which proceeds from publicness of *Minbon*, this discursive path did not appear (nor was it perceived) with any clarity in premodern society. But in this potential path, too, we can find a grammatical possibility that the Heavenly Principle might come down to the dimension of social practice(here, public deliberation) and be reconstructed. *Gongnon* politics in the Korean dynasty of Joseon, although hindered by the limitations of the premodern social status order, was not limited simply to the narrow confines of state publicness. Rather, it cut across the boundaries of the state, and expanded and deepened to become a check on state publicness.¹⁹ This historical fact suggests that the grammatical potential exists (or at least may not be negated) for a dialectic of Confucian enlightenment to develop through the path of public deliberation. If this potential is actualized, the Heavenly Principle might be reconstructed as a discursive reason, inherent in linguistic communication and regulating public deliberation, and the realization of this reason, furthermore, might be presented as a new political task. In this regard, we may speak of the grammatical possibility of a shift from Confucian deliberative publicness to the democratic deliberative publicness discussed in section 4. And, in a sense, the Korean path to democracy may be construed as a delayed realization of this grammatical possibility.

Of course, the democratization achieved by Korea through this path is still highly vulnerable and insecure. Not only is its self-understanding not fully in conformity with the principle of democratic deliberation, but the deliberative publicness we have achieved is on the verge of collapse before the barrages of capital and state power. In this respect, the path of the dialectic wrought through deliberative publicness remains an unfinished project that must be earnestly pursued in response to the contemporary crisis in publicness.

¹⁷ Given the deconstructive character of the Buddhist concept of “emptiness” (gong), this task of Sung Neo-Confucianism similar to the task today to reconstruct the rational principle of publicness against the postmodern critique of reason. See Park Young-do, “Chu Xi’s Argumentation on Zhonghe and Thought on the Boundary.” (Jiheui eui junghwa nonbyeongwa gyeonggye eui sayu) Society and Philosophy (Sahoe wa cheolhak), No. 20, October 2010, pp. 127-154.

¹⁸ In the West, the social dimension was projected onto the human being, giving rise to the human/deity or the empirical/the transcendental duality. See Park Young-do, *Dialectic of Critique* [Bipan eui byeonjeunbeop], Saemulgyeol, Seoul, 2011.

¹⁹ On the Gongnon politics of Joseon Dynasty, see Gim Yongjik, “Korean politics and Gongnon politics” (Hanguk jeongchiwa gongnon jeongchi) *Gukje jeongchi nonchong*, Vol. 38, no. 3. Gim Yeongju, “Gongnon Politics in the Joseon Dynasty”(Joseon shidae gongnon yeongu), *Eollonhak yeongu*, Vol. 14 no.1 (2010. 2).

We have discussed two possible paths for a dialectic of Confucian enlightenment, paths for enacting a shift from Confucian publicness to democratic publicness. The crisis in publicness we face today speaks to the fact that publicness of *Minbon* cannot be divorced from deliberative publicness without giving rise to a crisis of democracy. If only one of the two paths is realized, democratic publicness will be placed at risk. To be fully realized, public deliberation, as a mechanism for rational governance, must not be a political mechanism simply “for the people” but also “by the people.” To establish publicness of *Minbon*, state activities must be democratically controlled through the deliberative publicness. Only then may the democratic implications inherent in the grammar of Confucian publicness, i.e., deliberative *Minbon*(熟議的 民本性), be soundly implemented.

6) Dialectic of Confucian enlightenment and the paradox of freedom

Finally, let us explicate the significance of this democratic deliberative *Minbon* in relation to the paradox of freedom that has fueled the history of modern democracy. Paradox of freedom here refers to the phenomenon in which a project for institutionally guaranteeing freedom results in freedom being stripped away and violated. The early modern political revolution of the bourgeoisie began as a project to legally institutionalize the freedom of the bourgeois class. The revolution met with success; but it also created a paradox in that it structurally infringed on the freedoms of women and laborers. Socialist movement sought to overcome this paradox. However, this socialist project for securing freedoms of proletariat also resulted in violating them, a kind of paradox of proletarian freedom. But the first paradox has not yet disappeared, rather, with neo-liberal globalization, it is becoming more and more acute. Thus today, we face the task of simultaneously resolving the paradoxes of freedom produced by both liberal and socialist project. What implications does democratic deliberative *Minbon* have for this task? Let us address this question in connection with two paths of the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment.

First of all, the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment through the path of publicness of *Minbon* is akin to the project of overcoming the paradox engendered by the political project of liberalism. This is easily understandable if we understand the path of socialist modernization in China as one in which the project of publicness of *Minbon* is being modernized. But this project, promoted as it is by a statist, meritocratic practice, brings about a new paradox of freedom. Currently, China’s project for publicness of *Minbon* is being promoted in connection with the market economy. Such could be a road to overcoming economic aspects of the failure of actual socialism, but it does not overcome the paradox of freedom that the socialist project brought about.

Overcoming this paradox requires that the project for promoting a state-centered publicness of *Minbon* must be regulated by deliberative publicness. This is the demand of the democratically-transformed grammar of Confucian publicness. But can the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment enacted through the path of deliberative publicness overcome the paradoxes of freedom we face today? In section 4 we discussed the dual status of rules and citizens in democratic community. Therein lies a clue to the answer we seek.

A community of free and equal individuals possesses a paradoxical task: the mediation between freedom and force. This is because the rules required for communal life must always be experienced as force by free individuals. To deal with this problem, modern society invented the principle of autonomy; that is, the principle

that being forced to comply with a rule one has created oneself is not force. From that the principle of democratic participation was drawn. Through this participation, the citizens are not merely the addressees of the law but also its authors. This is the basic spirit of modern democracy. Thus, if a particular group of people, having been unable to participate voluntarily in the creation of the rules governing their lives, exists merely as the object of rules created by an 'other', that group may be said to be stripped of its freedom. This is also why the history of modern democracy can be understood as a historical process of resolving the paradoxes of freedom.

In section 4, we explored the sense in which democratic deliberation has the potential to guarantee 1) the connection between reason and popular sovereignty, and 2) the dual status of communal rules and citizens. This means that democratic deliberation has the potential to resolve the paradox of freedom, insofar as the paradox of freedom denotes the alienation created when that dual status is not guaranteed. Of course, the potential of democratic deliberation to overcome this alienation cannot be fully realized until it is coupled with the project of publicness of *Minbon*. This is because the overcoming of material inequalities is a precondition for realizing the ideal of equal political autonomy contained in democratic deliberation. This also explains why, in order to overcome the two forms of paradox of freedom we face today, not only democratic deliberation is required, but also deliberative *Minbon* (熟議的 民本性). This means that to transcend today's paradox of freedom, the two paths of the dialectic of Confucian enlightenment must be combined. It is precisely here where we find the democratic implications inherent in the grammar of Confucian publicness.

Individualization and its Impact on Intermediate Groups in Japan: From the Perspective of Maruyama Masao

Masataka Muramatsu

Hokkaido University, Faculty of letters

1. Introduction

I'm very honored to speak here and discuss the problems of the liberalism and the individualism with you. I would like to express my special thanks to Professor Han San-Jing, who kindly organizes this session.

Because my major is western philosophy, I'm not accustomed to the sociological analysis. It means that I'm not able to give you the scientific data about the status of the intermediate groups in Japan, which is one of the subjects of my presentation. I would be very happy, though, if my presentation would give some ideas about the problems of intermediate groups in Japan.

Firstly, it is better to mention the prevailing opinions about intermediate groups in Japan. The number of those who point out the importance of intermediate groups, including traditional communities and voluntary associations, is raising day and day in Japan. They seem to think that intermediate groups can be one of most effective hindrances against the excessive individualization and privatization provoked by the prevailing economic liberalism. This demand comes partially from the Durkheimian idea that intermediate groups could prevent the mental problems or the suicides caused by the excessive isolation in giving mental solidarity to individuals. It also comes from the idea that intermediate groups are likely to activate local economies by bringing about the new economic commerce. We must not neglect the idea, advocated especially after the tragic earthquake on the 11th march 2011, that intermediate group is a key to reduce the damages caused by natural disasters.

This boom of "intermediate group" or "community" is also seen in the field of academism. Some translations of Robert Putnam's works and the boom of the word "social capital" or the vogue of Alexis de Tocqueville are closely related with this "popularity" of intermediate groups.

Of course, too much expectation to intermediate groups can be dangerous, if it will fortify the hierarchy of the Japanese social traditional system, or if it will force us, unconsciously, to totally integrated ourselves to these intermediate groups. But, the participation in activities of intermediate groups is, no doubt, very effective in preventing the excessive individualism and in activating discussions about the public affairs.

In this presentation I would like to try this issue by analyzing the ideal of political subject in the thought of Masao Maruyama, one of the most influential philosophers in the political science in the post-war Japan. My point is as follows:

The ideal of political subject in Maruyama's thought is composed by three elements. A) Subject who is interested in the public affairs in the state-level and can participate in public discussions. We call this subject "National Subject" B) Subject who can objectively reflect on oneself. We call this subject "Self-Objectivizing Subject". C) "associative individuals –those who are ready to associate themselves with their neighbors in order to attain various, not necessarily political, purposes"¹ We call this subject "Associative Subject"² I will emphasize on the importance of "Associative Subject" in order to realize the other two types of subject.

But before proceeding to this analysis, it is necessary to present you a brief sketch of the intermediate groups in Japan.

2. Some types of intermediate groups in Japan

If we follow Alexis de Tocqueville's analysis about the American democracy in 1830's, it goes without saying that the associations that cause us to participate in the public sphere and remind us of its importance are vital for the maintenance of a sound democratic society.

Tocqueville's argument leads me naturally to ask whether such types of associations, or in other words, ideal intermediate groups exist or not in Japan.

My answer is "no", or "almost no." To elaborate on this point, I must discuss some characteristics of Japanese intermediate groups.

In fact, some of you may object to my argument, saying that in modern Japan intermediate groups were, or are powerful enough to easily suppress individual autonomy. In Japan, in fact, cooperative bodies have a great significance in everyone's life. Here, I suppose that there are two kinds of intermediate groups that are very active in Japan, one composed of vast interest groups and the other, the local community or *Jichi-kai*.

The former, such as the Japan Business Federation (*Keidanren*) or the Japan Medical Association (*Nihon-Ishi-Kai*) have a great influence on policy making. It has often been said that Japanese policies are generally decided by the "Iron Triangle" comprising politicians in the Liberal Democratic Party (hereafter LDP), government officers, and major interest groups. These interest groups try to directly influence the policy making process in their interests through negotiation with bureaucratic officials or with LDP politicians. The bureaucrats arrange these interests, sometimes in opposition to one another, while considering the larger national interest and their own; namely, their authority and power. In this process, sometimes officials are able to consider a great deal of social issues via the demands of interest groups and to satisfy the majority of these groups. Because of this structure, it is often said that the state and the society are closely interpenetrated and distinguishing the two in Japan is nearly impossible. When the objective of the state was very clear, that is to say, when the main focus was on economic prosperity, this system ran so well that dissatisfaction did not often manifest itself, apart from exceptions such as the mass movement against the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan." Of course, many citizens could have little access to this decision-making process,

¹ Maruyama Masao, "Patterns of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme", in *Changing Japanese Attitudes Toward Modernization*, Princeton University Press, 1965, pp.494f

² This classification is based on the following article: Uno Shigeki, "Maruyama Masao ni okeru mittsuno syutai-zo" (Three idea of subject in Masao Maruyama", in Maruyama Masao Ron, University of Tokyo Press, 2003, pp.40-74)

but they were easily satisfied by the comfortable life enabled by its policies.

Robert Pekkanen resumes this structure as follows.

“In short, however, Japan’s political opportunity structure did not offer fertile ground for civil society groups attempting to organize for influence; an insulated bureaucracy and often uninterested politicians provided poor soil.”³

Of course, the existence of labor unions could sometimes influence policy-making, but only in the very limited sphere of social welfare. The success of this system caused government or even local officials to neglect the importance of civil intermediate groups that would activate the social sphere. This tendency continues even now when the economic crisis and growing social needs require the active participation of citizens in social activities through such intermediate groups.

3. Another Japanese characteristic intermediate group – Chonai-kai

There is another important type of intermediate group, the *jichi-kai* or *chonai-kai*. These groups were established in every local community in 1940 under the order of the Department of the Interior. Then mayors and town chiefs directed the local councils, and neighborhood associations were organized as auxiliaries to local governments. These groups were established so that the government could transmit its dictates to the people more quickly. Another purpose of this establishment was the surveillance of actions and ideas that could prove dangerous to the integrity of the state. Such groups were naturally favored by the government.

In 1947, the Allied occupation authorities decided to dissolve the community councils because of their cooperation in the war. However, similar neighborhood organizations were established just after the occupation directive was issued.

Neighborhood organizations are now called *chonai-kai* or *jichi-kai*. Although they are self-governing organizations and people are not obliged to affiliate with them, they sometimes assist local administrations with public work. Furthermore, many *Jichi-kai* maintain close relationships with local governments and sometimes receive government subsidies. Despite being considered old fashioned in urban areas, in the wake of the Higashi-Nihon earthquake in 2011, they are proving to be powerful local sources of mutual aid. In fact, the *chonai-kai* organize actions for the prevention of crime, as well as demand the maintenance of local infrastructure, etc.

As is often said regarding any intermediate group, there are both positive and negative sides. On one hand, the *Chonai-kai* facilitate the transmission of decisions made by local governments through the close networks that enable inhabitants to get their needs met; for example, we can easily imagine an elderly woman who can obtain the exact information about administrative services available for her by the indication of members of this group. The members can also obtain the satisfaction of participating in the local political process via the *Chonai-kai*. Yet this also means that the system confines members to their respective localities, which makes it

³ Robert Pekkanen, *Japan’s dual civil society : members without advocates*, Stanford University Press, 2006, p.21. This presentation is largely based on this excellent book, especially in the analysis of intermediate groups in Japan. This book, awarded by the Japan NPO Research Association in 2006, is helpful not only for understanding intermediate groups in Japan, but also Japanese power structures and the decision making processes within.

impossible to discuss problems of a wider scope within this scheme. Another difficulty is discussing issues of political significance, particularly those that might cause antipathy among members.

In short, there are two types of intermediate groups that prosper in Japan: large interest groups and the *Chonai-kai*, and both are very active in fulfilling their respective roles. The activity of these associations may be closely related to Japan's traditional *okami-ishiki*, which means an "internalized trust in governmental authorities" or "an unreasoning worship of governmental authorities." The activities of powerful interest groups and the "Iron Triangle" have caused the people to forgo participation in the policy-making process. The fact that the *Jichi-kai* wants to be authorized through the cooperation with local government may be explained also by this "*Okami-Ishiki*".

In any case, I would like to say that Japan lacks the specific type of intermediate group that is essential for a civil society: a group "*formed outside the state, the market, and the family*"⁴ and powerful enough to participate in the policy-making process as a partner to state or local government. The Japanese government has been very reluctant to admit this type of group, which was independent from the traditional hierarchy of Japanese society.

In order to clarify this point, I would now like to present the theory of Masao Maruyama, one of post-war Japan's preeminent political thinkers.

4. Maruyama Masao's idea of political self

Masao Maruyama, a foremost political thinker, tries to construct a modern political subject in almost all of his life. As I have said, this subject is composed of the three elements.

First element, the idea of "National Subject" was already clearly present at the beginning of his career. He says:

"It has been said that a nation is something that wants to be a nation. The objective act of belonging to a common state entity and sharing common political institutions does not constitute a nation (*kokumin*) in the modern sense. What obtains in this case is at best a people (*jinmin*) or members of a state (*kokka*), not a nation. Before a people can become a nation they must actively desire to belong to a common community and participate in common institutions, or at least consider such a situation to be desirable."⁵

It is clear that he regarded the construction of this "National Subject" is vital for the modernization of Japan. This attitude of Maruyama has severely criticized in this past decade. Those who criticize this aspect of Maruyama remark that it might hide the danger of the Japanese nationalism which had brought about the colonialism. This critic is partially right, in that all nationalism has potentially its risk to turn into the fanaticism. But it would lead to a misunderstanding of Maruyama's thought if we insisted too much on this danger. In fact, "National Subject" which Maruyama idealizes is not a conformist. If one accepts the national ideology without reflection, he or she would never be a "National Subject" in the sense of Maruyama. This subject is someone who is interested in what happen in the public sphere and is ready to participate in the discussion about them

⁴ Susan Pharr, Preface to *The State of Civil Society in Japan*, Cambridge University Press, 2003, p.xiii

⁵ Maruyama Masao, *Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*, University of Toyo Press, 1974, p.323

when necessary. He or she may strictly oppose to the government when it tries to restrict his or her right.

The second element of the ideal of political subject is “Self-Objectivizing Subject”. This idea is, of course, very clear in almost all of Maruyama’s work which always shed light on the unconscious structure of Japanese society. I would like to add, that this point is almost his personal belief. We can see this in the following sentence.

“I have always a Hegelian idea. I believe that much objective recognition of “Who I am” leads to the clear consciousness of the unconscious parts of my ideas. This trial will reduce the danger of the sudden explosion of this unconsciousness, which would destroy myself” (*Problems of “ancient layer” in the history of Japanese thought*, CWM⁶-XI-222)

The “Self-Objectivizing Subject” tries to clarify the unconscious ideological scheme which may limit his or her thought, in order to hinder the violent explosion of the values supported by this scheme. This attitude is very important even from the point of view of the desirable social stability.

Now I will talk about the importance of the third element, “Associative Subject” in the Maruyama’s thought.

It seems that Maruyama had been opposed to the idea of intermediate groups at the beginning of his career, dreaming of a direct relationship, based on Rousseau’s model, between the state and the individual. At the end of “*Studies in the Intellectual History of Tokugawa Japan*,” he states:

“... the fact that the liquidation of the pouvoirs intermédiaires was carried out without the active participation of the popular classes, and, moreover, by the very elements that constitutes those intermediate powers, had a decisive effect on the character of the Meiji innovations intended to give rise to a modern nation-state. In the continuing presence of external pressures, what Fukuzawa Yukichi called “the implantation of the concept ‘nation’ in the minds of the people of the entire country” now became the urgent task of the Meiji thinkers.”⁷

This was written in 1944 during the war. It is clear that Maruyama found the main character of the modern state in the direct relationship between the state and the individuals, and in the lapse of intermediate groups. “The autonomous existence of intermediary powers” which “impeded the inward union of state and nation” (ibid, p.363) had to be vanquished for the realization of the spiritual integrity that Maruyama thought should be the necessary condition of the modern nation-state.

After the way, these ideas did not change initially. Maruyama was concerned that individuals should be conscious of being members of a nation-state, that is to say, a democratic Japan, for the sake of the democracy. He also thought that the traditional intermediate groups should be abolished for the sake of this democratic Japan. In our terms, he idealized the “National Subject” in order to construct the democratic Japan.

However, observing the affairs of postwar Japan, he gradually formed new ideas. Observing McCarthyism in 1950s America, he began remarking on the dangers of power monopolization and that of mass-democracy, and insisting on the necessity of pluralism in the public sphere. It was in this period that Maruyama began to appreciate the positive role of intermediate groups, which would never transform into interest groups,

⁶ In this presentation, “CWM” means “Collected Works of Maruyama Masao”, published by Iwanami Shoten from 1995 to 1997. We refer the number of tome and then the page of the citation after CWM.

⁷ ibid, p.367

for an effective political process in democratic Japan. Seeing the labor unions as an ideal for intermediate association, Maruyama insisted on the historical role of intermediate groups, such as unions or the church, in checking the power of Europe's central governments. At the same time, he began to find the failure of Japan's modernization in the lack of powerful intermediate groups, which permitted each individual to participate in public discussion. We could say that this line of thought continued until the end of his life⁸.

Because of this, Maruyama thought that the political sphere should never be monopolized by politicians or political parties. He argued, "it is particularly through the political activities of people who originally do not intend to make politics a profession or make politics their objective that democracy will assume a vital existence."⁹

Maruyama seemed to find the possibility of such actions in the activities of intermediate groups that would never form their own political parties, and it is quite interesting that his theory regarding intermediate groups has, despite his popularity, not received much attention. This may be traced partly to the popularity of Marxism in Japan, or from the difficulty of imagining active civil intermediate groups, but it is a question that requires further analysis. For now, let me only suggest that this lack of interest in Maruyama's theory of intermediate groups may reflect some features of the Japanese reception of Western social sciences.

Here I would like to say that this "Associative Subject" is very important, in that it can realize the other two ideas of the ideal "Political Subject", which I have mentioned.

How can an "Associative Subject" help us become a "Self-Objectivizing Subject"? There are, I suppose, two points in this process.

Firstly, if we try to pursue the interest of an intermediate group to which we belong in the public sphere, we must inevitably justify this interest with the relationship to the public interest. It is necessary, then, that we must regard ourselves in such a way as "the others" see us and to relativizes ourselves. This procedure will grow up critical point of view to ourselves and this will give us vitality to change ourselves.

Secondly, I would like to remark that Maruyama idealizes the society where "every individual belongs to some plural groups at the same time and where their mental loyalty is not monopolized but shared among some authorities." He also applauds the society where the plurality of social values and organizations is respected" (CWM-VIII-242) In such a society, as the human history proves, the diversity of social values easily lead to the activation of social sphere. There is another advantage. It prevents us from falling in Wakudeki, irrational worship of traditional values in a closed society, to belong to some social groups at the same time, because it may bring about the tensions between the values of these groups and it may make possible the reflection on the desirable social values (In Japan, it is difficult to belong to some groups at the same time, simply because of the business in daily life. The promotion of the conditions which enable us to do so is very important, I suppose).

Now I mention very briefly the relationship between "Associative Subject" and "National Subject"

I say again that the "National Subject" in Maruyama's sense is not a conformist, but an active member of a state who is ready to participate in discussions in the public sphere. The public sphere is always the space where many groups fight one another to attain the authority, and to find a possible point of compromise. In other words,

⁸ In this point, we can especially refer to the article cited in note.1, "Patters of Individuation and the Case of Japan: A Conceptual Scheme"

⁹ (Maruyama Masao, *Gendai Seiji no Shiso to Kodo*(Thought and Behaviour in Modern Japanese Politics), Mirai-sha, 1964, p.458)

those who participate in the public argument have to know the manners to respect the values of the opponents. Of course, it is rare that we participate directly in controversies in the public space, but it is preferable that we are prepared to take part in this process. The discussions among social groups (or intermediate groups) are likely to give opportunities to learn the respect of other opinions and the manners of discussion.

I would like to add, that the critic of “nationalism” of Maruyama’s thought is unfavorable, in that it may promote the privatization and may bring about the monopolization of the social authority.

In fact, if our government was a “small government”, it could be possible that we didn’t have enough interest in the public sphere. Because we live in this welfare society, supported by the highly complex administration, we have inevitably to be a “National Subject” (or a member of Nation-State), in that we must have interest in the social issues in which the government is one of the important actors).

The direct demand that we should be a member of this Nation State without the mediation of intermediate groups is very dangerous, because it may imply that we should be conformist. What is important know is to reconstruct the ideal image of a “National Subject”, and its relationship with the intermediate groups, referring to Maruyam’s thought, I suppose.

Of course, the idea which I have presented by now is much more idealistic. Further analysis of the structure of the Japanese society is necessary in order to find out an effective way to realize the idealistic political subject. We must also look for the social conditions which will promote the realization of this subject (education, working conditions, relationship between NPOs and local government, etc.) But these sociological problems are beyond of my ability.

At the end of this analysis, I would like to point out three problems of Maruyama’s thought about the intermediate groups.

One problem is that he always idealizes too much the non-interest intermediate groups and that he doesn’t give much importance to the interest intermediate groups. Based on this idea, he regards the labor union, where their members can freely discuss many issues, as an ideal form of an intermediate group. But, the labor union itself has its proper interest. If we don’t see this side of the labor union, we easily neglect of the reality of the social conflict. In fact, every intermediate group has its own proper interest. What is important is the relationship between this interest and the public interest. If an intermediate group would like to justify the pursuit of its interest, it must take its relation with the public interest into consideration and explain it to the society. If it cannot accomplish this duty, it must give up this pursuit, at least in the public sphere. I think it more important to clarify the importance of this procedure, rather than to look for an ideal intermediate group which had no private interest.

Second problem is that Maruyama seems to give little importance to traditional intermediate groups such as local community. Maruyama regards these communities as a hindrance which closely ties individuals to its solidarity, to prevent them from getting their economic and mental independence. This attitude of Maruyama, I guess, might bring about the hostility against him among the conservative people. In fact, Maruyama’s analysis was partly right in pointing the feudal characteristic of these local communities, and it was very natural for him to insist on this side in the 1950’s and 1960’s. But now, if we respect the structure of the Japanese society, it would be effective to respect these communities and to emphasize their public aspect. For example, some local congresses or some majors of local government express their worries against the secrecy law. This kind of controversy is expected to activate the discussion over the public affairs. I believe that it will be rather effective

to make the traditional local communities “public” than to criticize the “feudal” aspect of these communities, in order to avoid futile hostility against the Maruyama’s theory. The local community and the local government based on it can likely disturb the homogeneous hierarchy of the society in the positive sense.

The third problem is the lack of the international aspect of the political subject. It is very natural that Maruyama has little mentioned this aspect in the 1950’s and 1960’s, when the international communication between citizens was not so active as now. He would have been severely criticized, if he had much idealized the international communication then. But now, as you know, in the age of high-tech information, we can easily exchange the opinions with foreigners all over the world. Sometimes these international solidarities based on this communication can prevent the state government from abusing its power, as is seen in some countries.

It would be very interesting to integrate this “fourth” element into Maruyama’s idea of the political self, in order to have a contemporary ideal of the political subject.

Conclusion

It is true that Japan now faces many difficult issues which come from the economic problems and will face many severe problems which come from the population decline and the population aging.

It seems that many politicians, especially those in the LDP, think it would be better to solve these problems through the restoration of old traditions, and are trying to re-construct the “homogeneity” of the Japanese society in the name of “prompt decision making.” They are also attempting to fortify the ideological unity among Japanese by reforming moral education, referring to it as “Japanese” tradition.

However, it is not clear whether they will succeed because they may neglect to acknowledge the changes in Japan’s social structure that have occurred over the past decade.

It seems, also, their politics may fail to succeed in reestablishing the vitality of the Japanese society, simply because the homogeneity of society tends to spread the conformism among the people and to reduce the effort to invent an effective solution to the social problems.

There will be little problems if the traditional values are respected as one of the effective alternatives among the other values. But too much authorization of these values is very dangerous, because it may lead to the exclusion of the other social values, which will easily result in the destruction of the social plurality.

We can also refer to the following sentence of Maruyama, in order to suggest that the trial to reconstruct of the homogeneity of the society may be unfavorable even to the conservative politicians. Maruyama says as follows:

“If the government prevents the citizens from participating in the creation of social values and from discussing them, the active and voluntary obedience among the citizens and their cooperation to the governmental policies shall not be expected. In this situation, the government must fortify its police, its army, and the correctional institution in order to assure the obedience among the citizens. It is a dilemma that all powers must face. Especially, in the situation where one political group is severely opposed to another one, if the members of this group are prevented from the taking part in the discussion about the social values, they shall have little loyalty to the group to which they belong and pay no efforts against the attacks of the opposite group. Here the defensive power of the whole group will be very weak. [...] It is better, even for the government, to let the citizens participate in

the discussion on the public affairs, in order to stabilize and fortify the social order, lest their important interest may be attacked. (Maruyama Masao, "Field of politics", CMM-IV, pp.168f)

Just after the Higashi-Nihon earthquake, which revealed the weakness of isolated individuals and the importance of social solidarity, the term "Kizuna"(human intimate relationship) became an important watchword.

We cannot deny the truth of its appeal. The renaissance of the local community is very important because some local community were very effective to offer the aid to the habitants.

But, if these appeals have a tendency to hide, unconsciously or not, the necessity of civil intermediate groups such as NGOs, which could help Japan develop an authentic civil society, and if they have a tendency to fortify the traditional hierarchy of the Japanese society, the difficulties with which we face may not be solved, because of the possible lack of the civil vitality. In the period of high economic growth, the Japanese government was able to redistribute the wealth through the harmonious negotiation with labor unions, but now, there are no such circuits that would enable such redistribution. The state may remain disconnected from the needs of the civil society.

In order to identify social needs and resolve the issues surrounding these needs, the formation of civil groups will be an absolute necessity. In order to promote the civil vitality which could activate not only the public political discussion, but also the economic activities, the plurality of the social values must be seriously preserved.

However, many politicians seem to be antipathetic against civil movements even now, as in the case of the anti-nuclear power movement, or the anti-secrecy law movement. Japanese politicians cling to the old system, which is grudging and even hostile toward civil intermediate groups, they may win short-term success. Nevertheless, I think they will fail, because they cannot discover the real social needs that are easily neglected, and because they will, unconsciously, reduce the loyalty of the citizens to the state. If so, social frustration and dissatisfaction will continue to grow, which will lead to more serious problems in the future. If so, much more people will run away from the public sphere, to shut themselves in their private life.

Public Trust in Government and Political Liberalism in East Asia

Nam, Eun Young

Institute for Social Development and Policy Research, Seoul National University

Introduction

The purpose of this paper is focused on analyzing the relationship between citizens' perception of social justice, satisfaction in public services, individual risks measured by socio-economic anxieties in everyday lives, and government trust in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo. The relation between trust and democracy is paradoxical. On the one hand, the legitimacy of political and administrative institutions and actors is based largely of trust. In the system of indirect democracy the people delegate their sovereignty to these institutions and actors, trusting that this mandate handled in a appropriate way. On the other hand, an inherent part of any democracy is a "healthy distrust" in or skepticism toward interests of powerful actors. Democratic systems also institutionalize distrust by providing many opportunities for citizens to monitor the activities of the people and institutions they supposedly trust (Christensen and Laegreid 2005; Warren 1999).

Thus the causal links between trust and good government is a contested one (Rothstein and Stolle 2002). In both the developed and the developing world, citizens asking themselves the question of trust play a political game of delegation of power with uncertain outcomes. This is so mainly because the motivations and actions of political leaders cannot be known in advance with uncertainty (Przeworski 1991). Trust, in this regard, emerges as one of the most important ingredients upon which the legitimacy and sustainability of political systems are built (Blind, 2006).

In the regime of political liberalism, the foundation of politics is civil society that is guided by citizens, which draw a speculation that the public trust in government is important. Liberal democracy is an uneasy amalgamation of different political theories with different social and political origins. The term liberalism comes from the root word liberty. Liberalism will be used in this paper in its classic sense as the philosophy that places the highest value on individual freedom, especially the freedom of individuals from economic and social restraints of government. This paper focuses the public trust on government in the institutional and cultural context in East Asia. In terms of institutional factors, social justice and satisfaction in public services will be considered significantly. Cultural factors pertaining political liberalism include antiauthoritarianism and individualism. Above this, political attitudes on individual responsibility and gradual reform of the rich-poor gap will be taken into consideration in this paper.

Trust in government is a multifaceted, complex, and rather ambiguous concept. Trust covers general and systemic factors, such as the legitimacy accorded to the political-administrative system, but also more specific experiences with the government and its services and the dynamics interaction between the two (Bouckaert and Van de Walle 2001). Citizens are often skeptical toward the public sector when asked in general and abstract

terms but relatively satisfied with more specific services. Generally speaking, they desire a greater amount of services delivered from public sector (Bennett and Benett, 1990; Goodsell 1994; Huseby, 1995; Ladd, 1983).

The focus of this paper is trust in government, taken broadly to mean political institutions that have strong linkage to the social justice and individual risks that citizens feel in everyday life. Furthermore, this paper explores the relationship between political culture and government trust. This paper pays more attention to political culture, such as antiauthoritarianism and individualism, that is pertinent to political liberalism. Thus, it is a major concern of this paper to explore institutional factors and cultural factors to affect government trust. Variations in trust are explained in terms of people's satisfaction with specific public services, which is contrasted with social factors such as the perception of social justice and individual factors such as individual risks. How can political institutions such as government and their respective branches foster and develop trust? How does trust relate to social justice and individual risks? What are the important determinants to develop trust?

In terms of political regimes, Korea and Japan are considered liberal democracies while China is a one-party authoritarian state. Is specific political culture such as anti-authoritarianism, individual responsibility, individualism and attitude on gradual reform of the rich-poor gap associated with government trust in East Asia? This paper tries to shed light onto these questions, and investigates the place and importance of government trust in today's globalized world.

Literature Review

The Many Faces of Trust

Trust is a complex interpersonal and organizational construct (Duck 1997; Kramer and Tyler 1995). "Trust occurs when parties holding certain favorable perceptions of each other allow this relationship to reach the expected outcomes"(Wheless and Gortz 1977). A trusting person, group or institution will be "free from worry and the need to monitor the other party's behavior, partially or entirely" (Levi and Stoker 2000). In this sense, trust is an efficient means for lowering transaction costs in any social, economic and political relationship (Fukuyama 1995).

Trust is usually based on an individual's expectations as to how another person will perform on some future occasion, as a function of the target person's current and previous claims. Trust is always perceived from outside the actor, i.e. in the eye of the beholder who makes a subjective assessment of the other party. Some people are trusting to the point of being naïve. Paranoid people, or those not willing to trust anyone or anything, represent an extreme case. Some people may trust for altruistic reasons, but in the business context it is usually the "shadow-of-the-future," i.e. long-term interest, that underpins the vitality of trust. Trust is based on experience and social learning, and is thus also attributable in part to a specific local or national culture.

Trust is usually seen as the outcome of a process; in other words, trust relationships tend to develop gradually. Trust-building is seen as a self-enforcing process: trust creates trust and distrust creates distrust. Trust may appear in short encounters only, as between strangers, or it may occur in long-term relationships. Personal and impersonal or institutional level of trust both been identified. Quite often a rational judgment on the competence of the other, or emotions blurring the mind's complicated and invisible process, can lead to trust or distrust (Blomqvist, 1997).

Various disciplines also have different basic assumptions about trust. The economists' rational and calculative view of trust, for example, contrasts strongly with the philosophers' attitudinal and ethical view. Social psychologists underline the reliability of the word or promise and the fulfillment of obligations, whereas economists see trust as a response to expected future behavior and recommend the use of hostages to ensure rational behavior.

It has been challenging in the research to study how trust is assessed, signaled and created. Parkhe (1993) and Koenig (1995) have drawn attention to the literature on trust creation, compared to the generous range of studies on the collapse of cooperation and trust. Zucker (1986) has demonstrated three central modes of trust-building, namely the institution-based, the characteristic-based and process-based modes: (1) process-based, tied to past or expected exchange; (2) characteristic-based, tied to person, based on special characteristics; and (3) institutional-based, tied to formal societal structures, based on individual or firm-specific attributes or on intermediary mechanisms. The author describes the ascendancy of institutional trust-producing structure critical during the early period of industrial formation in the U.S.; spread of rational bureaucratic organization organizations, professional credentialing, the service economy, and regulation and legislation (Zucker, 1986).

Types of Trust: Political trust and Social Trust

Trust in general has two main variants. Trust assessed in political terms is the so-called political trust. Political trust happens when citizens appraise the government and its institutions, policy making in general and individual political leaders as promise-keeping, efficient, fair and honest. Political trust, in other words, is the "judgment of the citizenry that the system and the political incumbents are responsive, and will do what is right even in absence of constant scrutiny" (Miller and Listhaug 1990). As such, "political trust is a central indicator of public's underlying feeling about its polity" (Newton and Norris 2000).

Political trust can be directed towards the political system and its organizations as well as individual political incumbents. The first category of political trust is referred to as the macro-level or organizational trust. Organizational political trust refers to an issue-oriented perspective whereby citizens become trustful or distrustful of government "because they are satisfied or dissatisfied with policy alternatives" (Miller 1974). The organizational political trust can be further subdivided into the components of diffuse or system-based trust, and specific or institutional-based trust. Diffuse political trust refers to citizens' evaluation of the performance of the overall political system and the regime. Specific political trust, on the other hand, is directed towards certain political institution, such as Congress or the local police force (Blind, 2006).

The second category of political trust, or the so-called micro-level or individual political trust, happens when trust is directed towards individual political leaders. Individual political trust involves a person-oriented perspective whereby citizens become trustful or distrustful of government "because of their approval or disapproval of certain political leaders" (Citrin 1974).

Political trust does not emerge, nor does it operate, in a vacuum. Social trust, which refers to citizens' confidence in each other as members of a social community, is inseparable from the notion of political trust. According to Putman's theory of social capital, civic engagement in a community and the interpersonal trust among its members contribute to the rising of overall social trust in a given society (Putnam 1993, 1995, 2000). Face-to-face contact with members of the community in societal associations allows people not only to get to

know each other better in personal terms, but it also permits them to extend the positive feeling derived out of this civic experience to strangers in the society and in the government. Keele (2004) confirms that social capital has a significant and strong effect on trust in government apart from, and along with, government performance.

The previous studies make it clear that the influential factors that affect government trust are ability or competence (Mayer, Davis & Shoorman, 1995; Butler 1991; Barber 1983), impartiality (Butler 1991; Park 2000), transparency (Mayer, Davis & Shoorman, 1995; Mishra 1996), participation (Tocqueville, 1984; Rothstein 2001; Putnam 1993), and consistency in the policy (Mishra 1996).

Citizen satisfaction with public services as related to trust can be seen in a broader or narrower performance perspective (Bouckeraert & Van de Walle, 2001). When the individual's experiences are largely good, he or she tends to trust the state (Kumlin, 2002; Rothstein & Steinmo, 2002). People may be satisfied with the existence of a popular service or availability of certain services that meet their needs. At the same time, they may also be satisfied with information concerning the services, the accessibility and friendliness of the service providers they meet, the competence of service personnel, the fairness, effectiveness, and efficiency of the services, or other factors (Christensen & Lægreid, 2005).

In East Asia, there are various political regime such as liberal democracy, electoral democracy, electoral authoritarianism and one-party authoritarianism (Chang and Chu, 2013). In the different political regime, Government trust would be affected significantly by political attitude such as antiauthoritarianism as well as political institutions.

This paper explores the main factors that can develop government trust and the effects of political culture on government trust. This paper's research questions are as follows:

1. Is people's trust in government the same across all institutions, or is it differentiated between various institutions?
2. What is the connection between people's satisfaction with public services and their trust in government?
3. What is the significance of perceptions toward social justice, risk, and demographic factors on levels of trust?

Finally, the paper attempts to establish the actual and potential links between political culture and government trust.

Data and Variables

Sample

The data used here were collected by social surveys on citizen awareness in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo conducted by the Jungmin Foundation for Social Theory in Korea and Chingwha University in Beijing. Face-to-face interviews and internet surveys were carried out with adults aged 19 and above in 2012. The total functional sample size was 1,609 people. The sample consists of 512 Seoul citizens, 537 Tokyo citizens, and 560 Beijing citizens. The survey on citizen awareness includes questions related to the following topics: mutual cognition of Korea, Japan, and China among Korean people, Japanese people, and Chinese people; perception of risk; awareness of sustainable development; citizen's everyday lives; social infrastructure and services; and social justice and trust, among others.

Variables

The main variables in this study include socioeconomic variables, government trust, satisfaction in public services, social justice, individual risks and political culture. The socioeconomic variables are gender, age, education, and household income. Government trust is measured by confidence in government. Satisfaction in public services consists of satisfaction with public service of village offices, district offices, city halls and central governments. Social justice refers to the fairness of society towards the following: income, job opportunity, college education, recruitment and promotion of public officials, public health services, compulsory education, implementation of laws, balanced development of capital areas and other regions, balanced development of cities and rural areas, social welfare, tax policy, gender equality and the rights of minorities.

The data on individual risks consisted of the respondents' feeling in their daily lives toward the following statements: "I am anxious about falling behind someday because there is fierce competition in our society"; "I am worried about illness or accidents of family members that could place our household budget in jeopardy"; "I am worried about worsening family finances due to the economic crisis"; "I feel lonely and desolate because I have no one who understands me."

Finally, political culture was measured by the following questions: I would like you to tell me your views of various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with statement on the left; 5 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. 1) Customs and authority need not be respected / Customs and authority should be respected if possible; 2) People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. / Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for; 3) It is more important to protect the individual interest / For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed; 4) The gap between the rich and poor should be reduced gradually. / Gap between the rich and poor should be resolved completely.

<Table 1> Measures of Variables

Variables	Explanations
Socioeconomic variables	Gender, age, education, household income
Government Trust	Could you tell me how much confidence you have in the government: a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence or none at all
Satisfaction in public services	Could you tell me how satisfied you are with the public services of these government agencies: 1) village office 2) district office 3) city hall 4) central government - very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, so-so, somewhat dissatisfied, very dissatisfied
Social justice	Could you tell me how fair or unfair you think our society is on the following issues : income, job opportunity, college education, the recruitment and promotion of public officials, public health services, compulsory education, implementation laws, balanced development of capital areas and balanced development of cities and rural areas, social welfare, tax policy, gender equality and the rights of minorities. These items are categorized into three factors by factor analysis: 1) stability of income; 2) public policy in education and health care 3) balanced development and gender equality -very fair, somewhat fair, somewhat unfair, very unfair

Individual risks	Could you tell me how strongly you feel in your daily life about the following statements: 1) I am anxious about falling behind someday because there is a lot of competition in our society 2) I am worried about illness or accidents of family members that will place our household finances in jeopardy . 3) I am worried about worsening family finances due to the economic crisis 4) I feel lonely and desolate because I have no one who understands me - feel very strongly, feel fairly strongly, feel not very strongly, feel nothing at all
Political culture	I'd like you to tell me your views of various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means you agree completely with statement on the left; 5 means you agree completely with the statement on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. Customs and authority need not to be respected / Customs and authority should be respected if possible. People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves. / Government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for. It is more important to protect the individual interest / For the sake of national interest, individual interest could be sacrificed. The gap between the rich and poor should be reduced gradually. / The gap between the rich and poor should be resolved completely.

Results

Trust, social justice, satisfaction in public services, individual risks, and political attitudes in Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo

To gauge the respondents' evaluation of institutional trust, they were told the following: "I am going to name a number of organizations. For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them. The organizations are the government, business, media, NGO." Answer categories included: a great deal of confidence, quite a lot of confidence, not very much confidence and none at all. People who responded that they trust government reached about 30% in Seoul, 68% in Beijing, and 24% in Tokyo. Those who responded that they trust enterprises were about 30% in Seoul, 50% in Beijing, and 31% in Tokyo. Media trust was mentioned by 34% in Seoul, 44% in Beijing, and 19% in Tokyo. People who responded that they trusted experts was 78% in Seoul, 60% in Beijing, and 56% in Tokyo.

Almost 63% of the respondents in Seoul, 71% of the respondents in Beijing, and 42% of the respondents in Tokyo replied that they trusted NGOs. Thus on average, people in Beijing showed the highest trust in government, enterprise, media, and NGO among the three groups of citizens. The level of institutional trust rate was highest in the citizens of Beijing, followed by the citizens of Seoul. The citizens of Tokyo showed the least trust in almost every compared institution such as government, enterprises, media, experts and NGOs. In Seoul, most respondents said they trusted experts and NGOs, while the least respondents said they trusted government and enterprises. In Beijing, government and NGO had a lot of public confidence, while media and enterprises had relatively less confidence among citizens. In Tokyo, experts and NGOs were the most trusted, while media and government had the least trust among all the institutions of the three countries.

<Table 2> Institutional Trust rate (Unit: %)

	Seoul	Beijing	Tokyo
Government	29.9	68.1	24
Enterprises	30.5	49.7	31.2
Media	33.6	44.8	19.2
Experts	78.1	60.0	55.8
NGOs	62.5	71.1	42

Respondents were then asked: “Could you tell me how much satisfied you are with the public service of government agencies such as village offices, district offices, city halls, and central governments?” The answer categories are “very satisfied,” “somewhat satisfied,” “so-so,” “somewhat dissatisfied,” and “very dissatisfied.” Table 2 reports the score of satisfaction; the maximum score is 5 and the minimum score is 1. The citizens of Beijing showed the highest satisfaction, followed by the citizens of Tokyo. The citizens of Seoul showed the lowest satisfaction with governmental institutions. In Seoul and Tokyo, the central government was less trusted than municipal institutions such as village offices, district offices, and city halls.

<Table 3> Satisfaction in services of governmental institutions (mean score)

	Seoul	Beijing	Tokyo
Village office	3.3	3.6	3.4
District office	3.2	3.5	3.4
City hall	3.1	3.6	3.3
Central government	2.7	3.8	2.8
Total	3.1	3.6	3.2

Table 3 shows people’s perception of social justice measured by the following question: “To what extent is one’s society fair in the following issues?” In Seoul fairness in income, job opportunity, implementation of laws, balanced development of cities and rural areas, tax policy, and rights of minorities was mentioned by the least respondents (less than 26%). In Beijing fairness of income, job opportunity, recruitment and promotion of public officials, and balanced development of cities and rural areas obtained the lowest evaluation (less than 34%). In Tokyo the fairness of tax policy, job opportunity, balanced development of cities and rural areas, and rights of minorities mentioned by the least respondents (less than 35%).

While in Seoul over 48% of the respondents perceived compulsory education, public health services and college education as fair, in Beijing over 54% of respondents said that compulsory education, college education, and tax policy are fair. Meanwhile, over 60% of the respondents from Tokyo replied that compulsory education, college education, execution of law, and public health services are fair. Compulsory and college education got the higher evaluation of equity among various social issues in the three countries.

<Table 4> Perceptions on social justice (%)

	Seoul	Beijing	Tokyo
Income	<u>16.0</u>	<u>26.1</u>	39.4
Job opportunity	<u>22.3</u>	<u>34.9</u>	<u>34.3</u>
College education	<u>48.7</u>	<u>58.2</u>	<u>76.2</u>

Recruitment and promotion of public officials	36.3	<u>34.0</u>	49.9
Public health services	<u>50.4</u>	48.1	<u>68.3</u>
Compulsory education	<u>71.1</u>	<u>78.1</u>	<u>87.1</u>
Implementation of laws	<u>23.7</u>	58.8	<u>71.3</u>
Balanced development of capital area and local area	<u>26.0</u>	43.2	<u>30.8</u>
Balanced development of cities and rural areas	<u>21.1</u>	<u>33.9</u>	<u>26.6</u>
Social welfare	<u>34.4</u>	42.7	43.9
Tax policy	<u>22.3</u>	<u>54.1</u>	<u>30.3</u>
Gender equality	44.4	<u>71.8</u>	49.6
Rights of minorities	<u>24.4</u>	<u>53.9</u>	<u>35.0</u>

Individual risks were measure by asking respondents to agree or disagree with the following statements: “I’m anxious about falling behind someday because there is fierce competition in our society”; “I am worried about illness or accidents of family members that will place our household budget in jeopardy”; “I am worried about worsening family finances due to the economic crisis”; “I feel lonely and desolate because I have no one who understands me.” Anxiety because of competition was mentioned by 65% in Seoul, by 83% in Beijing, and by 74% in Tokyo. Worry about managing illness or accidents of family members amounted to 81% in Seoul, 75% in Beijing, 76% in Tokyo. Worry about difficulties in the household economy reached 82% in Seoul, 61% in Beijing, 70% in Tokyo. Respondents who reported that they feel lonely because no one understands them was 47% in Seoul, 30% in Beijing, 43% in Tokyo. On the whole, individual risks such as worry about managing illness or accidents of family members, worry about difficulties in household economy, and feeling lonely were most mentioned by the citizens of Seoul, followed by citizens of Tokyo, and the least by citizens of Beijing. However, people who are anxious about fierce competition amounted to 84% in Beijing which is the highest among the three countries.

<Table 5> Perception of individual risks (Feelings of insecurity in everyday lives)

	Seoul	Beijing	Tokyo
Anxiety toward competition	65.1	83.5	<u>74.3</u>
Worry about managing illness or accidents of family members	<u>81.5</u>	<u>75.1</u>	<u>76.7</u>
Worry about difficulties in the household economy	<u>81.9</u>	60.9	70.2
Feel lonely because no one understands me	46.7	30.0	42.7

Table 6 shows the respondents’ attitudes of political culture on antiauthoritarianism, individual responsibility, individualism and gradual reform of the rich-poor gap. Political culture was measured by the following statements. 1) Customs and authority need not be respected; 2) People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves; 3) It is more important to protect the individual interest; 4) The gap between the rich and poor should be reduced gradually.

Antiauthoritarianism among the citizens of Beijing shows the highest level, followed by the citizens of Tokyo, and the citizens of Seoul showed the lowest level. Those who agree antiauthoritarianism were 32.1% in Beijing, 31.6% in Tokyo, and 29.7% in Seoul. People who prefer individual responsibility over government


responsibility in Tokyo showed the highest level with 57.2%, followed by citizens of Seoul with 56.1%, and people who agree individual responsibility in Beijing showed the lowest level with 48.7%. The response rate of individualism was highest in Tokyo with 28.7%, followed by Seoul with 20.2%, and was lowest in Beijing with 19%. Those who agreed with the gradual reform of the rich-poor gap was the highest in Seoul with 44.7%, followed by Beijing with 30.2%, and showed the lowest level in Tokyo with 24%. To sum up, citizens of Tokyo showed the highest level of antiauthoritarianism, individual responsibility, and individualism among the three groups of citizens. Citizens of Seoul agreed with a gradual reform of the rich-poor gap more than the citizens of Beijing and Tokyo.

<Table 6> Political attitudes on antiauthoritarianism, individual responsibility, individualism, and gradual reform of rich-poor gap. (%)

	Seoul	Beijing	Tokyo
Antiauthoritarianism: "Customs and authority need not be respected."	29.7	32.1	31.6
Individual responsibility: "People should take more responsibility to provide for themselves."	56.1	48.7	57.2
Individualism: "It is more important to protect the individual interest."	20.2	19	28.7
Gradual reform: "The gap between the rich and poor should be reduced gradually."	44.7	30.2	24

Figure 1 shows the mean score of attitude toward antiauthoritarianism, individual response, individualism, and gradual reform by each age group. In Seoul, the younger group, made up of those who are less than 30 years old, has a more antiauthoritarian and individualistic attitude than the older group made up of those older than age 50. In Beijing, the younger group assented to more individual responsibility than the older group did. Gradual reform of the rich-poor gap was supported more by the older group of those aged 50 and older in Seoul. Political attitudes such as antiauthoritarianism, individual responsibility, individualism, and gradual reform saw no significant differences among the age groups of citizens in Tokyo.


Figure 1 Attitudes on antiauthoritarianism, individual response, individualism, and gradual reform by age groups (mean score)



Seoul; antiauthoritarianism *** individualism * gradual reform *
 Beijing; individual responsibility *

Figure 2 shows the mean score of attitudes toward antiauthoritarianism, individual response, individualism, and gradual reform by education groups. In Beijing the higher education group like college graduates had the higher level of antiauthoritarianism and individualism than the lower education group, such as high school graduates. There was no significant difference of political attitudes between education groups in Seoul and Tokyo.

Figure 2 Attitudes on antiauthoritarianism, individual response, individualism, and gradual reform by education groups (mean score)



Beijing; antiauthoritarianism *** individualism***

The factors affecting government trust in Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo

To illuminate the influential factors to foster and develop government trust, the researcher conducted OLS regression analysis of trust in government on social justice, individual risks and demographics. In Seoul those who more satisfied with public services, and realized Korean society is more impartial in balanced development and gender equality were inclined to give more trust in government. In Beijing people who are older, more satisfied with public services and perceived Chinese society as more equitable in education and health care tended to give more trust to government. In Tokyo the citizens who are more satisfied with public services and recognize Japanese society fairer in income and job opportunity gave more trust in government.

Satisfaction in public services and social justice are the most influential common factors to developing government trust in the three countries. However, the different agenda of social justice resulted in different effects on fostering government trust in each country; balanced development and gender equality in Seoul, education and health care in Beijing, and stability of income in Tokyo. These results allow the researcher to draw the following assumptions. It appears that in each country citizens perceive that their government has more responsibility for specific social agendas. What the citizens of Seoul perceive as fair in the agenda of balanced development, the citizens of Beijing feel more equitable in the agenda of education and health care, and the citizens of Tokyo appreciate more impartial in the agenda of stability of income.

<Table 7> OLS Regression of Trust in Government on satisfaction in public services, social justice, individual risks and demographics

	Seoul	Beijing	Tokyo
gender	.085(.058)	.038(.023)	.095(.066)
age	.003(.005)	.007(.111)**	.001(.018)
education	-.023(-.032)	-.031(-.051)	.067(.087)
income	.014(.023)	-.007(-.011)	.003(.006)
Satisfaction in public services	.074(.276)***	.112(.432)***	.056(.242)***
Social justice 1 (stability of income)	.049(.075)	-.014(-.023)	.060(.120)*
Social justice 2 (education and health care)	.011(.037)	.044(.158)**	.025(.097)
Social justice 3 (balanced development & gender equality)	.063(.254)***	.038(.160)	.015(.066)
Perception of Individual risk	-.016(-.057)	-.010(-.027)	-.023(-.073)
constant	.168	13.869**	2.530
R ²	.289	.475	.189

The relationship between political culture and government trust

What is the relation between political culture and government trust? Does any specific political culture develop or reduce government trust in East Asian countries? To answer the question, the researcher carried out an OLS regression of government trust on political culture, satisfaction in public services, social justice, and demographics.

In Seoul those who more satisfied with public services give more trust to government. The more perceived social justice in balance development and gender equality, the more he or she is likely to trust government. Political factors such as antiauthoritarianism and attitude toward gradual reform also affect the government trust. Antiauthoritarianism has a negative effect and agreement with gradual reform of the rich-poor gap has a positive effect on government trust. People who have more antiauthoritarian attitude tend to distrust government and those who advocate the gradual reform give more trust to government.

In Beijing older people are more likely to trust government, and those who more satisfied with public services trust more in government. People who perceived Chinese society as more equitable in education, health, balance development, and gender equality have more trust in government. What is the influence here of political factors? Individualism is negatively associated with government trust, and agreement with gradual reform positively affects government trust. The more individualistic attitude, the more he or she likely is to distrust government. Those who support gradual reform of the rich-poor gap give more trust to government.

In Tokyo the more educated, and those more satisfied with public services give more trust to government. People who believe there is fairness in the stability in income, education, and health care tend to trust the government more. However, political factors such as antiauthoritarianism, individual responsibility, individualism, and attitude of gradual reform do not affect government trust at all.

<Table 8> OLS Regression of Trust in Government on satisfaction in public services, social justice, political attitude, and demographics

	Seoul	Beijing	Tokyo
Gender	.093(.064)	.035(.021)	.109(.075)
Age	.001(.023)	.007(.122)***	.002(.038)
Education	-.030(-.042)	-.022(-.037)	.084(.109)*
Income	.019(.033)	.004(.006)	.010(.020)
Satisfaction in public services	.072(.268)***	.104(.408)***	.050(.214)***
Social justice 1 (stability of income)	.036(.054)	-.014(-.023)	.060(.120)*
Social justice 2 (education and health care)	.007(.022)	.038(.137)**	.029(.114)*
Social justice 3 (balanced development & gender equality)	.063(.256)***	.038(.160)**	.016(.068)
Political culture			
Anti-authoritarianism	-.065(-.086)*	.002(.004)	-.044(-.054)
Individual responsibility	.011(.406)	-.003(-.006)	-.038(-.049)
Individualism	-.041(-.052)	-.098(-.140)***	.000(.000)
Gradual reform	.058(.106)*	.051(.086)**	-.002(-.003)
constant	.278	15.285***	.370
R ²	.308	.495	.195

Conclusion

Trust is a complex interpersonal and organizational construct. Trust is usually based on an individual's expectations as to how another person will perform on some future occasion, as a function of the target person's current and previous claims. Trust is always perceived from outside the actor, i.e. in the eye of the beholder who makes a subjective assessment of the other party. Trust assessed in political terms is so-called "political trust." Political trust happens when citizens appraise the government and its institutions, policy making in general and individual political leaders as promise-keeping, efficient, fair and honest.

This paper is focused on analyzing the relationship between citizens' perception of social justice, satisfaction in public services, individual risks measured by socio-economic anxieties in everyday lives and trust in government in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo. The focus of this paper is also on the trust in government, taken broadly to mean political institutions that have strong linkage to the social justice and individual risks that citizens feel in everyday life. Variations in trust are explained in terms of people's satisfaction with specific public services, which is contrasted with social factors such as perception of social justice and individual factor such as individual risks. Thus, the researcher conducted an analysis to find out the influential factors in developing government trust.

On average, people in Beijing show the highest trust in government, enterprises, media, and NGOs among the three citizen groups. The level of institutional trust rate is highest in the citizens of Beijing, followed by the citizens of Seoul. The citizens of Tokyo show the least trust in almost every compared institution such as government, business, media, experts and NGOs.

Concerning satisfaction in public services, the citizens of Beijing show the highest satisfaction, followed by the citizens of Tokyo. The citizens of Seoul show the lowest satisfaction with the governmental institutions. In

Seoul and Tokyo central government is less trusted than municipal institutions such as village offices, district offices, and city halls.

Perceptions of social justice vary among the three countries. In Seoul fairness in income, job opportunity, implementation of laws, balanced development of cities and rural areas, tax policy, and rights of minorities was mentioned by the least respondents (less than 26%). In Beijing fairness of income, job opportunity, recruitment and promotion of public officials, and balanced development of cities and rural areas got the lowest evaluation (less than 34%). In Tokyo the fairness of tax policy, job opportunity, balanced development of cities and rural areas, and rights of minorities was mentioned by the least respondents (less than 35%). Compulsory and college education got the higher esteem of equity among various social agenda in the three countries.

On the whole individual risks such as worry about managing illness or accidents of family members, worry about difficulties in household economy, and feeling lonely is most mentioned by the citizens of Seoul, followed by citizens of Tokyo, and the least by citizens of Beijing. But people who are anxious about fierce competition amount to 84% in Beijing, which is the highest among the three countries.

In terms of political culture citizens of Tokyo show the highest level of antiauthoritarianism, individual responsibility, and individualism among the three groups of citizens. Citizens of Seoul supported gradual reform of the rich-poor gap more than the citizens of Beijing and Tokyo. In Seoul, the younger group has a more antiauthoritarian and individualistic attitude than the older group. In Beijing the younger group supports more individual responsibility than the older group. Gradual reform of the rich-poor gap was supported more by the older group in Seoul. Political attitudes such as antiauthoritarianism, individual responsibility, individualism, and gradual reform show no significant difference among the age groups of citizens of Tokyo. In Beijing the higher education group like college graduates shows the higher level of antiauthoritarianism and individualism than the lower education group such as high school graduates does. There's no significant difference of political attitude between education groups in Seoul and Tokyo.

What are the main factors to affect government trust? To illuminate the influential factors to foster and develop government trust, I conducted OLS regression analysis of trust in government on social justice, individual risks and demographics. In Seoul those who are more satisfied with public services, and realize Korean society is more impartial in balanced development and gender equality are inclined to give more trust in government. In Beijing people who are older, more satisfied with public services and perceive Chinese society is more equitable in education and health care have more trust in government. In Tokyo citizens who are more satisfied with public services and recognize Japanese society fairer in income and job opportunity give more trust in government. Therefore, satisfaction in public services and social justice are the most influential common factors to develop government trust in the three countries. But the different agenda of social justice affect to foster government trust in each country.

The relationship between political culture and government trust is significant in Seoul and Beijing. In Seoul antiauthoritarianism is a major factor in decreasing government trust, and in Beijing individualism has a negative influence on government trust. Positive attitude toward gradual reform of rich-poor gap affects to increase government trust in Seoul and Beijing. In Tokyo political attitude have no significant effect on government trust.

People who have a more antiauthoritarian attitude are likely to give less trust to government in East Asia. Those who have a more positive attitude on the gradual reform of the rich-poor gap tend to trust more in

government. In terms of political culture, anti-authoritarianism and individualism are negatively associated with government trust in East Asia. In other words, people who have a more authoritarian and collectivist attitude give more trust to government in Korea and China. These findings seem to come from the fact that the most governments in East Asia are still more authoritarian and collectivist than those in western countries. Thus, people who are disposed to more antiauthoritarian and individualistic attitudes are inclined to distrust government.

From these findings, this paper concludes there are two social and cultural influences that affect government trust in East Asia: social justice and political culture. Social justice has a positive effect on trust in government. In terms of political culture, antiauthoritarianism and individualism tend to reduce the level of governmental trust in East Asia. In the process of transformation such as democratization and development, the politics of authority and collectivism undermine the foundation of governmental trust.

In this paper it was found that social justice and satisfaction in public services are consistent influential institutional factors to develop government trust in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo. Cultural factors such as antiauthoritarianism and individualism are negatively associated with trust in government in East Asia. Thus, this paper concludes that institutional factors and cultural factors build two pillars to foster or reduce government trust.

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Individualization of funerals in Japan and role of religions in depopulated society

SAKURAI Yoshihide

Graduate School of Letters, Hokkaido University

Ulrich Beck, 1986, *Risikogesellschaft. Auf dem Weg in eine andere Moderne*. Suhrkamp, Frankfurt a.M. 東 廉, 伊藤 美登里1998『危険社会—新しい近代への道』法政大学出版局。
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- In late modernity individual has been more liberalized from conventional institution such as family, community, work group, and class than during modernization in the end of 19 centuries as a result of industrialization. At the same time people are prone to more risks when institutional protection has declined.
- There were discussions over whether typical individualization occurred in middle class in developed Europe, or there are variations of individualism under specific conditions.
- However, studying from life-course story, individuals tend to stress their "decision" in planning their lives, which was different from former generation. And they also chose their reference groups and connect to each other for comfort as well as ideals. Therefore, individualization does not automatically result in social atomism, there are alternatively ways of making new communal groups.

Japanese sociological review, 2004,54-4:318-321, Individualization


- At the foreword editors argue that the usage of “individualization” in Japan could be replaced with “subjectivation” and “privatization,” and that “individualization” proceeded with the collapse of “institution.”
- This edition deals with the following issues:
 - Should social security system based on household be changed to base on individual?
 - How are individualization and privatization related in family?
 - How has non typical employment in young generation related to individualization of labor?
 - Which is more appropriate when we consider social class? From the viewpoint of household or individuals?
 - How has the relation between teachers and consumer-oriented students (parents) changed?
 - How has the relation between doctors and patient changed in advanced medical care?
 - What consequences has the protection for criminal victims brought in the court?
 - How has individualization of religion proceeded and how has individuality assumed holiness in spiritualism movement?
- Social inclusion policy should presuppose the individualized society and its vulnerability, whether we will be able to change risks in our time into chance to make alternative vision for human being as well as society.

outline


- 1 Change of demographic structure in Japan
 - Depopulation and its reasons
 - Unbalanced mobility in cities and regions
- 2 Case Studies
 - National funeral and no funeral for “Human being”
 - Booming of funeral and memorial for “Pet”
 - Disappearing Buddhist temples and their roles in regions
- 3 Progressing of Liberalization or Individualization?

Aging and depopulation

Figure 1-1-6 Steadily aging Japanese population




Change of demographic structure



Shrinking Japan


- Depopulation has been estimated and partially dealt with by bureaucrats, politicians, and scholars for over thirty years. However, we could not change this demographic change and most of us have not really understood the severity of this issue.
- Aging society requires increasing social security expenditures and therefore the decreasing working generation suffers heavy burdens.
- Japan has approximately 50,000 centenarian and the highest female average life expectancy of 85.90 (male 79.44 in 2012). NHK broadcasted 8 million elderly are suffering more or less dementia. Who give care for them?
- The Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare made the plan of comprehensive home care, which means no beds for elderly before their long life journey comes to an end.
- Politicians have been concerned about the majority of voters and postponed necessary measures to reform medical care and pension system. As a result, the younger generation has lost trust in the national pension system and suffered from a sense of helplessness.

Declining of birth rate



Unmarried people will not give birth in East Asia


Figure 1 Unmarried Rates by Age



Source: Population statistics of Japan 2011, the National Institute of Population and Social Security Research

Vulnerability of employment structure


Change of income by class



Since Asian financial crisis in 1997 the disparity between lower middle and upper widened.

Change of labor market

正規雇用者と非正規雇用者の推移




Why have Japanese women been reluctant to give birth?


- So far, the burden for women to marry and give birth has been discussed extensively, eg. gender inequality and lack of child care supports in society. However, the most simple fact is that many young and middle aged Japanese have not been able to make sufficient money to afford child-rearing, education, housing, and daily expense in recent stagnant economy. Current working generation cannot carry out the set of life-events that former generation could.
- Delayed marriage over the age of thirty results in higher risk of infertility and decision of having no child. Of course, female's higher education attainment and career goals was the cause of delayed marriage, but in fact workable women have higher tendency to marry than house-wife oriented women with non permanent jobs.
- One possible measure to lessen the burden of childrearing is to provide higher education and housing at a reasonable price. However, contrary to couples' hope, education and housing are the major expensive industries in Japan.

Mobility of population

Depopulated regions




Overpopulated city



Shrinking families

図4 世帯の家族類型別世帯数の推移（1970年～2005年）




Depopulation in regions and overpopulation in cities

- The mobility of people from regions to cities results in excessive depopulation, by which regional communities cannot survive without municipalities' supports. And in cities housing condition has deteriorated.
- As a result of LDP policy and candidates' constituencies, regions received huge subsidies to build roads to link different communities and villagers had temporal jobs because of these construction projects. But this policy will end due to no maintenance budget.
- Before each regions can find their way to survival, the elderly have to face the decreasing function of community. Children left their parents. What social agenda do they have?
- Citizens of old comers as well as new comers in cities will face very expensive housing, competitive education and work, and nursing service conditions.
- My research question is what kind of mind-set will be nurtured in such social condition. I try to find out the tendency of mind-set in daily lives at the time of death.

One of growth industries


Increase of dead person



Increase of funeral industry

Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 特定サービス産業動態統計調査

Total sales



Information on funerals is demanded


Funeral cost by regions

日本消費者協会の(平成15年9月第7回「葬儀についてのアンケート調査」)

全国葬儀費用平均				
対象地区	合計	葬儀費用	寺院費用	飲食接待費用
全国平均	236.6 万円	150.4 万円	48.6 万円	38.6 万円
北海道地区平均	186.2 万円	138.0 万円	30.0 万円	90.0 万円
東北地区平均	250.9 万円	117.5 万円	59.6 万円	37.8 万円
関東A地区平均 (千葉・埼玉・茨城・栃木)	165.1 万円	101.8 万円	40.0 万円	18.0 万円
関東B地区平均 (東京・神奈川・埼玉)	313.0 万円	178.5 万円	64.1 万円	66.1 万円
中部A地区平均 (愛知・岐阜・山梨・長野)	203.4 万円	143.4 万円	38.9 万円	39.6 万円
中部B地区平均 (静岡・群馬・栃木・長野・山梨)	378.9 万円	248.0 万円	87.5 万円	53.9 万円
近畿地区平均	239.2 万円	150.0 万円	30.0 万円	15.0 万円
中国地区平均	203.2 万円	157.6 万円	24.7 万円	19.2 万円
四国地区平均	206.4 万円	143.7 万円	44.2 万円	40.2 万円
九州地区平均	216.8 万円	150.0 万円	45.5 万円	26.0 万円


Dissatisfaction in funerals

日本消費者協会「第9回「葬儀についてのアンケート調査」報告書」(平成22年)




Isolated elders are increasing

Preference of funerals



Number of isolated dead in Tokyo

東京都区部における性・年齢階級別の孤独死数



“Isolated Dead” in Japan

- The number of death has surpassed birth since 2006 and the funeral industry has developed in accordance with the increasing deaths.
- However, many people are concerned about funeral costs and the way of services. Mass media often criticized dubious accounts and flow of money, which is divided by funeral companies and temple priests who provide posthumous name with expensive donation.
- This give-and-take relationship has been undermined by the preference of familial funerals and non funerals. When the elderly of over 90 years old die, bereaved family might be exhausted with long-time care and their friends may not attend the ceremony.
- Above all, isolated elders who died without care increased. Their numbers has recently reached approximately 2,000 per year in Tokyo. In 2012, 15,000 Japanese were discovered dead four days after they passed away.
- A traditional funeral that has family, kin, and large number of attendees has become rare in cities and funeral custom is changing in Japan

Mark Rowe 2003

Grave Changes: Scattering Ashes in Contemporary Japan

Japanese Journal of Religious Studies 30-1/2:85-118

CASE HISTORY OF FUNERAL AND THE MOVEMENT OF GRAVE FREE

Historical background of grave in Japan

- **Onin war** 応仁の乱 1466-77
 - Before this war, human corpses were feared and scattered in mountains and riversides. However, Buddhist monks conducted memorial services for the war dead.
- **Tokugawa Shogunate** 徳川時代 1603-1868
 - With the fear of Christianity, Shogunate required all Japanese families to register to local temples (寺請制度) and Buddhist funerals and memorial rites became mandatory.
 - New style of gravestones and heightening of family-centered consciousness (家) emerged at this time.

- Meiji period 明治時代 1868-1912
 - The State attempted the promotion of Shinto funeral. However, it abandoned the banning of Buddhist style funeral for two years.
 - Meiji civil code 明治民法 in 1898 legalized the right of succession of household act and controlled familial institutions.
- Taisho and Showa period 大正・昭和時代 1926-1989
 - New civil code also preserved the inheritance of religious assets.
- Since Heisei 平成 1989—
 - Inability of those without descendants or with daughters to buy graves has been common. To use land property that is premised to continue by lineage successors has also become difficult.
 - At the time of bubble economy, a backlash against inflated grave prices and unethical business ties with religious organization happened in the 1990s, hoping for funeral freedom.

Case 1 Natural Funeral

- Grave-Free Promotion Society
 - Founded in 1991 with 300 members, and grew 11,000 members and 13 branches in 1998
 - “With the graying of Japanese society, widespread nuclearization of families, an increase in divorce, rising land costs, and growing concern for the environment, Japan is now facing a crisis over insufficient space for the dead.” Mark Rowe



Short history of GFPS

- The Justice Ministry:
 - “Since the aim of the criminal code mutilating and abandoning dead body (死体損壊罪・遺骸遺棄罪) is to protect religious sentiments, natural funeral (自然葬) is no problem,” commented in 1991.
- GFPS:
 - Bones must be crushed into less than 5 millimeters.
 - Scatters them on the sea far from 22 kilometers.
- Round table by the Welfare Ministry in 1997-8
 - GFPS considered that the GFPS vis-à-vis the State by making funerary freedom a battle against State oppression and scattering was the most fundamental of human rights.
 - Committee reported we should take care of the religious sentiment of those people who lived in areas where ashes were scattered, which was regulated at the prefectural level because it involves reselling of properties with human remains.

Challenges to scattering ashes

- Are there tradition of scattering in Japan?
 - Just scattering dead bodies vs. romantic funeral according to the will of the passed away
- Is it really environmental friendly?
 - The upstream village opposed: even if GFPS privately owned forest, the land belongs to locals; scattering hurts the tourists’ image; littering human remains seems strange to some people.
- Buddhist monks want conventional way.
 - Priest transform a brave spirit to a peaceful one by memorial services.
 - Performing memorial rites gives benefit not only to the dead, but also to the descendants.
 - Form of Buddhist grave guides the living to enlightenment.



Grave situations

Shortage of graveyard

- Tokyo public graveyard
 - One in thirty applicants
- Graves of No surviving relatives increased

Privatization of funeral custom







新井満「千の風になって」(講談社)

2003

- 私のお墓の前で 泣かないでください
そこに私はいません 眠ってなんかいません
千の風に
千の風になって
あの大きな空を
吹きわたっています
- 秋には光になって 畑にふりそそぐ
冬はダイヤのように きらめく雪になる
朝は鳥になって あなたを目覚めさせる
夜は星になって あなたを見守る

Do Not Stand at My Grave and Weep

Mary Frye, who was living in Baltimore at the time, wrote the poem in 1932

- Do not stand at my grave and weep, I am not there; I do not sleep. I am a thousand winds that blow, I am the diamond glints on snow, I am the sunlight on ripened grain, I am the gentle autumn rain. When you awaken in the morning's hush I am the swift uplifting rush. Of quiet birds in circled flight. I am the soft stars that shine at night. Do not stand at my grave and cry, I am not there; I did not die.

Change of the self-consciousness in funeral and grave

- The life of Japanese people centers around family, community, and working place that provide them a sense of convenience/proximity as well as social security. However, continuous demographic and economical change deprived them of belongingness so that funeral services became individualized and commercialized to the extent that individual spirituality were not comforted by conventional Buddhist funeral.
- Although the funeral liberalization movement by Grave-Free Promotion Society met challenges from local communities and professional religious institutions, this group set up branch office in each prefecture and attracted peoples' attention.
- Funeral industry adapted to peoples' demand, conducting family funeral and/or only cremation, therefore they could not make a huge profit as they have expected, despite an increasing number of dead. Most of temple priests seem to be incapable to deal with this trend.
- Another promising field of funeral industry is pet funeral.


Barbara Ambros, *Bones of Contention: Animals and Religion in Contemporary Japan*, University of Hawai'i Press, 2012

CASE 2 PET FUNERAL

Pet booming


Growth of dog's registration

■ 犬の登録頭数推移



【出所】厚生労働省「犬の登録頭数と予防注射頭数等の年次別推移」

Promising market



【注】1:小売金額ベース
2:(既)経済効果、(予)経済効果



(矢野経済研究所推計)

In 2012 11,530,000 dogs and 9,750,000 cats are registered.
10,700 pet hospital receive pet patients.

People generously give their money to pet.

Decreasing daily expenditure
and increasing pet cost

Middle aged couples own pets
and pay for them




「家計調査通信439号(平成22年9月15日発行)」より

More loved pet, more sorrow on their death.



Single person loves pet.

May rest in peace.



You do not worry about pet' soul.
They are treated as human are.

Ossuary for pet



This ossuary keeps pet's bone for two year.
If you want, keep longer with extra charge.

Ossuary for pet with owner



If you want to scatter pet's ashes, you can
conduct national funeral like human.

Pet memorial services



Glamorous ossuary



Bereaved owners gathered on 彼岸



Feel easy in practicing pet funeral at Aeon affiliated cemeteries

Six security

- 1 protect the dignity of pet' body and soul.
- 2 guarantee of satisfactory funeral.
- 3 equipment of cremation and funeral hall.
- 4 fair and clear charge.
- 5 full of kind treatment for memorial service as well as grief care for you
- 6 total management for security and privacy
- You can pay by Aeon credit card.

イオンのペット葬について
お客様の声をお聞かせください

①今回、ご利用(火葬)されたペット霊園名をお書きください。

ひらかた動物霊園

②「イオンのペット葬」の満足度は100点満点で何点になるでしょうか。

100点 / 100点

③「イオンのペット葬」を選んだ理由をお聞かせください。

①安心感 ②価格面 ③サービス・品質面 ④イオンカード
5. その他 ()

④「イオンのペット葬」は何でお知りになりましたか。

①ホームページ ②知人からの紹介 ③動物病院からの紹介
4. その他 ()

⑤その他、ご利用された霊園やイオンコールセンターの対応について
ご意見ご感想などございましたらご記入ください。

ナールセンターの女性が親切にこちら側の身に
なり代わって取り急いでいます
葬儀の方も葬儀の方からの連絡でお腹のたの
みで、葬儀の日時が定まり、取り急いで人助がた

⑥こちらの内容を貴社のホームページなどに直筆のままご紹介させて
いただいてもよろしいでしょうか。(個人情報漏洩させて掲載いたします)

Why have pet funeral services emerged in Japan?

- Japanese has old folk tales in which people and animals got to marry and funeral rituals were conducted for working animals like cow and horse. Since Edo period pet memorial service has been practiced at a Jodo-temple (回向院). Most animals were, indeed, abandoned in field and forest.
- Pet booming in the 1980s to the present changed Japanese attitude to pets, and they treated them as a member of family more than companion animals. More they were owned by conjugal families, mid and elder people, and single household, more the sorrow and lament would result in society when the pets pass away.
- In the 1990s the concept of pet-loss syndrome and its treatment were introduced from US and the effectiveness of funeral and memorial services were paid attention by animal therapists and doctors.
- Especially in Japan, after the booming of memorial service for liquid life in the 1970s some temple priests received the request from pet owners for funeral. In addition to that, TV psychics talked about the soul of pet that often went around this world, which further sadden the bereaved owners.
- Pet industry, grave-yard company, and priests welcome this new demand.

Shito also appreciated owners' sincere love to pet.

小野住吉神社



The dog received 7-5-3 praying from the priest. It needs booking and 7,000yen.

市谷亀岡八幡宮



Even the turtle received 7-5-3 universal praying.

Even pets have rite of passage and marriage.

Amulet for pets 市谷亀岡八幡宮



Amulet including ID card

Priest prays for amulets



Protecting words

Pet wedding hall 岐阜県各務原市チャペルザ・シアターサルヴェ



Rites of Passage in Japan

神道 Shinto



仏教 Buddhism



Traditional Japanese life cycle model





図1 生者の通過儀礼と死者の通過儀礼 (オームズ, p.99)

What is the grieving of pet loss ?

Five stages by Elisabeth Kubler-Ross

- 1 denial, shock and numbness
 - 2 anger
 - 3 bargaining
 - 4 depression
 - 5 acceptance
-
- Pet loss is identical to human loss.

How to comfort grievance?



Rainbow Bridge Poem

- When a beloved pet dies , the pet goes to this special place. There is always food and water and warm spring weather.
- The old and frail are young again. Those who are maimed are made whole again.
- They play all day with each other. There is only one thing missing.
- They are not with their special person who loved them on Earth.
- So each day they run and play until the day comes when one suddenly stops playing and looks up !
- The nose twitches !
- The ears are up !
- The eyes are staring !
- And this one suddenly runs from the group !
- You have been seen, and when you and your special friend meet, you take him or her into your arms and embrace.
- Your face is kissed again and again, and you look once more into the eyes of your trusting pet.
- Then you cross the Rainbow Bridge together, never again to be separated
- Author Unknown

Interesting contrast between individualized human funerals and deluxe animal one

- In Japan funeral and grievance for human became simpler. However, affection for pets is becoming so great that many people face grievance when their pets die. Why did so many Japanese as well as people in other countries grieve so much after the death of pets? Are pets cuter and more affectionate than elders over 90 years?
- On the other hand, in 2010 approximately 50,000 dogs and 160,000 cats were killed at municipal health centers, half of whose animals were brought by pet-owners. There is gap among pets as in human society.
- With regard to funeral and memorial services in Japan, people have been liberated from traditional form of grievance, which will undermine the survival of temple Buddhism that has monopolized Japanese expressional form of grievance. But people still want an object that can represent their intimacy and grievance when they lose them.
- Can we say that religions have discovered potential believers? Or did temple Buddhism lose their religious role in contemporary Japan?

This research has been conducted since 2010. The purpose is to survey on the role of temples in depopulated regions.

CASE 3 TEMPLE IN REGIONS

Abandoned Temple



Case Study of Shishu-othani school 直宗大谷派

• Founder: Shinran

• 親鸞 1173-1162

- Salvation by Amitabha Buddha 南無阿弥陀仏
- Easy training for people and no precepts for monks
- Expanded by his descendants
- Various denominations 宗派
- Many devoted adherents 門徒
- Num. of Temples: 8,588
- Num. of Parishioners: 5.5 million







Fig 1 Temple Order




Ratio of 65 Agers and Declining of Temple parishioners



Head Temple 真宗本廟

Local Temple 東照寺




1 Comparative analysis on rural temples

1 Management

- Num. of Parishioners are:
 - Less than 50 unstable
 - No successors
 - 51~150 modestly
 - Still thinking
 - 151~300 stable
 - Make sons and heirs to be monk and/or let them work at head temples
 - Over 301 wealthy
 - Make sons and heirs to be deputy abbot

Num. of Parishioners
revenue



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2 Conditions of location


Seriously depopulated regions
-aging and leave

-abbot disappears before parishioners

Modestly depopulated regions
-near cities and/or commutable area
-supported by leaving people

Expanding cities
-entry of other parishioners
-many funerals to increase new parishioners
-secularism in parishioners

Residential area of parishioners



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3 Social activities by monks

•Local temple

- As historical monument
 - Older than municipality
 - Integral symbol of migration and development
- As community center
 - Assembly house before municipal center has built.
- As visiting care-giver
 - Once a month at least
 - Listen to agers' complaint
 - Take care of single elders
- As Local celebrity
 - Public service by abbot
 - human rights protector
- educational board member
- probation officer
- administrative counseling member
- social education board member
- library board member
- PTA president
- special nursing home president

•Abbot leader–parishioner follower

- Different from earnest Christian church and new religions' church in terms of participation in social activities.

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Temple Buddhism still holds function to give care for elders in regions.

- Although temple Buddhism is often criticized as funeral Buddhism, it has still kept an important social role in two ways.
- First, Buddhism could deal with the death of human as well as animals. Since Japanese people have been so secularized to the extent that more than 70% regard them as non-religious, they have no answer to the following questions: why are there fortunate people and unfortunate people in the world? Why should I and we meet sorrows such as serious disease, separation, and loss of meaning of life? What will I or pet go after death? Religions may tell something to us. Probably we need some answers at such critical times.
- Second, people in depopulated regions still affiliate to Temple Buddhism that continues to provide religious and social services until a community disappears several decades later. The role of Buddhism should not be underestimated. Temple Buddhism are busy for their survival. However, if it shares similar challenges as the general society is facing in a depopulation age, it may also find the new role to cope with people's new demand.

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Concluding remarks

- First, my paper describes Japanese demographic change, people's decision not to marry and postponing marriage resulted in low fertility, especially under twenty years' stagnant economy, competitive career, lack of child-rearing support, and expensive housing. Unbalanced mobility between cities and regions caused extreme aging and volatile society.
- Second, my case study shows the individualization of funerals in which people are liberated from convention and planed their ending in different ways. Such orientation attracted certain peoples' attentions and the formation of network among elders who decide not to rely on children or no-choice. Another interesting issue in pet funeral is peoples' privatized religious pray for being with their beloved "object" forever. Japanese secularized and commercialized religions corporate with people's new demands.
- Third, on the other hand, local community still need conventional religions such as temple Buddhism as well as regional shrines in order to keep integrity of regions. We can recognize various aspect of individualization, by looking at the current funerals in man and animal, and cities and regions.

Marketized Individualization and Welfare Needs

Shin, Kyung-Ah

Hallym University

Contents

- **Introduction**
- **Theoretical Background**
- **Study Methods**
- **Analytical Framework**
- **Findings :**
 - group I : Welfare-Oriented**
 - group IV : Individual-Oriented**

Introduction

- **Problems related to individualization research in Korea**
 - the conceptual uncertainty of the Individualization
 - the specificity of the historical experiences of individualization
 - the difficulty of empirical verification of the theory
- **Research Questions:**
 - 1. Is Korean Society being individualized?**
 - 2. What is the characteristics of individualization in Korea?**
 - 3. The relevance of the personal experiences faced with economic crisis in 1998 and welfare needs**
- **The historical characteristics of Korean Society**
 - **Condensed Modernization**
 - **Strong leadership of the state**
 - **Active social movements**
 - **High level of job insecurity**

- The absence of welfare system
- Lack of individualism
- ⇒ Experiencing Risk Society from 1994, the collapse of Sungsu Bridge
- Necessity for the Study on People in their 30s in Korean Society
 - “Generational Divide in Election” since 2010
 - The young voters in their 20s and 30s votes for the opposition parties.
 - The people in their 30s can be called as “progressive generation.” (generational identity)
 - This political liberalism has had a deep relationship with the historical changes since 1970s, especially the economic crisis in 1997, financial crisis in 2008, and political democratization after 1987.
- Questions
 - How did social crises affect the life and consciousness of individuals in Korea that did not fully experience a welfare state system?
 - What effect did this experience have on the welfare needs of Korean people?
 - How has the way of thinking about the relationship between the individual and society been changed during the crises?

Theoretical Background

- The Risk Society and Individualization (Ulrich Beck)
 - Forced Individualization
 - Multidimensional Globalization
 - Risk Society
- ⇒
- Individualization from Family, Social Class, the Nation-State
- ⇐
- Effort to Stability, Social Protection, Intimacy
- ➔ Institutionlized Individualization

Theoretical Background

- N. Rose
 - Individualization as a neo-liberalistic governmentality

- **M. Dean**
 - Privatization of risk
- **Individualization in Korea**
 - Bureaucratic authoritarian state of Park Chung-hee government
 - IMF crisis and neo-liberal market society
 - Marketized individualization in neo-liberal risk society
- **Some symptoms of marketized individualization**
 - Rates of marriages, fertility, and divorce
 - Increasing one-person households
 - Mass murder by the helpless
(murders by less educated dispatching workers in Japan and Korea)

Study Methods I

- **State and Life Course**
 - The Institutional Approach to LC (Bremen Research Team)
 - Focus on the relationship between institutions and individuals across the life span
 - In the continental European context, LC institutions define timing and sequencing of transitions across LC.
 - IN the United States biographies are shaped more by the interaction of markets, social networks, and individual decisions
- **LC and Globalization**
 - In the age of globalization, individual biographies will become more flexible and have to be shaped with less institutional guidance and support.
 - The emerging patterns of individual coordination of life spheres, transitions, and sequences depend on the processes of deregulation of the labor market, flexibility of employment patterns, and family life discontinuities.
- **The Constructionist Approach**
 - Focusing on subjective meaning and appraisal made by the people in institutions and living arrangements
 - Qualitative methods
 - Integrated research

Study Methods II


➤ Study on People Born in 1975

- In 1975, the Korean government changed its growth strategy into heavy chemical industry.
- In 1980s, the middle class was formed.
- In 1987, a movement for democracy arose.
- In 1991, the Soviet Union was collapsed.
- In 1990s, the consumer society had been developed.
- In 1994, the College Scholastic Aptitude Test was started.
Safety accidents like the collapse of Sungsu Bridge happened.
- In 1997 and 2008, they suffered from a series of financial crises and the economic depression had been continued.

➤ Life Course Study


- Collecting and analyzing data on the sequence, transition and trajectories in the life course, such as birth, schooling, employment, marriage, childbirth and childcare, by using life course study
- In-depth interviews were used and the total 50 samples were collected through theoretical sampling based on the class, gender, educational background, employment, marital status and region.

Analytical Framework



Findings : Four groups


classified with the relationship between the experience
of economic crisis and welfare needs



Analysis

- **Group I : Exp of Economic Crisis Yes, Welfare Needs Yes (Welfare-Oriented)**
 - 20cases (female 8, male 12)
 - Subgroups
 - ✓ I -1 : The poor
 - ✓ I -2 : Irregular worker and self-employed
 - ✓ I -3 : People in early parenthood
 - ✓ I -4 : Political Progressives
- **Characteristics :**
 - Poverty
 - Unstable Employment

- **Life-Course Needs : Public Support for Housing, Childcare, Education**
 - **Political Progressivism**
- **Group IV : Exp of Economic Crisis Yes, Welfare Needs No (Individual-Oriented)**
- 11cases (female 7, male 4)
 - 9 (junior) college graduate, 2 high school graduate(female)
 - 6 regular workers, 3 irregular workers, 1 self-employed, 1 full-time housewife
 - Middle or lower middle classes
- **Characteristics :**
- All of them are members of middle class.
 - Most of them are political conservatives.
 - **Middle Class Consciousness : Distrust of Government**
Tax Resistance
Upward Orientation
 - **Personal Acceptance of Risks**



Discussion

- **As the social inequality increases in Korea, the gap among social classes will be growing, and the group I will be enlarged, with group IV being reduced.**
- **Globalization will make the pressure toward individualization stronger, while at the same time, the welfare needs for the social protection will be increased.**

Insecure Employment and Coerced Individualization: Focusing on the Labor Market Mobility Patterns by Gender and Class^{*}

Park, Kinam

Korea Foundation for Women

1. Research Interests

Sociologists have long concerned about social risks related with increase of labor market mobility, insecure employment, nomadic work, and polarization of people in complex aspects of lives and life cycles (Beck, 2000; Furlong and Cartmel, 1997). Labor market insecurity has long been regarded as the heaviest social challenge people must face during their working careers. Intensities and degrees of risks may differ depending on gender, age, human capital, and individual characters. However, most of the social scientists may agree employment insecurity and its consequent individual and social problems have turned into chronic social issues even in most advanced societies.

For Beck, this represents a new form of individualism whereby people fall back on their own resources to construct their own employment biographies, negotiating the hazards and opportunities in inventive ways. In Beck's view, however, the precarious nature of much contemporary employment will, over time, blur the familiar boundary between employment and unemployment, with some people moving in and out of different forms of paid employment (from permanent to temporary or contract work and back again, for example) and across the divide between full- and less than full-time work in the course of their working lives. The cost of this ability to retain a hold on some form of paid work is the 'generalization of employment insecurity'; not as part of a cyclical economic downturn or through the experience of frequent lay-offs, but rather as a regularized feature of working life (Allen and Henry, 1997; Bauman, 2000; Beck, 1986, 1992, 2002; Sennet, 2002).

Korean society has also witnessed polarization of labor market and dramatic increase of non regular employment since the financial crisis 1997. Even though Korea was able to overcome economic crisis very quickly, people had to embrace flexibilities and instabilities in their working lives without realizing how serious it is. Korean government facilitated these processes with the introduction of new labor laws and policy measures encouraging dispatched work and employment restructuring. Most of the policy and institutional measures for curbing the dramatic increase of unstable employment have been failed. During last decade, the estimated size of non regular employment expanded has increased dramatically. Even though the growth trend of non regular employment has slowed very recently, we are now facing a dismal reality that more than half of the total employment in Korean society is actually non regular.

Proponents of employment flexibility vigorously argued non regular employment will be a bridge for

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better and stable employment. It was advertised as means for necessary ladder of success. The hard reality testifies exactly the opposite. It had been repeatedly found to be a trap enforcing people to remain permanently in insecurity. The concentration of social risks on younger generation people under 40s is another hard awakening that enormous number of people is now suffering from insecure employment.

This research is a trial to investigate on the lived experiences of the new generation workers born in 1975. They are very typical and peculiar in our society because they had to get jobs just at the beginning of the economic crisis. They represent a new generation workers who had to embrace and suffer fluctuations and hard realities of new labor market regime. Their life courses have been very challenging due to recurrent economic crisis, labor market contraction, and harsh employment policies. They had to marry, hold their jobs, and manage through families in the midst of worsening market situation. Depending in-depth interviews on their lived experiences we would like to identify how individualization are actually disembedding and re-embedding its social and personal foot prints on the people. Individualization processes are very divergent depending on social back grounds such as gender, human capital, family back ground, and classes. By looking more closely on their lives focusing on their life experiences, we may figure out how economic, institutional, and social changes are really making their imprints on the life courses of people in very complicated but understandable ways.

2. Data and Method

In collecting data, in-depth interviews were used and the total 50 cases that were born in 1975 were collected through theoretical sampling based on the class, gender, educational background, employment, marital status and region. The in-depth interviews were conducted by using questionnaire. The study team members interviewed each person for 2-4 hours and recorded the interview for analysis. In this study I used 41 cohort cases that are working in the labor market. I focused on 26 people who are working as non regular workers including 8 workers who are hopping around freelancer, unemployment, and self-employment. Remaining 15 regular employees were used as comparison.

I apply event sequence analysis for data . This method is very useful for grasping the chain events of life as a holistic development of a unit phenomenon. We do not approach life occasions like finding, losing, and changing jobs of a person not as disconnected or independent happening but as closely related continuous string of events. This method is especially useful for exploration of peculiar life patterns with similar contexts.

3. Research Results: Divergent working trajectories of insecure employment

1) Temporary and contract work

Temporary and contract works are reserved for the people with relatively higher education. Their employment status is relatively stable, because they are guaranteed with at least 2 years and possible to renew the contract. They are insecure due to discrimination of bonus and company benefits. However they are a little bit better compared with other non regular employees because they are eligible for 4 major social securities.

Among 26 non regular interviewees, temporary and contract workers are 7. They are 6 male and 1 female by sex and 4 Univ. graduates and 3 high school by education. Their jobs' trajectories reflect the hard job market

situation after graduation. They found jobs around the year 2000 when non regular employment are expanding remarkably fast. They had to accept contract work with limited terms even though they are equipped with college degrees. Due to unstable employment, they are constantly looking around other workplaces and two jobs. Their Personal connections for some youths as like case 35 and 44 are easy means of finding various jobs for temporary workers. For them, getting a stable family is regarded as more successful life rather than striving to keep a stable job in the labor market. Manual jobs will be easier to stabilize, however, they have to endure hard working conditions and their jobs are difficult to be extended for long time. They are witnessing coerced individualization due to back storms of economic crisis.

<Table 1> temporary and contract worker's working trajectories

Case NO.	Sex	School	Region	Earnings (10,000won)	first job age	Marital age	Working Trajectories
44	M	Univ.	Seoul	250/M	27	32	W(J1/J2:1/J3:1/J4:2/J5:1/J6:1/J7:2/J8:2)
35	M	College	Chonbuk	-	25	26	W(J1/J2:1/J3:1/J4:J5:5two jobs/J5:5·J6:2·two jobs)
29	M	Univ.	Chonbuk	2,000/Y	28	35	E:2 - W(J1:1/J2:6) – N - W(J3:2)
38	M	High	Chonbuk	180-200/M	20	32	T:2·A – M - W(J1/J2/J3....:6) – N – W(J4:4/J5:1/J6:2)
41	M	Commercial H.	Seoul	2,600/Y	21	34/37 divorced	W(J1:1)-M-W(J2:2/J3:2/J4:9)
42	M	Technical H.	Seoul	220/M	20	31	W(J1:1/J2:1) - M(1) - W(J3:1/J4: various two jobs:10~ /J5:4)
17	F	Univ.	Seoul	2,500/Y	24	single	W(J1:1) – S – Australia ·A - W(J2:3) – Europe - W(J3:3/E4) – N - W(J5:3)

J no.(series number of Jobs) : N(duration)

A(Arbeit), E(Exam. preparing), F(Freelancer), H(Housewife), M(Military Service), N(Not : not in education and not in training), SE(Self-Employed), S(Univ.), S1(Graduate S.), S2(Doctoral Course), T(Training and Qualification etc.)

Drifting around labor market filled with uncertainty, people must change their life skills several times (Sennett, 2001). Male interviewee as like Case 3 has already changed their companies 6 times. They had to reshuffle major skills 3 times. He learned baking skill hoping to open his own shop ultimately. However, due to hard squeeze coming from big franchise bakeries, he had to fold his tiny dream. After that, he entered into chicken distribution business. Meager increase of cash income during 4 years was not able to prevent him from undoing his job due to mental depression of his pregnant wife. He is now working as non regular blue collar worker in his wife's home town. He has to endure disadvantaged treatment and discrimination of company benefits. Despite this, he is maintaining perseverance with a small hope for promotion into regular employment after 2 years.

2) Indirect employment like Dispatched and subcontracting work

Dispatched, subcontracting workers are located at a more difficult employment pyramid. They are mostly lower in human capital. Number of female employment tends to increase in proportion with lower employment conditions. They are very frequent in turnover and their paths are very complicated. Without 4 basic social security, legal protection, and working rights, they are extremely vulnerable. They are scrambling for more

income in order to maintain and educate family members. Without formal employer to pay for their security, they have to preserve big chunk of their income for social and medical insurances. All the life risks must be taken by their own account.

<Table 2> Dispatched, subcontracting, indirect employees' working trajectories

Case NO.	Sex	School	Region	Earnings (10,000 won)	first job age	Marital age	Working Trajectories
3	M	Commercial H.	Busan	250-350/M	18	28	W(J1:3)-M-W(J2/J3:2/J4:2/J5:2/J6:8)
20	M	Univ.	Busan	110/M	28	single	W(J1:1)-E:4-W(A:1/J2:3)-W(J3:1)·S
31	F	Middle	Chon-buk	2,500/Y	16	30	T-W(J1:5/J2:2/J3:.....5)-N-W(J4:2/J5:2)-H-W(J6:3)
24	F	High	Gwangju	160/M	20	23	W(E1:2)-T-W(J2:2/SE:6~J3/J4/J5...)
7	F	High	Seoul	-	18	25/35 separated	W(J1) - W(J2:3)·T - W(J3:2-two jobs/J5/J6:1) - H·A:5 - W(J7:5/J8/J9:2)
18	F	High	Seoul	130/M	20	single	W(J1:2/J2:1/E3:1)-N·A-W(J4:2/J5:1) - travel abroad· T·A - W(J6:1/A/J7:2/J8)-N...-W(J9)

Significant proportion of their low income will be snatched by the brokers, which is worsening their economic situation. Desperate people without skill and education have to accept the job offer in order to survive. Even people with some education as like Case 20 are exposed to dispatch employment. Women are very easy to be trapped into this kind of employment. Typical cases are telemarketers like case 7, 18, and 24. Even though they move around various companies, they are actually repeating similar unstable employment like Sisyphus. Difficult employment situation has very close selective affinity with non marriage or single parenthood.

3) Daily and Alba (Arbeit) workers

The bottom layer of insecure employment is the spaces for daily workers and so called Albas. Different mixture of male and female, under high school graduates, and technical school people were interviewed and most of them are suffering from illness. One of the interviewees is barely working for daily lives due to worst health situation and another one is complementing his life with welfare pension for disabled. Paradoxically, the bad working conditions for them are one of the main reasons for them preventing from trying better employment opportunities. They can easily find works which are always awaiting them. Like cheap stuffs, they can find Albas any time as soon as they get out from home. People could maintain their lives by bundling several different Albas although there are no protections against harsh and dangerous working conditions.

<Table 3> Daily and Alba (Arbeit) workers' working trajectories

Case NO.	Sex	School	Region	Earnings (10,000 won)	first job age	Marital age	Working Trajectories
34	M	High	Seoul	100/M	20	Single	W(J1:2) – M - N·A - W(J2:3/J3/J4:2....irregular day works: 8~)
16	M	College	Kangwon-Do	-	22	single	W(J1:1) – M - S:1 - W(J2/J3:1/J4/J5....) – (since bleeder's disease in 2007) - N – T - N·S·A...
5	F	High	Seoul	-	15	single	Continue to have been in lots of Arbeit and temporary working and lay-offs – SE – N - A~

48	F	High	Chon-buk	-	20	single	W(J1) - N·A....-online game addicted : 2 - N·A.... -W(J2:3) - N·A
46	F	Open Univ.	Seoul	-	20	single	W(A/J1/A) – T - W(J2) - W(J3:4)·S - study in France : 3 – T – A – T - W(A/E4:1/E5:1) - S·W(J6:2)

People are discouraged from building their human capital because they can get cheap jobs whenever they want. See of cheap jobs is one of the major factors strengthening short-sightedness. Cheapest and dead end works available any time may spoil young people to remain at the bottom because they are at least secured with daily lives. Daily works and Albas are discouraging young people from motivating them to invest themselves. When they are provided with something to free ride from their families, Alba and daily works are convenient means to remain at the bottom level. So-called freeters may be designated name for them.

However, some people are enforced to find Albas due to various personal reasons such as ill health or poor human capital. People engaging in irregular employment may become easy preys for internet, alcohol, or game intoxications. Those lonely habits bring in disconnection from social relations, thus completing vicious negative cycles.

4) Self-employed and freelancers

4 male and 4 female were interviewed as the cases of self-employment and freelancers. Those jobs were not their own choices. They had to do such employment due reluctant reasons. They are distinguished from other categories due to their professional skills and higher education.

Self-employment and free lancers are very diverse in their ways to reach their situations. However, they are common in hovering around several jobs and companies. Their market experiences were not achievement of higher ladders but results of downward spirals. Misfortunes due to bad economic situation like IMF had greater impacts on their dreams to succeed as independent entrepreneurs. Aging is also draining better opportunities too fast. Stresses coming from companies and organizations are shortening their careers. Most of the male workers are trying to extend their careers due to the fear of left alone as self-employers.

<Table 4> Self-employed and freelancers' working trajectories

Case NO.	Sex	School	Region	Earnings (10,000 won)	first job age	Marital age	Working Trajectories
45	M	Univ.	Seoul	300-400/M	28	33	W(non-regular Jobs....: 4 - SE:6)
39	M	College Univ.	Seoul	350/M	27	32	W(J1/J2:2/J3:3) – T - W(F:6) - preparing SE
40	M	Univ.	Suwon Seoul	-	25	single	W(F:2/SE(1)/contracting Jobs: 7~8) - N·A
28	M	Commercial H.	Seoul	200/M	20	single	W(J1:2) – M - W(A-J2:2/J3/J4/J5:4/J6:2) – T·W(J6:2) - W(SE:3)
6	F	Univ.	Seoul	-	23	32	W(J1:2) - E(2) - W(J2:1/F:10)
13	F	Univ.	Chon-buk	-	22	single	T·A- W(J1:7)-travel abroad- W(J2:6)- W(SE·F)·S
14	F	Graduate	Busan	-	28	32	W(J1:1/J2:1/A/J3:1/J4:1/J5:1) - S2: 3 - W(F:1)
25	F	C. High College	Busan	-	18	32	W(J1/J2/J3/J4/J5:3) - travel abroad - T·A – travel abroad-W(J6:2/J7:2/J8:2/J9:3)-N- W(SE1:1/SE2:1)

Women workers are rather more homogeneous and predictable in their career patterns. Highly educated like college graduates are accustomed to engaging in various kinds of teaching jobs as well as maintaining their families. One of the interviewees, case 13, is living a unique individual life by returning to her home town as unmarried status keeping two different jobs as ice cream shop owner and foreign language translator.

Economic crisis also left deep scars on their careers, which enforced them to remain stagnant in the low layer of market hierarchies. At first, they voluntarily chose self-employment and freelancers in order to have stable economic lives. However, labor market and economic hardships will never allow peaceful ways. Of course, they realize they are solely responsible for their economic lives without institutional or organizational protections. One of the cases like case 40 had to move up and down the fringes of jobs and absence of work very frequently. Days of no work are happening more and more often, and they have to refrain from social appearance due to the lack of money. Life without marriage, children, and future prospects may one day become stigmas of loser players and isolated individuals. They are unwilling and free floating individuals nowhere to anchor their lives.

4. Findings and Discussion:

Working Trajectories and Characteristics of Individualization by Gender and Class

Most of non regular interviewees were experiencing different labor market events. Figuring out common patterns among extreme dispersion is very difficult. However, they were all common in their frequent mobility of similar jobs, juggling two jobs, ups and downs of different non regular employments or hanging around miscellaneous things. They are also inventing various kinds of individualized risk avoiding strategies within extremely limited opportunity spaces. Patchwork employment biographies are abundant comparable with the different patterns of non regular employment. Even among non regular employment patterns, there are discernible ranks and status gaps. Different non regular employment patterns are like a hierarchy of bubbles, always changing and constantly moving. For the workers, their chances for escape from bubble clusters were becoming more and more difficult. As their time within bubbles of insecure employment extends the small opening for regular careers will become more and more remote. Young people may start with cheap jobs without much consideration. However, they may easily slide into lower ditches unless they try to pull out quickly.

Women are situated in much more disadvantaged and endangered places even in the insecure world of labor. Their wages and securities are lower and trajectories are much more twisted. Compared with non regular, regular jobs(see <Appendix 1>) are much simple, stable, and clearly designed. However, regular employment does not necessarily mean indefinite stability. They may have to change companies several times searching for better jobs. Their protection curtains are becoming more and more open and porous. High school graduates may have to change companies more frequently and must accept slow promotion and low wages. Women employees are exception in their discrimination of their wages and life chances. Most of them may have to maintain stable employment in exchange for dead-end jobs. The once clear demarcation line between regular vs. non regular employment are becoming more and more blurring. Insecure elements are slowly permeating into their job securities. Deep anxieties on the unstable career future are always overshadowing their minds. Never ending

struggles for competition are always stalking their mentalities. Unmarried people are most vulnerable. Disadvantaged, dead-end, and isolated careers may anytime disintegrate the careers of people without family support. They are floating individuals without destinations, not knowing where to go.

Cohorts of 1975 still preserve strong determination to maintain their lives with their own responsibilities. Even though they live with their parents, they want to solve their incomes. They are confident to find jobs whenever they are willing to search. However, they began their careers with periods when all the varieties of bad jobs began to spread out from employment world. They never concerned about scarcity of jobs, because cheap jobs were always available. Market places were always filled with cheap jobs like cheap stuffs. However, their expectation that one day they may successfully get into regular employment was found to be vanities.

Now they are anxious of estrangement from their families. Especially, male workers are trying to remain within families in order to cancel out unstable and risky employment situations. In contrast, some female workers are determined to reorient into new lives even though their jobs are very shaky. Their venture into new mode of individualization will reshape renewed nomadic lives. However, people with burdens and handicaps like single moms, non-married, or family duties are extremely difficult to escape from their destinies.

< Appendix> Regular Employees' working trajectories

Case NO.	Sex	School	Region	Earnings (10,000 won)	first job age	Marital age	Working Trajectories
8	F	graduate	Daejon Seoul	-	23	Single	W(J1) - S1 - W(J2/J3/J4/SeoulJ5/J6/J7)
15	F	graduate	Gangwon-Do	2,500/Y	24	single	W(J1)·S1 - W(J2)·S2 - W(J2:12)
2	F	Commercial H.	Seoul Busan	2,000/Y	19	25	W(J1:4) – T - W(J2:2) - H(6) - W(J3:7)
47	F	Commercial H.	Chon-buk Seoul	220-230/M	18	25	W(Seoul J1:20)
11	F	Open Univ.	Seoul	3,600/Y	20	25	W·S - W(J1/J2/J3) - W(J4/J5/J6/J7)·S
37	F	Commercial H.	Gwangju	4,000/Y	19	Single	W(J1:7/J2/J3/J4/J5:4/J6:7)
1	M	Graduate	Seoul Busan	8,000/Y	32	Single	W(J1:6)
21	M	Univ.	Seoul Busan	4,000/Y	27	29	W(J1:11)
33	M	Univ.	Daejon Seoul	3,700/Y	27	37	W(J1:1/J2:2/J3:3/J4:5)
44	M	College	Seoul	5,600/Y	25	Single	T - W(J1:6/J2:2/J3:6)
49	M	Univ.	Gwangju	2,500/Y	27	35	W(J1) – T - W(J2) - E(3) - W(J3:3/J4:3)
23	M	Com. H. College	Seoul	150-250/M	18	Single	W(J1:2) – M - W(J1:3) - S:2 - W(J2:4/J3:6·two jobs)
50	M	Technical H./ Univ.	Chon-buk	-	19	30	W(J1) - S:2 - W(J1:3/J2/J3:3) - W(J4:2, two jobs)·S - W(J5:2) - W(J6:3)·S1
12	M	High Univ.	Chon-buk	3,000/Y	21	37	W(J1:3) - S:4 - S1·W(J2:3) - W(J3:7)
30	M	High	Seoul	300/M	20	33	W – M - W(J1/J2:2/J3:3....SE/J?:1)

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발행처 중민사회이론연구재단

151-848 서울특별시 관악구 관악로 164, 202 호

(봉천동, 대우슈페리움 1 단지)

Tel. 02-875-8474, www.hantheory.org
