

< 2nd Year Seminar >

Individualization and Community Reconstruction in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo: From the Perspective of Risk Society

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2nd Year Seminar of Global Research Network 2017 - 2020

Individualization and Community Reconstruction in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo: From the Perspective of Risk Society

- 日時: Sunday, October 21, 2018 (08:20-18:00)
- 場所: Oak Room, Hoam Faculty House, Seoul National University
- 主催: 中民社會理論研究財團 (Joongmin Foundation)
- 後援: 韓國研究財團 / 韓國教育部, 漢陽大學校 法學研究所
- 協力: Seoul大學校 社會發展研究所, Seoul研究院

※ Language: English

8:20-8:40 Registration

8:40-8:50 Opening Ceremony

Young-Hee SHIM, PI of the Research

8:50-9:30 Keynote Speech

An Intermediate Reflection on our Global Research Network

: Toward a Rationality of Community-Oriented Action

Sang-Jin HAN (Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea)

9:30-12:30 Session 1 - Beijing

Community Need, Government Support and the Development of NGOs in China

: Panel Data Analysis of a National Community Survey

Lu ZHENG (Tsinghua University, Beijing, China)

Neighborhood Relations and Community Participation

: An Evidence from East Asia

Hao WANG (China Agricultural University, Beijing, China)

Participatory Community Planning in Qinghe, Beijing

: A Third Way Exploration in Old Community Regeneration

Jiayan LIU (Tsinghua University, Beijing, China)

2:00-4:00 Session 2 - Tokyo

Globalization, Information Society and Individuality

Shujiro YAZAWA (Seijo University, Tokyo, Japan)

Study on Setagaya Experience of Social Governance

Hiromi KOYAMA (Toyo Gakuen University, Tokyo, Japan)

4:00-6:00 Session 2 - Seoul

Who Supports Community Reconstruction in Seoul?

Young-Hee SHIM (Hanyang University, Seoul, Korea)

Pragmatic Communitality and the Future of Social Governance

Young-Do PARK (Joongmin Foundation, Seoul, Korea)

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Joongmin Foundation for Social Theory

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An Intermediate Reflection on our Global Research Network : Toward a Rationality of Community-Oriented Action

Sang-Jin HAN
Seoul National University, Seoul, Korea

Introduction

We have been doing a joint study on neighborhood community reconstruction in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo funded by National Research Foundation of Korea for three years, with participants from these three metropolitan cities in East Asia. More specifically, the research began with an explicit focus on the experiments of three local communities; *Seongmisan* (Seoul), *Qinghe* (Beijing), and *Setagaya* (Tokyo). Though these three communities differ from each other in many respects, they share certain common characteristics. Thus, since we are in the second half of the second year cooperation, I would like to make an intermediary reflection to think about where we started from, where we are now, and to where we would like to move.

We started this research theoretically from the perspective of risk society and social governance. This means that we understand the neighborhood community reconstruction under way in the three cities primarily, though not exclusively, as a preemptive (proactive) response to either perceived or anticipatable risks that citizen, as residents of neighborhood community faces. This also means that we see these experiments as a concrete exemplar of social governance which requires the consultative and participatory mechanisms of non-state actors like the experts, NGOs, and citizens.

Historically, we started from the observation that individualization either voluntary or enforced is rapidly spreading in East Asia and, consequently, the primary communities like the family and neighbors become increasingly destabilized losing their function of mutual help, care, and intimacy. In this context, initiatives have emerged to reconstruct neighborhood community as a condition for a balanced development of individual and community. For this reason, we have paid particular attention to the relation between individualization and community reconstruction, as an important point of divergence of East Asia from the Western countries.

Methodologically, this research is aimed at a deliberate combination of theoretical reasoning, citizen survey research and case studies. The starting point of empirical research was the 2012 citizen survey in Seoul, Beijing, and Tokyo. The second survey had been planned, but it was carried out only in Seoul so far. In addition, many field researches and survey studies were made in the area of *Qinghe* in Beijing and *Seongmisan* in Seoul.

Based on these surveys, field studies, and workshops held in Seoul, we have published four papers in Korea Journal (A&HSCI), including one comparative study of Beijing and Seoul. Perhaps, we need to publish case studies of Seoul and Tokyo as well as a comparative study of Seoul and Tokyo. Furthermore, it is necessary for the participants of this joint research to cooperative to produce qualified papers investigating specific characteristics of the social governance experiments of each city as well as comparative outcomes from salient points of view. It is also the time to move forward to reflect upon the theoretical significance of this joint research investigating anew the relation of individual and society, the property and function of community, and the pertinent issues of rationality of social actions.

Characteristic of Community-oriented Action

From the perspective of social actor, when we deal with neighborhood community reconstruction, as a concrete site of social governance, one of the key tasks set before us is to identify those actors (citizens or residents) who are either actively participating or willing to participate in these initiatives. We need first to grasp the participant actors and then examines the role of social values attached to this action. Both questions require empirical investigation first, and we may then move to a theoretical discussion. Thus, I would like to deal with these first at the level of empirical analysis.

Needless to say, however serious the risk perception of citizens may be, some citizens are more active in participation in community reconstruction whereas others are not. There are reasons for this difference. In this regard, I want to pay attention to 'social value' which is distinguished from economic value. A pertinent question is how 'community-oriented action,' is defined, what are the main function or 'value effect' of this action, and how this type of action is distinguished from what sociology has called traditionally 'association-oriented action.' The typical values built into community oriented action are more resonant with care and sympathy than success and victory, more with intimacy than calculation, more with emotion (feeling and affection) than logic (science, law), more with human relation than one's own success story, more with understanding than control, more with reciprocal dialogue than instrumental-purposive reason, more with living together than competition, more with mutual help than survival imperative, more with fair distribution than market determination, etc.

In this regard, we should note that the values intrinsically associated with community-oriented action are 'social' values which differ categorically from what we may call 'economic' values or enterprise values. The increasing destabilization and deconstruction of community means that these social values emphasizing human relations are more and more marginalized as the market-dictated instrumental imperative of survival is penetrating deeply into our social life as a whole. Against this backdrop, and in opposition to the mainstream of corporate management theory, 'social enterprise' began to draw public attention because this enterprise incorporates social values in its selective way and is related to community-oriented action.

It is now clear that the social values are intrinsically built into community-oriented action and are than indispensable for community. From this we can derive a thesis that those who are either actively participating or willing to participate in neighborhood community reconstruction are defined by their capacity to pursue these social values. Furthermore, the social values are indispensable not only for community and social enterprise but also a standard economic firm operating within the logic of market economy because the focus of corporate management is shifting to embrace social values, like corporate social responsibility, and thereby upgrade the level of job satisfaction and self-realization on the part of employees. All these points out clearly why and how social values built into community-oriented action are important for community reconstruction and corporate management. I shall offer some empirical evidences supporting these points.

Empirical Evidences of Social Values

1) 2018 Bioleaders Survey Research

Let me introduce a survey study conducted in 2018 over the employees in a small R and D oriented company "Bioleaders." Based on theoretical reasoning above, this survey is aimed at finding the role of social values in shaping the outcome of job satisfaction and self-realization. For this purpose, we

made scales of social values and enterprise values. The first social value is composed of 9 items; 1) open communication, 2) mutual respect, 3) mutual trust, 4) gender equality, 5) protection from human rights violation, 6) fair distribution of rewards, 7) inclusion without discrimination, 8) employing disabled, 9) transferring part of profits to society. In contrast, the scale of enterprise values is composed of such 9 items as 1) R & D investment, 2) research creativity, 3) market competition, 4) vocational training, 5) objective evaluation of achievement, 6) differential incentive system, 7) market research and expansion, 8) evaluation of management by external experts, and 9) social rating of the company. Concerning social values, we measured the perceived importance of these social values and the extent of their realization by the company. Figure 1 shows that the extent of realization of social values consistently lags far behind the perceived importance of these values.




Figure-1 Perceived Importance and Actual Realization of Social Values

As mediating variable, we paid particular attention to communication with the view that among many factors, the variable of communication is particularly important in shaping human relations in the society and company as well. We constructed the scale of communicative capability based on the relations of employees with CEOs, supervisors, and fellow employees.

As dependent variables, we constructed two scales: one refers to the satisfaction with working conditions and the other is related to self-realization and job pride. The first scale is computed out of the following questions: 1) working hours, 2) working environments, 3) relation with fellow workers, 4) relation with supervisors, 5) grievance settlement, 6) wages, 7) incentive bonus, 8) labor-management relation, and 9) welfare programs. The scale of self-realization and job pride is consisted of the responses to 7 items, such as 1) "I like the work I am doing," 2) "I feel achievement from my work," 3) "I feel self-confidence over my work," 4) "I am overall satisfied with my job," 5) "I participated in the decision-making concerning my work," 6) "I am proud of my working at my company," 7) "I want to work in this company long."




Figure-2 path analysis of the satisfaction with working conditions




Figure-3 Path analysis of self-realization and job pride

Figure-2 and Figure-3 clearly demonstrate that social values significantly affect the satisfaction with working conditions and self-realization and job pride directly and via the mediating variable of communication. The higher social value realized, and the greater communicative capability, the higher the level of job satisfaction and self-realization. Remarkably contrasting, the extent of the realization of enterprise values has no influence on either communication as mediating variable or the satisfaction with working conditions and self-realization and job pride as dependent variables. This clearly shows the independent influence of social values and communication on such feelings as satisfaction, pride, happiness, belongingness, self-realization, and conviviality.

2) 2018 Survey Study of Seoul citizens

In 2018 after 6 years from the first empirical research on risk perceptions in Seoul, Beijing and Tokyo in 2012, we conducted the second round survey research in Seoul to find out the citizens who are more active in participating in neighborhood community reconstruction. One of the consistent findings of this survey study is that communication makes significant contribution to such participation. To present the main outcome without the details in operationalization and measurement in scaling, among Seoul citizens, those who better communicate with neighbors are either more actively participating or willing to participate in the experiment of this reconstruction. Figure-4 shows this clearly




Figure-4 communication index and participation scale (Seoul, 2018)




Figure-5 Path analysis of the support for neighborhood community reconstruction

Figure-5 takes two independent variables: risk perception as push factor and desired future urban development as pull factor. Risk perception is an accumulated scale of public perception of risks among Seoul citizens in 2018 computed out of their responses to 21 items of risks that citizens face. This works as push factors in the sense that it forces citizens to exit from risk society in terms of threats, dangers, and insecurity. In contrast, the pull factor refers to the desired city development in the future in terms of the participation of citizens, the development of cultural heritages, and the preservation of neighborhood community like village and alley ways. This pull factor provides the energy and motivation for community reconstruction in opposition to the traditional and bureaucratic top-down way of city planning and development. Path analysis demonstrates that independent variable as pull factor yields significant independent influence on the way that the residents participate in community reconstruction. In turn, the push factor affects significantly the mediating variable of community which, in turn, yields significant independent influence on the support for community reconstruction.

Figure-4 and Figure-5 combined, it is clear that the capability of reciprocal communication, which is, in fact, an essential characteristic of community-oriented action, is crucially important for understanding who goes ahead of others in community reconstruction and how social values are working in economic enterprises as well.

3) 2015 Survey Study on CSR and SOE

Finally, I want to show a stronger version of the influence of communication on community development based on the 2015 survey research conducted over the employees of an intermediary sized economic firm called 'Ssangyong Materials' (employees about 300). The starting point is the community-oriented action by an independent investor. The Stockowner-Employee (SOE) partnership model, as I have named, proposes a means for investors to recognize that their gains are not the independent result of wise investment decisions, but rather, from the hard work and effort of employees. Socially responsible stockowners can use the profits from their investments for philanthropic activities to further social good, and there is no doubt that this brings benefits to society. However, the SOE partnership concentrates on creating synergy within the corporation itself. When investors voluntarily give back to employees in this manner, they recognize the value of employees and their contributions in a direct way. Thus, it represents a community-oriented action while creating the space of mutual trust and partnership and inviting employees into this community of partnership.

It is within this context that we can develop a model of path analysis since it has been proven that communicative reciprocity gives rise to a highly positive evaluation of this community-oriented action by investors. In line with our analysis shown above, we can set communication as independent variable and investigate 1) how this independent variable affects the evaluation of CSR and SOE respectively, 2) how this affects independently job satisfaction and self-realization as dependent variable, and 3) how this affects job satisfaction and self-realization via the mediating variables like the evaluation of CSR and SOE.




Figure-6 Path Analysis of Communication and Job Satisfaction

Figure-6 clearly demonstrates that communication, CSR, SOE, and job satisfaction are closely related to each other significantly and independently.

The Affective Basis of Politics Today

The participation in neighborhood community reconstruction presupposes the function of community-oriented action. Of decisive importance in this regard is that this action is based on intimacy and care rather than instrumental calculation and success. The affective basis of community-oriented action requires careful attention to the role of emotion and feeling in social explanation. How to bring back community to modernization and post-modernization is a central issue, against the tendency of

regarding community just as a traditional value which cannot but decline.

According to Streeck and Schmitter (1985: 119), the basic order of the social life is defined by the relations of three central institutions: the market, the state bureaucracy and community. The market is governed by the principle of freedom, like profit seeking, free trade and competition. So, liberal economy forms a backbone of social order. The political institution is governed by the principle of popular sovereignty in terms of free election and fair administration. What has come out from these structural relations in the West is a balance of countervailing powers between the market representing freedom and the political institutions representing equality. Thus, social order accompanies the mechanisms of interest articulation and negotiation (bargaining) among the main economic and political actors and institutions. Today, however, political representation through the political party and parliament functions no more effectively as in the past. Instead, community began to preoccupy attention. Neither rational calculation of interests nor deliberation of value works as a major orientation in politics, but affection, emotion, and feeling work and spread fast. In the global risk society in which individuals face ever more potential dangers, isolation, and anxiety, they look for a community which would offer fraternity, help, protection, and affection as “a sense of belonging to and participating in the group as such” (Streeck & Schmitter, 1985:121). Community is important for them to “satisfy their mutual needs for a shared affective existence and a distinctive collective identity” (p.212). In this context, emotion emerges as a primary driving force of politics. This tendency is inexorable and irreversible as it is intrinsically supported by the new technology of digital communication like social network services (SNS).

Giddens explained how digital revolution had changed the political terrain in an interview that I had with him at the Lord House in London in early December 2017.

“If you look at digital world you got amazing opportunities for transformation of a positive kind. On the other hand, you have risks that we have never faced before. And the opportunities and the risks are a bit different from any other historical era in some ways. The main thing is to analyze out the balance of risks and opportunities and it’s very large on both sides, I think. The opportunities are huge because let’s say, some people really think you could produce immortality. It’s not impossible anymore, whether it’s desirable or not. On the other hand, the risks are equally huge.”

“You have always got to have a certain emotional substratum to politics. Politics can’t just be empty debate. You have got to have some motivational force to it. Another way of putting it is that you got to have values. And the values Donald Trump stands for are not mine, mostly anyway. But what I am saying is to me, the big force behind a lot of these things is the onrush of the digital age, which interacts with more well-established risks

“I would tend to insist on the importance of living in a digital age, because when we got one of these smart phones in your pocket, you got all kinds of the world’s knowledge in your pocket. You can chuck anything you want. Nothing is outside. That’s the different world. You know you can find anything about political leaders. You got of sorts of assertions made on social media across the world, many of which may be fake news and so forth. So, we have to deal with a cluster of issues, to reconstruct democracy, one of which is the control of the digital world because we’ve lost control of it, as individual citizens and as nation-states. That’s one of the reasons for the troubles, but to some extent the digital world is also the answer I think. The pace of change is so huge. But you can’t allow the world, or we shouldn’t allow the world, where people just set up fake websites and others are influenced by those websites, where one state can simply introduce,

kind of, covert cyberwar against the other state. That's a pretty dangerous world from which democratic systems have to rescue themselves."

John Thompson at Cambridge University, UK also expressed his worries about digital communication in an interview that I had in early September 2018.

So far, the approaches to rationality are just one-sided and don't offer the sufficient account of the role of emotion and feeling in political life. The other side of it is that the changing nature of the communication technology. It's fundamental because it changes the way that people are able to present themselves to others, express their feelings, express their emotion and appeal to others and so on. Now it has been accentuated in taking new form for the new world we live in today. Trump is the master of it. He has totally mastered the use of digital media for expressing emotion and appealing to emotion. That's what he does every day on Twitter using capital letters and exclamation marks and the whole language is a language of emotion. And no matter how critical you are of him, he does that incredibly well. And so this is a layer of social life. We haven't paid much attention to it and now people are beginning to wake up and realize it and that's partly a shock of Trump and the shock of Brexit. In fact, Trump realizes ordinary people have emotion and they are pissed off...you know and they feel neglected. And they're going to be given the chance to express that. And so, yeah, we need to be much more sensitive to that.

Given the huge literature on emotion in social science and humanities today, even the increasing attention to affective human relations like reciprocal norms, the feeling of self-determination, self-respect and autonomy, happiness, trust, and job satisfaction in the fields of corporate management, there is no doubt that it is now well recognized that emotion and feeling as volitional energy of human life is increasingly important for understanding social change and human life today. It has also been often pointed out that emotion works as a motivational force in most of the so-called rational action. However, it has not been properly asked whether or not, and, if so, how emotion can be treated as involving its own rationality which can be tested and redeemed. Thus, I would like to move from community-oriented action to the possible relation of emotion (feeling, affection, sympathy, compathy etc.) and rationality. No doubt, this question has been suppressed or marginalized in the mainstream Western discourses of reason and rationality. Yet, given the increasing influence of emotion in politics and everyday life today, it is the time to clarify whether emotion, as a primordial value orientation, involves rational characteristics in itself, and, if so, how we can define and assess its rationality. This requires a theoretical confrontation with Max Weber.

Three Questions about Weber's Theory of Rationality

Kaesler, a German scholar well known for his biographical study of Weber, delivered a lecture on Weber's theory of rationalization at the seminar room 208, Jing Yuen 2nd House, Peking University in the afternoon of March 23, 2018. The topic of his talk was "Universal Rationalization: Max Weber's great Narrative," and this was chaired by Li Qiang, a distinguished professor of political science, with the designated discussant, Tian Geng, a sociology professor of Peking University. The presentation was concise and sobering, making clear where he stands in the academic community of Weber, but there was nothing new. Starting from the familiar question, why it was only in the Western world that has produced a specific rational culture of universal significance (Kaesler, 2017, 319), he confirmed the

thesis of universal rationalization by saying, ‘No matter where Max Weber looked, everywhere he saw the irrefutable evidence of a great, world-historical process of rationalization’ (320). This thesis has been long articulated. Schluchter, Tenbruch, Kalberg, and even Habermas have joined in it. What makes him interesting, however, is the argument that Weber examined the every and complex layers of human life comprising “the external organization of the world” (economy, law, technology, science, and state bureaucracy, etc.) and “the internal organization of the world” (religion, ethics, arts, culture and sexuality, etc.) and that Weber witnessed the systematic, inexorable, and universal rationalization throughout all of these spheres of human life. He also stressed what he called “an apocalyptic irony of unintended success,” which means Weber was highly skeptical and pessimistic about human destiny. Kaesler metaphorically described the future as “the polar night of freezing darkness and hardship’ rather than ‘the blossoming of summer.”

The inseparable connection between this system of capitalist order of the economic life and the universally emerging machines of bureaucratic order in all spheres of life caused the endangerment of the individual freedom of all people, if not their ultimate destruction. (Kaesler, 2017, 322)

We can raise three questions from his more or less standard interpretation of Weber. First, is it accurate that Weber examined all the major layers of human life, though with different degrees of intensity and systematization, and confirmed the trend of universal rationalization? Weber supported value pluralism, evidenced by his studies of world religions. How can we make the thesis of universal rationalization compatible with Weber’s pluralistic worldviews? In particular, I want to discuss about emotion as a deepest layer of human life.

Second, is Weber’s alleged pessimism of the future of rationalized world grounded theoretically well? Is it more contextually rooted or theoretically inevitable? The former may not be serious. We can understand well Weber’s political experience and the historical context in which he thought. If the latter is the case, why is Weber’s pessimism inevitable theoretically? Where does it come from, and is there any way out conceivable and feasible? In particular, I want to explore whether this is any possibility within Weber’s writings to open up a way out from this pessimism.

Third, it is exactly here that we should come back to Weber’s idea of value pluralism and its relation to rationality. There can be no dispute over the trend of value pluralism. But how it is related to rationality requires more careful attention than found in Weber and his followers. The key idea is that the concept of rationality in its strong version has a rational basis not simply in its predictability in terms of patterned, regularized, contextually shared and binding interaction among actors, but in the accomplishment of ‘validity’ anchored in value orientations which has something to do with its testing. Value pluralism and the validity of value orientation are not the same. Weber grasped the pluralities in value orientations with succinct clarity and also touched up the issues of validity, however in a limited scope except his theory of scientific and instrumental rationality. For this reason, I want to reexamine Weber’s idea of understanding and interpretive sociology as a methodological framework of his theory of rationality and rationalization.

Value Pluralism, Rationality and Emotion

To translate value pluralism into Weber’s concept of interpretive sociology, “the action of individuals

can well be subjectively oriented toward several orders whose meaning, according to currently conventional modes of thought, "contradict" each other, yet nevertheless coexist" (Weber, 1981: 162). Life worlds are plural and diverse. Yet wherever we find ourselves, we interact to each other in certain ways intrinsically related to rationality. To make it simple, we orient our action to the expectations shared by stake holders so that interaction can be reasonably predicted and, possibly, explained. Weber deals with the rational basis of social order which lies in the patterned relationships. Interaction is rational in the sense that it follows certain rules and thus can be predicted. The emerging rational order is contrasted to being chaotic or unpredictable. Weber (1981:162) explained the rational basis of order by the notion of average probability. The members of a community,

on the average, count on the probability of order-oriented behavior on the part of others, just as they also, on the average, regulate their own action according to the same kind of expectations held by others

Here comes the idea of empirical validity of an order. Weber suggests that the rule-following and order-oriented action is for sociology "the most rational meaning most directly comprehensible." But he adds that the mutual orientation towards others' expectations is too limiting and unstable from the point of view of rationality.

The stability of these expectations is increased the more one can, on the average, not only count on the participants' orienting their own action toward the expected action of others, but also, the more widespread among them is the view that the subjectively comprehended "legality" (or 'validity' more generally-Han) of the order is "binding" on them.

In this way, Weber combined in his theory of rationality both the objective orientation towards shared expectation (order) and the subjective orientation towards the validity of the order. Seen in this perspective, the rationality of an order depends on the subjective belief in the validity of the shared expectations, as empirically observed rather than assessed normatively or reflexively.

We can take this perspective and investigate various spheres of life world and differentiated systems by asking how interactions are patterned in each system along the ways suggested above. Weber himself attempted this in his 1913 article on some categories of interpretive society by focusing on the rational basis of social order built into interest organizations like association, economic organization, and state authority. At the same time, in many other writings, Weber followed the idea of the pluralization of value orientation and the specialization of social systems and investigated which value orientation has become firmly institutionalized in which system, sorting out salient characteristics of the patterns of rationality anchored in these value orientation and systems.

Consequently, Weber has been said to provide various types and levels of rationality, such as purposive-instrumental rationality, value rationality, scientific rationality, formal rationality, bureaucratic rationality, legal rationality, substantive rationality, rationalities of world religion, arts, professional activities, etc. Strictly speaking, we can speak of rationality of magic and sorcery when these practices were taken for granted and served as guidelines of human interaction. Historically speaking, rationalization means disenchantment which breaks down the validity of the institutionalized order of

interaction built into the world of magic and sorcery. However, the logic or rationality is same at this primitive level of description Weber offers in the 1913 article. The objective orientation toward shared expectation among the members of the community and the subjective orientation towards the validity of an order emerging from this are not different in kind between the systems of science and magic. The difference is that in the systems of science and professionally differentiated systems rationality accompanies the process of becoming ever more methodologically consistent, systematic and specific in application and regulation.

Weber was able to keep the thesis of universal rationalization and value pluralism for the reason that, as a society becomes more and more modern, in every spheres of life world and systems where specific value orientation is operating, rationalization in terms of methodological consistency, systematization, and specificity can be universally observed. In this sense, Weber is consistent. Rationalization in this particular sense can be seen not only in science and technology but also in religion and arts.

However, I would argue that the thesis of value plurality is cut short by Weber's methodology of interpretive sociology. He saw social change in terms of internal differentiation and specialization of value orientation and understood rationalization from the perspective of actor and institution involved. Thus, we can speak of rationality and rationalization of religions and arts since there refer to the specific institutions like church and actors like artists. They are not the same as science and technology. They develop their own concepts, standards, and rules of rationality distinguished from other systems. But they all can be said to be in the process of rationalization as briefly sketched above. However, the problem emerges in the cases of value orientation which is so basic that it cannot be identified as professionally expressed in any particular institution like arts though it works at the bottom of human life. Here, the pertinent issue is emotion, particularly the kind of heart regime deeply rooted in history providing the common basis of sympathy. Emotion has been long treated to be unpredictable and thus irrational. Emotion has been recognized as offering the energy to, and context of, rational action. Seldom, however, it has been brought into theory of rationality itself.

Purposive-Instrumental Rationality and the Pessimistic Future Outlook

There is nothing to add to the thesis of universal rationalization which, in fact, means the increasing world governance of the specific type of rationality Weber called purposive-instrumental rationality. This rationality is embodied in such major institutions of modernity as science, technology, laws, bureaucracy, capitalist enterprises, etc. But why Weber remained pessimistic about the future of rationalized world requires some reflections. Here we must distinguish two levels (not types) of rationality. One is the rationality with "empirical" validity of value orientation as observed in the life world; another is the rationality with "scientific" validity of value orientation which can be tested. I have argued above that insofar as we are concerned about the first, there is no difference in rationality between science and magic. In both systems, individuals orient themselves to the shared expectation objectively and accept subjectively the empirical validity of the emerging order out of this context. However, in the latter case, the instrumental rationality embodied in science, technology, bureaucracy and market institutions differs from other types of rationality by the fact that it can prove its validity in terms of testing either a scientific proposition or efficiency. What matters here is not simply the subjective orientation and acceptance of empirical validity of value orientation but the objective evidence of truth or efficiency as validity realized by science, bureaucracy, and the capitalist enterprises. For this reason, purpose-instrumental rationality can make progress by putting the concerned validity of value orientation into the process of testing. Along this progress, rationality becomes more capable

of controlling and regulating the world. One of the inevitable consequences of this is the increasing world domination by purposive-instrumental rationality.

Weber was correct when he sorted out this specific type of rationality out of many others and anticipated the world to be increasingly penetrated and dominated by this rationality, not simply as a historical force, but as supported by accumulating scientific knowledge, technology, efficiency in management, the effect of bureaucratic control, etc. Whether this anticipation should lead one to a pessimistic view of the future, perhaps, depends on the assessment of the historical context in which one is situated. More important than this is a theoretical reason for this pessimistic outlook. Though Weber upheld a pluralistic world view with multiple value orientations, he didn't clearly distinguish the concept of value orientation and that of validity embodied in it. Furthermore, he was unable to see other modes of testing validities except scientific testing. He sharply distinguished facts and values and argued that value judgment cannot be rationally justified as we do in science. Fundamentally, value orientation, as a condition of all knowledge, is something that I either find already inscribed in my way of looking at the world or have to choose as a matter of decision. In either case, however, value decision cannot be rationally discussed as in science. Consequently, the thesis of universal rationalization cannot but be anchored in the one-dimensional constant expansion of purposive-instrumental rationality despite his advocacy of value pluralism. This is why Weber was unable to get out of the pessimistic future outlook.

Revisit to Weber and Habermas' Focus on Validity Claims

I propose that we go back to Weber's 1913 article on interpretive sociology to explore whether there is any way out from what Kaesler called an apocalyptic skepticism or pessimism of Weber. In this respect, I want to focus on Habermas' conceptual strategy of separating validity claims from value orientation and explore how his argument based on this strategy can help us reread Weber's concept of *Richtigkeitsrationalitaet* anew.

Weber's concept of *Richtigkeitsrationalitaet* is so ambiguous and complex that it is extremely difficult to translate into English. He used this concept in his methodological writing of interpretive society but completely left out when he later tried to develop the logically clear-cut concepts of rationality on the basis of differentiation and institutionalization of value orientations. A standard translation of this concept is 'objectively correct rationality.' Similarly, *Richtigkeitsrational* action is translated into 'action correctly oriented toward objectively valid goal.' This concept is inspiring since it refers to a broad range of complex possibilities before differentiation of the concepts of rationality. In fact, Weber used this ambiguous concept as a reference to a primordial and undifferentiated comprehensive rationality which he set in the background of his theory of rationalities. Nevertheless, the simple question we face is what the expression 'correct' (*richtig*) means.

When we take certain action of others to be correct, it can have multiple connotations. Mostly commonly, it is correct in the sense that it unfolds as I expect or predict. It is correct in the sense that it takes shared expectation to be valid and binding for orientation. To be more specific, an action can be said correct when it rationally adopts the most efficient means to realize the goal. Correct may mean that the action follows normative rules of interaction that I support. It could also mean that the action immerses into the emotional spheres of feeling and sympathy working in my heart. Objectively correct rationality embraces all these aspects of rationality of value orientation before being analytically separated. If we introduce analytical and logical differentiation into this concept, it can then be said that the criteria of being correct are not simply cognitive and moral, but also expressive and emotive.

Weber recognized the complexities involved in conceptualizing rationalities of action. He took the objectively correct type of action and the purposive-instrumental type of action in the opposite pole of classification and attempt to delineate different types of action in-between these two poles.

For sociology, the following are related on a gliding scale: (1) the objectively correct type, approximately attained; (2) the (subjective) instrumentally rational type; (3) behavior only more or less conscious or perceived and more or less unambiguously instrumentally rational; (4) behavior that is not instrumentally rational but is in a meaningfully understandable context; (5) behavior that is motivated in a more or less meaningfully understandable context, a context more or less strongly interrupted or codetermined by unintelligible elements; and finally, (6) the wholly unintelligible psychic or physical phenomena "in" and "about" a person. Sociology knows that not every course of action progressing in an objectively "correctly rational" manner was conditioned by subjectively rational purpose; in particular, it is self-evident to sociology that the actual action is not determined by the logically and rationally inferable but rather by the psychological relationships (p.156)

This statement can be interpreted in the following way. First, Weber treated the objectively correct type of action as the undifferentiated background reference to complex rationality and the purposive-instrumental type of action as the analytically most clear-cut and systematic rationality. Second, Weber assumed in this context historical change in terms of increasing differentiation of rationalities starting from this undifferentiated background concept. Third, in-between these two opposite poles Weber saw different types and levels of rational action including the role of norm and emotion. In particular, the psychological relationships refer to emotional streams embodied in rationality. Thus, it remains a pressing task how to develop the possibility of the rationality of deeply rooted common feeling from Weber's undifferentiated comprehensive concept of objectively correct rationality. This task is important because the common feeling historically shaped provides the basis for objectively correct rationality.

Before we move to the rationality of compathy from this perspective, we need to consider briefly Habermas' contribution to the theory of rationality. Habermas attempts to systematize Weber's idea of value pluralism.

The cultural rationalization from which the structures of consciousness typical of modern societies emerge embraces cognitive, aesthetic expressive and moral-evaluative elements of the religious tradition. With science and technology, with autonomous art and the values of expressive self-presentation, with universal legal and moral representations, there emerges a differentiation of *three value spheres, each of which follow its own logic*. [...] As soon as science, morality and art have been differentiated into autonomous spheres of values, each under *one* universal validity claim—truth, normative rightness, authenticity or beauty—objective advances, improvements, enhancements become possible in a sense specific to each (Habermas 1984: 164-65, 176-77).

Habermas' genuine contribution lies in conceptually separating validity claims from value orientations (Harrington, 2000) and views learning via testing these validity claims as the key to social evolution. This links a new horizon to Weber in the sense that it now becomes possible to speak of the rationality of normative judgment which was impossible for Weber. It also makes it possible to go beyond the one-

dimensional expansion of purposive-instrumental rationality attached to Weber's thesis of universal rationalization. We can also see the increase of discursively mediated practical rationality in the form of deliberative democracy and identify its rational basis in collective learning through testing normative validity claims. So, it is now possible theoretically to get out of Weber's preoccupation with the one-dimensional concept of universal rationalization in terms of purposive-instrumental rationality and its unavoidable consequences of pessimistic outlook of the future.

However, it still remains unclear how to conceptualize the rationality of common feeling and sympathy. Emotion has become a distinctive value orientation today. It is not necessarily irrational. Compathy can serve as a rational basis of politics. The rationality of common feeling is certainly possible as is the rationality of common sense. It is also essential to define clearly the specific validity claims anchored in the rationality of compathy and seek the possible way in which this claim can be tested and institutionalized.

Furthermore, we should move further to ask questions in line with Habermas. His contribution to a discursive testing of the validity claim of the normative value orientation is significant. Thus, we can think of rationalization of life world not only from the cognitive but also moral perspectives. Yet we should ask seriously how the scientific rationality can be fruitfully related to the normative rationality which Habermas has defended. Each has its specific logic and developmental pathway. But how are they interrelated with respect to the concrete problem we face like global risks? In this regard, as an example, the address by Obama, former President of the United States, at Hiroshima, Japan on May 26, 2016 is revealing.

Science allows us to communicate across the seas and fly above the clouds, to cure disease and understand the cosmos, but those same discoveries can be turned into ever more efficient killing machines. The wars of the modern age teach us this truth. Hiroshima teaches this truth. Technological progress without an equivalent progress in human institutions can doom us. The scientific revolution that led to the splitting of an atom requires a moral revolution as well.

That is why we come to this place. We stand here in the middle of this city and force ourselves to imagine the moment the bomb fell. We force ourselves to feel the dread of children confused by what they see. We listen to a silent cry. We remember all the innocents killed across the arc of that terrible war and the wars that came before and the wars that would follow. Mere words cannot give voice to such suffering. But we have a shared responsibility to look directly into the eye of history and ask what we must do differently to curb such suffering again (Obama, 2016).

The experience of Hiroshima sensitizes our attention to the need for a balanced theory of rationality. What is needed is not just a model of parallel development of scientific (purposive-instrumental) and moral (normative) rationality but an overlapping structure in which truth and norms can support each other constructively in practical applications. This means that the rationality of common sense, common feeling, common norms, which progresses in history, can serve as a critical yardstick for testing the relevance of scientific and technological application which affects the security and safety of citizens' life.

(The next part will be shown by power-point material)

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Community Need, Government Support and the Development of NGOs in China : Panel Data Analysis of a National Community Survey

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Abstract

Research on Chinese NGOs has become a hot topic in sociological research in recent years. At present, this line of research has the following three characteristics. First, scholars try to outline the development status of NGOs, such as research on the development differences of NGOs at the provincial level. Such difference is mainly explained in terms of social needs, resource supply, and institutional conditions. Sun Xiulin (2015) analyzed the spatial differences in the distribution of NGOs in Shanghai. He found that there was a correlation in the spatial distribution of NGOs. Second, some scholars have examined funding bottlenecks in the development of NGOs. Research in this area is mainly focused on government procurement services. Third, the development of NGOs is interpreted through the angle of expanding civil society, such as Gu Yu and Wang Xu (2005)'s research on the relationship between the state and professional groups from the perspective of state corporatism.

There are two shortcomings in the existing research. First, from the perspective of quantitative analysis, the existing research focuses on the analysis of provincial-level differences in NGO founding, lacking more microscopic data. Second, there are only case studies on the government's role in the development of NGOs. For example, Guan Bing (2013) discusses the impact of urban government structure on social organization. He argues that the urban environment with multi-level government structure is conducive to the development of NGOs, because the existence of a higher-level government helped constrain the authority of the lower-level government. As the latter's administrative capacity becomes weakened and the possibility of intervening society limited, this provides a relatively friendlier environment for NGO's development.

Building on above existing research, this paper attempts to examine two important factors that impact the development of NGOs by using community-level data. One is the needs of the communities, the other is the role of the government in guiding the development of local NGOs. We draw on three waves of panel data from the Survey of Urban Community Governance conducted by the Policy Research Center of the Ministry of Civil Affairs from 2015 to 2017. Community microdata has two advantages. On the one hand, NGOs play an important role in community governance. Research on NGO development at the community level is of great importance in social governance research. On the other hand, the community is an important breeding ground for local NGOs. Studying the relationship between community context and the development of NGOs is crucial to understanding the broader question of China's social governance. To measure the needs of the community, we use the proportion of women in the community, the proportion of the elderly, the proportion of the disabled, the proportion of the elderly without support, the proportion of those on the minimum living allowance and the proportion of the orphans. We want to test whether the founding rate of local NGOs in a community is in response to the needs of above vulnerable social groups. Moreover, unlike Western societies, government guidance plays a vital role in forming local NGOs in China. The government regards local NGOs as an important force in grassroots social governance and adopts a strong supportive attitude towards specific social organizations. To measure the government's guidance or support on the

development of NGOs, we focus on the instances in which residential community's leaders also become the leaders of the NGOs and the prevalence of professional social workers and volunteers in the community.

We use fixed-effects models with the logarithm of the density of NGOs in the community as the dependent variable, and then observe the changes in the coefficient of independent variables to measure the impacts of community needs and government support on the development of NGOs. To avoid alternative explanations, we control for funding level across communities as well as the existence of home-owner's association in the community.

We find that inter-community differences in NGO density can be explained by varying level of community needs and government support across communities. The proportion of disabled people in the community, the proportion of the elderly without support, the proportion of orphans and the proportion of those on the minimum living allowance are all positively associated with the density of social organizations. The leaders of the community neighborhood committee taking part in NGOs is also beneficial to the founding of local NGOs. We also find that government supports selectively certain types of NGOs but not the others. So is the case when the needs of different vulnerable groups in the community is concerned.

This study contributes to the literature by explaining the variation in the development of NGOs based on micro-level analysis of a sample of communities representative of the tens of thousands of urban residential communities in China. We find the government's selective support for the development of NGOs and the inconsistent effects of the needs of vulnerable groups in the community. This provides a new perspective and fresh evidences for understanding the development of Chinese NGOs.

摘要：社区需求和政府支持对社区社会组织发展有什么影响，政府支持是否和社区需求相匹配？通过利用2015-2017年民政部《城市社区治理现状综合调查》面板数据，我们检验了社区需求，政府支持对社区社会组织发展的影响。我们发现社区中弱势群体的需求刺激了社会组织发展，政府支持社会组织发展具有选择性特点以及政府支持与社区弱势群体需求不协调的现象。

关键词：社会组织、社区需求、政府支持

一．引入

关于中国社会组织的研究，近年来成为社会学研究的热点（如，李国武&李璐，2011；李国武&邓煜平等，2014；管兵，2015, 2016等）。当前中国社会组织研究的主要特点要有以下三个特点：其一，学者们努力勾画社会组织的发展现状，如研究社会组织在省级层面的发展差异（李国武&李璐，2011），他们主要从社会需求、资源供给、和制度变迁¹方面解释这种差异。而孙秀林（2015）分析了上海市社会组织

¹ 在文中，作者用老年人口（60岁以上）比例，少儿人口（0-14岁）比例和农民工比例这三个指标来衡量弱势群体的社会需求。用专业技术人员比例测量人力资源供给；用城镇居民人均可支配收入测量经济资源供给。财政支出占GDP比重测量地区的市场化程度；用人均财政社会保障支出、每万名非农户籍中享受最低生活保障人数和每万名农业户籍人口中享受最低生活保障人数这三个指标测量政府社会保障支出；用非农户籍人口中享受基本医疗保险人口比例和非农户籍人口中享受社会养老保险人口比例两个指标来衡量社会保险覆盖率。

分布的空间差异，他发现民办非企业单位在空间分布上存在相关性。其二，一部分学者研究社会组织发展过程中遇到资金瓶颈。这方面研究主要集中在政府购买服务（管兵, 2015, 2016；张海&范斌, 2013；胡薇, 2012；崔正, 2012）。其三，社会组织还被赋予公民社会建设的涵义，如顾昕和王旭（2005）从国家法团主义的视角出发，去理解国家与专业团体的关系。

现有研究存在两个缺陷：首先，从定量分析来看，现有研究侧重分析社会组织省级层面差异（李国武, 李璐, 2011），缺乏更加微观的数据；其次，关于政府引导对社会组织发展的影响分析只停留在个案层面，如管兵（2013）关于城市政府结构²对社会组织影响的讨论，他认为有多级政府结构的的城市环境利于社会组织的发展，因为上级政府可以对下级政府权威进行制约，行政能力较弱，渗透社会及其他领域的可能性受到限制，这客观上为社会组织提供一个相对宽松的发展环境。

在已有研究基础上，本文试图从社区微观数据出发，研究社区需求，政府引导对社区社会组织发展的作用。本文的数据来源为2015至2017年民政部政策研究中心《城市社区治理现状综合调查》面板数据。社区微观数据有两个优势，一方面，社会组织在社区治理中扮演重要角色，研究社区层面社会组织发展利于拓展社区治理研究；另一方面，社区是社会组织重要孕育地，社区环境对社会组织发展有至关重要作用，研究二者关系利于揭示中国社会组织发展的经验。我们用社区女性比例、老年人³比例、残疾人比例、三无老人⁴比例、低保比例和孤儿比例衡量社区需求，社区社会组织的产生可能是为应对弱势群体的需求。在弱势群体需求的刺激下，和西方经验不同，政府引导在社会组织中起到至关重要的作用。政府把社会组织当做基层社会治理的重要力量，对特定的社会组织采取大力支持的态度。我们用社区领导兼任社会组织领导，社区专业化社工队伍建设和志愿队伍建设来衡量政府对社会组织发展的引导。

我们采取以社会组织数密度的对数为因变量的固定效应模型，然后观察自变量系数的变化来衡量社区需求对社会组织发展的影响。当我们衡量社区需求，政府支持对社会组织发展的影响时，可能会受到遗漏变量的影响。我们控制了社区办公经费和业委会可能对社会组织发展产生的影响。

我们发现，社会组织发展的社区间差异可以从社区需求和政府支持引导的角度进行解释。社区中的残疾人比例，三无老人比例，孤儿比例和低保比例与社会组织密度成正比。社区居委会领导兼任社会组织比例和党组织干部兼任对社会组织发展起积极作用，政府支持社会组织发展具有选择性特点以及政府支持与社区弱势群体需求不协调的现象。

本研究是对近年来社会组织发展地域差异研究的一个补充。在前人的基础上，本文的贡献在于将社会组织的发展差异研究落实到社区微观层次，利用社区层次的数据研究社会组织的发展异同。更重要的是，本文发现了政府支持社会组织发展的选择性特点以及社区弱势群体需求不协调的特点。这为理解中国社会组织发展过程中政府角色提供了新的视角。

本文将分为五个部分进行，第一部分为引入；第二部分为文献综述和研究假设；第三部分介绍数据与变量；第四部分将报告模型结果；第五部分为结论。

² 在文中，作者把除了市政府之外，还存在上一级别政府及上一级政府所属的各个职能部门，以及上一级的其他权力机关被称为多级政府结构，而市政府就是当地的最高政府被称为单级政府结构。

³ 老年人指60岁以上人口。

⁴ “三无”老人指无生活来源、无劳动能力、无法定抚养义务人或法定抚养义务人丧失劳动能力而无力抚养的公民。

二．文献综述与研究假设

社会组织被看作是国家、市场之外的第三部门，在市场和政府双重失灵的情况下起到了弥补缺位，满足社会诉求的作用。当市场和政府双重失灵的情况下，社区内弱势群体的需求催生了社会组织的诞生与成长（Wolch & Geiger, 1983；Weisbrod, 1988）。所谓市场失灵理论（Ferris & Graddy, 1989; Johansson, 1991; Stevens, 1993）是指市场面临公共属性商品难以定价、需求量不足，以致商品供应商获得利润较少，无法向消费者提供某些商品服务的情况，而市场是基于人们的支付能力而做选择的，对于弱势群体而言，市场在其面前是失效的。政府出于政治原因，可能需要对弱势群体进行救济或通过资助社会组织机构来提供服务（Salamon, 1987, 1989; Smith & Lipsky, 1993; Stevens, 1993）。但在民主社会往往是大多数投票人意志的体现，可能会忽略少数群体或弱势群体的需求（Weisbrod, 1977, 1986, 1988）。政府在权衡社会成员相互冲突的多元需求时，无法将有限资源投向所有人群，必然面临取舍问题，因而对于某些社会群体来说，政府在提供公共服务时，可能会出现失灵（Douglas, 1987）。社会组织正是在社会多样化需求无法得到满足的情况下应运而生。弱势群体由于缺乏社会、经济资源，可能无法受益于政府或市场提供的服务。

基于以上分析，我们有假设1：

社区中弱势群体比例越高，社会组织密度越高。

在中国社会组织发展过程中，政府在其中起到至关重要的作用。在讨论国家与专业人士的关系时，三种理论模式经常为人们所引用：国家主义，多元主义和法团主义，国家主义是指国家直接参与组织专业服务并雇佣专业人士，又称之为全能主义；而多元主义指的是，民间力量作主导，国家参与在其中只起辅助手段。处于中间的称之为法团主义，它的特征主要为，国家积极参与民间活动。法团主义又可细分为社会法团主义和国家法团主义，二者的区别在于政府的干预程度，前者较为开放，后者往往受制于中央官僚权力的干预（顾昕、王旭，2005；Schmitter, 1974）。政府控制着社会组织发展所需的资源，包括财政资助，税收减免等。国外的经验发现，政府对非盈利组织的资助超过其收入的一半以上（Corbin, 1996）。资源依赖，加上社区需求，刺激了非盈利性组织专注于贫困问题，社会组织只有在解决好资金来源问题后，其才能有能力去解决贫困问题（Gronberg, 1990）。当然，社会组织也会接受其他私人捐赠和其他非政府资助（Skelly, 1992），而对转型期的中国而言，社会组织的典型特征是，活动经费主要来源于国家（顾昕、王旭，2005）。

政府主要通过购买服务对社会组织进行资助。政府购买服务兴起的原因政府以“经济人”为导向，以竞争为原则，促进资源的合理利用，目的在于通过鼓励第三部门的参与，精简国家机构和减少国家的福利开支（登哈特·丁煌，2004）。政府实行购买服务之后，对社会组织而言，是一次发展的大好机会。管兵（2015）发现，2002年政府购买服务实施之后，上海的社会组织开始迅速发展，购买服务为社会组织提供更好的发展机遇。

因此我们有假设2，有政府购买服务项目的社区社会组织的密度越高。

此外，政府还为社会组织提供组织支持。如社区干部担任社会组织领导，政府意在通过此举孵化社区内的社会组织，社区干部担任社会组织领导的数目越多，该社区社会组织发展越好。

因此我们有假设3，社区领导兼任社会组织领导的社区社会组织密度越高。

三．数据与变量

本文数据来源为2015至2017年民政部政策研究中心《城市社区治理现状综合调查》面板数据，该调查的单位为社区，回答问卷者为社区的党支部书记、副书记、社区居委会主任或副主任等社区干部。调查方式为分层抽样，最后在全国县级城市随机抽取社区样本进行调查，调查内容为城市社区治理情况。其中，问卷模块“社区社会组织培育及其治理角色”详细询问了社区中社会组织发展的基本状况，包括社会组织数目、类型以及社会组织与社区的关系。本文的分析侧重于社区中社会组织的发展情况。

本文的因变量为社会组织密度，具体来说为社区中社会组织总体密度（在民政部门登记注册的社会组织）、民办非企业密度、社会团体密度和基金会密度。

自变量为社区需求和政府支持。社区需求用社区中弱势群体比例来衡量，包括女性比例、老年人比例、残疾人比例、“三无”老人比例、低保比例和孤儿比例；政府支持用政府购买服务项目、社区领导兼任社会组织领导情况来衡量。

当分析以上影响因素时，本文控制了居委会的办公经费，是否有业委会以及志愿者数目。居委会办公经费和当地发展水平密切相关，经费充足的社区可能有更多资源为社会组织发展提供良好的社区环境。在研究社区需求与政府作用时，我们需要控制社区居民的自组织能力，业委会一定程度上反映了居民的自组织能力。志愿者精神被认为是影响社会组织发展的重要因素，我们也对其进行了控制。

表1描述性统计

变量	平均值	标准差	最小值	最大值	样本数
社会组织数（个）	2.356434	13.08888	0	803	6349
民非总数（个）	0.9321501	13.02745	0	800	6367
社会团体数（个）	1.133271	3.656206	0	69	6378
基金会数（个）	0.0188915	0.2101107	0	9	6405
常住人口数（人）	6388.971	7072.388	0	160330	6427
女性人口	2930.46	2775.819	0	41000	5967
老年人口	1126.653	1332.479	0	45930	6104
残疾人口	77.74239	151.6391	0	10000	6374
三无老人	6.870338	24.38928	0	600	6355
孤儿	1.094873	7.826549	0	420	6398
低保	105.0401	199.7493	0	5626	6389
志愿者数目	215.0475	634.273	0	35000	6338
政府购买服务项目数（个）	2.663219	13.41297	0	239	6381
居委会干部兼任领导的社区社会组织数	0.4385774	1.407689	0	28	6439
社区党组织干部兼任领导的社会组织数	0.3041453	0.9994703	0	23	6441
社区办公经费	123955.4	2708508	0	201000000	5930
业委会	0.3924856	0.4883418	0	1	6441

注：（1）老年人：60岁以上；“三无”老人指无生活来源、无劳动能力、无法定抚养义务人或法定抚养义务人丧失劳动能力而无力抚养的公民。

四．社区弱势群体需求与社会组织发展

（一）社区弱势群体需求与社会组织发展

根据西方社会组织的发展经验，社会组织发展和弱势群体需求相关。弱势群体比例越高，越可能促进社会组织的萌芽。为了从微观层面验证此假设，我们用以下实证策略进行检验。

$$\ln(Y_{it}) = a_1 + a_2 \ln(demand_{it}) + a_3 control_{it} + community_i + year_t + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

其中 Y_{it} 为社区 i 在 t 年社会组织密度，我们取其自然对数⁵作为我们的因变量。 $demand_{it}$ 为社区 i 在 t 年的弱势群体需求，分别为女性比例，老年人比例，残疾人比例，三无老人比例和低保人口比例； $control_{it}$ 为控制变量，包括社区办公经费，是否有业委会（虚拟变量）和志愿者比例。 $community_i$ 为社区固定效用， $year_t$ 为年份固定效应； ε 为误差项。系数 a_2 反映社区需求对社会组织密度的影响。

实证结果见表2。模型1-4的因变量分别为社会组织密度，民办非企业密度，社会团体密度和基金会密度的自然对数。模型结果证实了我们的假设，从总体上来看，残疾人比例，孤儿比例，低保比例与社会组织密度成正相关。残疾人比例每增加1%会显著提高社会组织密度0.157%，孤儿比例每增加1%会显著提高社会组织密度0.258%，低保比例每增加1%会显著提高社会组织密度0.097%。同时，模型显示社区老年人比例对社会组织密度没有影响。这可能和当前中国养老模式有关，老年人的服务需求由子女承担。

由于社会组织的类型不一，分为民办非企业，社会团体和基金会。民办非企业单位是由企业事业单位、社会团体和其他社会力量以及公民个人利用非国有资产举办的、从事社会服务活动的社会组织，分为教育、卫生、科技、文化、劳动、民政、体育、中介服务和法律服务等十大类，社会团体是由公民或企事业单位自愿组成、按章程开展活动的社会组织，包括行业性社团、学术性社团、专业性社团和联合性社团。基金会是利用捐赠财产从事公益事业的社会组织，包括公募基金会和非公募基金会（新华网，2010）。为了使我们的模型结果更加稳健，我们分别验证了弱势群体需求对社会组织各子类密度的影响。模型2显示的是弱势群体比例对民办非企业发展的影响，结果和模型1类似，残疾人比例，孤儿比例，低保比例和社区社会组织发展成正相关，不同的是，模型1显示三无老人比例的自然对数对总体社会发展没有影响，但在模型2中呈现正相关，说明针对无生活来源，并且无法通过家庭养老满足其需求的老年人来说，民办非企业的发展可以为其提供服务。此外，从模型4中我们可以看出，三无老人的需求也刺激了基金会的萌芽，三无老人的比例和基金会密度呈正相关。模型3结果和模型1的结果一致，社区残疾人，孤儿以及低保的需求促进了社区社会团体的产生。

表2. 社区弱势群体需求与社会组织发展

变量	(1) 社会组织	(2) 民办非企业	(3) 社会团体	(4) 基金会
Ln(女性比例)	0.093 [0.063]	0.005 [0.058]	0.107 [0.063]	0.023 [0.039]
Ln(老年人比例)	0.010 [0.041]	0.024 [0.026]	0.006 [0.035]	0.022 [0.017]
Ln(残疾人比例)	0.157***	0.147***	0.119**	0.110***

⁵社会组织密度 = (社区社会组织数 + 1) / 常住人口数。

	[0.041]	[0.031]	[0.038]	[0.020]
Ln(三无老人比例)	0.044	0.065**	0.029	0.034**
	[0.024]	[0.020]	[0.024]	[0.011]
Ln(孤儿比例)	0.258***	0.254***	0.248***	0.263***
	[0.047]	[0.043]	[0.047]	[0.031]
Ln(低保比例)	0.097*	0.105***	0.143***	0.111***
	[0.038]	[0.031]	[0.036]	[0.020]
常数项	-3.735***	-4.362***	-4.138***	-4.842***
	[0.367]	[0.324]	[0.358]	[0.248]
控制变量	Y	Y	Y	Y
社区固定效应	Y	Y	Y	Y
年固定效应	Y	Y	Y	Y
样本总数	4919	4936	4938	4955
R平方	0.813	0.858	0.822	0.960

注:(1)数据来源:2015-2017年民政部《城市社区治理现状综合调查》面板数据;(2)模型固定效应模型(4)括号内为标准差;(5)显著性水平:“*”5%,”**”1%,”***”0.1%。

(二) 政府支持：社区领导兼任，政府购买服务

中国社会组织发展和政府联系紧密，在社区层面，我们主要从两个方面去衡量政府支持对社会组织发展的影响，社区领导兼任和政府购买服务。我们用以下实证策略进行检验。

$$\ln(Y_{it}) = a_4 + a_5 \text{government}_{it} + a_6 \ln(\text{demand}_{it}) + a_7 \text{control}_{it} + \text{community}_i + \text{year}_t + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

$$\ln(Y_{it}) = a_8 + a_9 \text{government}_{it} * \ln(\text{demand}_{it}) + a_{10} \text{government}_{it} + a_{11} \ln(\text{demand}_{it}) + a_{12} \text{control}_{it} + \text{community}_i + \text{year}_t + \varepsilon \quad (3)$$

在公式2中，其中 Y_{it} 为社区 i 在 t 年社会组织密度，在公式(1)的基础上，我们添加 government_{it} ，代表政府支持因素，分别为社区 i 在 t 年是否有居委会或者党支部领导单担任社会组织领导，社区里是否有政府购买服务项目。

为了进一步衡量政府支持是否有效应对社区中弱势群体的需求，我们在公式(3)中添加政府支持与社区需求的交互项 ($a_9 \text{government}_{it} * \ln(\text{demand}_{it})$) 系数 a_9 反映了政府支持对社区弱势群体的反应，如果系数为正，则代表政府支持很好契合了社区弱势群体的需求。模型结果见表3-表5。

表3 报告了社区领导是否兼任社会组织领导对社会组织发展的影响，模型结果证明我们的假设，社区领导兼任社会组织领导会显著提高社区内组织密度。有社区领导兼任社会组织领导的社区比没有社区领导兼任社会组织领导的社区社会组织密度多0.714%。对于社会组织的不同类型来说，有社区领导兼任社会组织领导的社区比没有社区领导兼任社会组织领导的社区民办非企业和社会团体密度分别多0.207%, 0.459%。社区领导兼任对基金会的密度没有影响，这可能是因为基金会大多为私人运营，政府在其中涉及较少。

表3. 社区领导兼任与社会组织发展

变量	(1) 社会组 织	(2) 民办非企 业	(3) 社会团 体	(4) 基金会	(5) 社会组 织	(6) 民办非企 业	(7) 社会团 体	(8) 基金会
社区领导兼任 (Dummy)	0.714*** [0.060]	0.207*** [0.053]	0.459*** [0.061]	-0.001 [0.023]	1.314** [0.512]	0.325 [0.478]	0.886* [0.515]	-0.017 [0.311]
Ln(女性比例)	0.085 [0.061]	0.002 [0.060]	0.101 [0.059]	0.023 [0.039]	0.079 [0.062]	0.001 [0.054]	0.084 [0.058]	0.019 [0.039]
Ln(老年人比例)	0.005 [0.039]	0.022 [0.025]	0.004 [0.033]	0.022 [0.017]	0.014 [0.042]	0.024 [0.027]	0.015 [0.034]	0.019 [0.018]
Ln(残疾人比例)	0.154*** [0.038]	0.147*** [0.030]	0.117** [0.037]	0.110*** [0.021]	0.132** [0.040]	0.117*** [0.032]	0.107** [0.037]	0.105** [0.020]
Ln(三无老人比例)	0.040 [0.024]	0.063** [0.020]	0.026 [0.023]	0.034** [0.011]	0.047* [0.026]	0.056*** [0.019]	0.036 [0.023]	0.032** [0.012]
Ln(残疾人比例)	0.263*** [0.044]	0.256*** [0.043]	0.251*** [0.046]	0.263*** [0.031]	0.249** [0.046]	0.276*** [0.043]	0.242** [0.042]	0.269** [0.031]
Ln(低保比例)	0.099** [0.035]	0.104*** [0.031]	0.142*** [0.035]	0.111*** [0.020]	0.103** [0.036]	0.111*** [0.030]	0.129** [0.034]	0.114** [0.020]
Ln(女性比例)*社区领导兼任					0.033 [0.207]	0.056 [0.222]	0.165 [0.207]	0.045 [0.119]
Ln(老年人比例)*社区领导兼任					-0.022 [0.080]	0.006 [0.057]	-0.044 [0.121]	0.013 [0.028]
Ln(残疾人比例) *社区领导兼任					0.105 [0.075]	0.150** [0.070]	0.042 [0.076]	0.028 [0.039]
Ln(三无老人比例) *社区领导兼任					-0.035 [0.048]	0.032 [0.049]	-0.040 [0.051]	0.011 [0.024]
Ln(残疾人比例) *社区领导兼 任					0.062 [0.071]	-0.086 [0.068]	0.026 [0.085]	-0.027 [0.039]
Ln(低保比例) *社区领导兼任					-0.020 [0.046]	-0.030 [0.043]	0.057 [0.044]	-0.011 [0.020]
常数项	- 3.978*** [0.356]	-4.439*** [0.325]	- 4.318*** [0.349]	- 4.841*** [0.249]	- 4.102** [0.360]	-4.444*** [0.323]	- 4.429** [0.334]	- 4.830** [0.247]
控制变量	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
社区固定效应	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
年固定效应	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
样本总数	4919	4936	4938	4955	4919	4936	4938	4955
R平方	0.840	0.860	0.834	0.960	0.840	0.862	0.835	0.960

注:(1)数据来源:2015-2017年民政部《城市社区治理现状综合调查》面板数据;(2)模型固定效应模型(4)括号内为标准差;
(5)显著性水平:“*”5%,”**”1%,”***”0.1%。

此外，我们还想了解社区兼任领导的方式是否和社区弱势群体的需求结合在一起。表3模型5-8结果显示社区领导兼任是否在弱势群体需求多的地方发挥作用。我们主要关注社区领导兼任与弱势群体比例交互项的系数。总体上来说，社区领导兼任社会组织领导与社会组织密度仍然呈现正相关（模型5），但是，我们发现社区领导兼任与弱势群体的比例的交互项不相关。这说明，社区领导兼任社会组织领导的方式可以有效地增加社区的社会组织密度，但是这种方式没有和社区的需求相结合，二者出现了不匹配的情况。从社会组织的子类来看，这种不匹配的情况也比较明显，例外的是，在残疾人比例高的社区，社区领导兼任社会组织领导的方式促进了民办非企业的发展。但是对于其他弱势群体的需求，社区领导兼任的方式没有很好和其结合起来。

政府支持对社会组织发展是否有选择性呢？为了探究这个问题，我们根据社会组织功能，将社会组织分为社会服务和公益慈善类、群众性文体类、协助社区管理类和群众自我管理与服务类。同时还区分了社区内部的社会组织和在社区内部活动的外部社会组织。表4报告了模型结果，模型1-4显示，政府倾向支持社会服务和公益慈善类，协助社区管理类社会组织的发展，社区兼任社会组织领导显著提高社会服务和公益慈善类社会组织密度0.273%，提高协助社区管理类社会组织密度0.143%。

与此同时，我们对社区领导兼任对社会组织的影响做了一个安慰剂检验。模型5-8显示社区领导兼任社会组织领导对社区外部的社会组织没有影响。这符合我们的预期，社区领导兼任只对社区内部的社会组织产生影响。

表4.社区领导兼任与社区内部和外部不同类型社会组织发展

	社区社会组织类型				社区外部社会组织（安慰剂检验）			
	（1）社会服务和公益慈善类	（2）群众性文体类	（3）协助社区管理类	（4）和群众自我管理与服务类	（5）社会服务和公益慈善类	（6）群众性文体类	（7）协助社区管理类	（8）和群众自我管理与服务类
社区领导兼任（Dummy）	0.273*** [0.073]	0.078 [0.069]	0.143* [0.069]	0.104 [0.084]	0.052 [0.053]	0.036 [0.058]	0.072 [0.041]	0.047 [0.043]
Ln(女性比例)	0.100 [0.123]	0.042 [0.114]	0.057 [0.140]	0.045 [0.104]	-0.022 [0.060]	0.004 [0.096]	0.023 [0.078]	0.016 [0.076]
Ln(老年人比例)	0.006 [0.055]	0.008 [0.050]	0.024 [0.047]	0.001 [0.068]	0.033 [0.040]	0.071 [0.049]	0.013 [0.032]	0.011 [0.040]
Ln(残疾人比例)	0.135* [0.062]	0.188*** [0.056]	0.140* [0.055]	0.147* [0.069]	0.133** [0.049]	0.148** [0.055]	0.120** [0.042]	0.135** [0.046]
Ln(三无老人比例)	0.038 [0.045]	0.034 [0.036]	0.051 [0.037]	0.070 [0.043]	0.028 [0.031]	0.029 [0.033]	0.032 [0.025]	0.049 [0.025]
Ln(残疾人比例)	0.258** [0.081]	0.283*** [0.067]	0.264*** [0.066]	0.252** [0.085]	0.263*** [0.066]	0.284*** [0.061]	0.289*** [0.049]	0.283*** [0.065]
Ln(低保比例)	0.129** [0.049]	0.117* [0.053]	0.083 [0.053]	0.121 [0.071]	0.136** [0.042]	0.137** [0.046]	0.128*** [0.034]	0.130*** [0.033]
常数项	-4.092*** [0.596]	3.465*** [0.585]	-4.391*** [0.545]	-3.981*** [0.640]	-4.679*** [0.480]	4.350*** [0.508]	-4.649*** [0.418]	-4.365*** [0.470]

控制变量	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
社区固定效应	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
年固定效应	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
样本总数	3371	3375	3372	3375	3360	3364	3371	3371
R平方	0.851	0.866	0.864	0.831	0.900	0.892	0.937	0.934

注:(1)数据来源:2015-2017年民政部《城市社区治理现状综合调查》面板数据;(2)模型固定效应模型(4)括号内为标准差;(5)显著性水平:“*”5%,”**”1%,”***”0.1%

政府购买服务是社会组织发展的重要资金来源,政府购买服务在社区层次差异较大。从描述性结果看,将近一半社区(46.72%)在2015-2017年没有政府购买服务项目。在表5中,我们报告了政府购买服务对社会组织发展的影响。我们发现政府购买服务对社区社会组织密度没有影响。这可能是因为政府购买服务的项目比较稀缺,社区社会组织很少有机会得到项目。

表5. 政府购买服务与社会组织发展

变量	(1) 社会组 织	(2) 民办非企 业	(3) 社会团 体	(4) 基金会	(1) 社会组 织	(2) 民办非企 业	(3) 社会团 体	(4) 基金会
政府购买服务 (Dummy)	0.047 [0.046]	0.010 [0.036]	0.018 [0.039]	-0.017 [0.019]	0.169 [0.345]	-0.056 [0.296]	0.494 [0.311]	0.083 [0.205]
Ln(女性比例)	0.088 [0.063]	0.002 [0.057]	0.102 [0.063]	0.019 [0.039]	-0.029 [0.090]	-0.029 [0.055]	-0.038 [0.084]	-0.030 [0.034]
Ln(老年人比例)	0.010 [0.041]	0.024 [0.026]	0.006 [0.035]	0.021 [0.017]	0.014 [0.056]	0.011 [0.039]	0.010 [0.049]	0.006 [0.027]
Ln(残疾人比例)	0.155*** [0.041]	0.146*** [0.031]	0.116** [0.038]	0.109*** [0.021]	0.152*** [0.051]	0.146*** [0.039]	0.090** [0.044]	0.108** [0.026]
Ln(三无老人比例)	0.044 [0.024]	0.061** [0.020]	0.029 [0.024]	0.034** [0.011]	0.063** [0.032]	0.065** [0.027]	0.040 [0.028]	0.034** [0.017]
Ln(残疾人比例)	0.258*** [0.048]	0.256*** [0.044]	0.247*** [0.048]	0.262*** [0.032]	0.251*** [0.055]	0.266*** [0.049]	0.236*** [0.054]	0.263** [0.035]
Ln(低保比例)	0.097* [0.038]	0.104*** [0.031]	0.142*** [0.036]	0.109*** [0.020]	0.082** [0.040]	0.096*** [0.034]	0.130*** [0.040]	0.111** [0.020]
Ln(女性比例)*购买服务					0.252* [0.151]	0.062 [0.124]	0.297** [0.145]	0.098 [0.091]
Ln(老年人比例)*购买服务					-0.018 [0.069]	0.019 [0.049]	-0.023 [0.057]	0.021 [0.030]
Ln(残疾人比例)*购买服务					-0.001 [0.058]	-0.002 [0.044]	0.045 [0.051]	0.000 [0.027]
Ln(三无老人比例) *购买服务					-0.032 [0.039]	-0.007 [0.032]	-0.018 [0.034]	0.001 [0.018]
Ln(残疾人比例)*购买服务					0.009 [0.055]	-0.019 [0.048]	0.014 [0.050]	-0.001 [0.028]

Ln(低保比例) *购买服务					0.030	0.014	0.022	-0.002
					[0.035]	[0.026]	[0.031]	[0.013]
常数项	-	-4.390***	-	-	-	-4.364***	-	-
	3.770***		4.178***	4.856***	3.844***		4.440***	4.916**
								*
	[0.371]	[0.326]	[0.364]	[0.252]	[0.408]	[0.353]	[0.395]	[0.269]
控制变量	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
社区固定效应	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
年固定效应	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
样本总数	4893	4909	4912	4928	4893	4909	4912	4928
R平方	0.813	0.859	0.822	0.961	0.814	0.859	0.823	0.961

注:(1)数据来源:2015-2017年民政部《城市社区治理现状综合调查》面板数据;(2)模型固定效应模型(4)括号内为标准差;
(5)显著性水平:“*”5%,”***”1%,”****”0.1%

五. 结论

本文的研究问题为社区需求,政府支持如何影响社会组织发展,政府支持是否和社区弱势群体需求相匹配。现有研究仅利用省或市级层面数据进行研究,并且缺乏探讨政府支持是否和社区需求相匹配的问题。本文试图利用社区层次的面板数据对中国社会组织发展差异做出解释,并探讨政府支持与社区弱势群体需求的匹配问题。通过使用民政部政策研究中心2015-2017年《城市社区治理现状综合调查》的面板数据,我们使用固定效应模型对我们的问题做出检验,得出了以下结论:

其一、社区中弱势群体需要促进了社会组织发展。残疾人比例,孤儿比例和低保比例和社区社会组织密度成正相关。其二,我们从社区领导兼任社会组织领导和政府购买服务的角度来衡量政府支持对社会组织发展的影响,实证结果显示,社区领导兼任社会组织组织领导的方式大大促进了社会组织组织的产生,同时,我们发现,政府对社会组织发展的支持是选择性的,体现为社区领导倾向支持社会服务和公益慈善类,协助社区管理类社会组织的发展。

其三、政府支持与社区弱势群体的需求存在着张力,从社会组织总体看,社区领导兼任社会组织领导对弱势群体需求大的社区的社会组织发展没有影响。其四、政府购买服务对社会组织发展没有影响。

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Neighborhood Relations and Community Participation : An Evidence from East Asia

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Abstract

Sociologists generally believe that social capital and community participation have declined in tandem in the West. This paper argues that the relation between the two is not the same in East Asia. Using representative data from China, Japan and South Korea, this paper finds that: in China, neighborhood relations are close, but community participation is weak; Japanese and South Korean are estranged with their neighbors, yet their community participation is very active. Consequently, sociologists' understanding about the relationship between social capital and community participation deserves further investigation.

Keywords: Neighborhood Relations, Community Participation, Social Capital, East Asia

I. Introduction

Community and social capital are two important and interrelated issues of sociology. Since Ferdinand Tönnies distinguished between two types of social groupings¹, community and society, "community" is widely regarded as groupings of people based on identity and proximity. Thus, community itself means a close relationship among its people.

Community and social relations are also two most concerned topics of the theory of social capital. Coleman proposed the concept of social capital, arguing that social relations, trust, information network and shared norms can help people achieve specific goals.² In Putnam's view, social capital can link the inhabitants and prompt them to be deeply involved in various matters in the community. Putnam believes that community social capital, including mutually beneficial cooperation guidelines for network and local voluntary associations, was a deep foundation for the development of civil society and the active participation of residents in American history.

However, he found that although the United States is considered to have a strong citizen participation in tradition, since the 1960s civic engagement in the United States has been declining. Instead of participating in community life, such as bowling clubs, churches, trade unions or other voluntary organizations, the Americans prefer to individual activities, such as watching TV at home, more and more. Putnam attributed the decline in civic participation to the decline of social trust and the disintegration of social ties.³

This seems to be consistent with the theory of modernization and individualism, that is, as society develops, people are becoming more and more individual, social relations and interaction are less and

¹ Tönnies, F., & Loomis, C. P. (2002). *Community and Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. Dover Publications.

² Coleman, J. S. (1988). Social capital in the creation of human capital. *American journal of sociology*, 94, S95-S120.

³ Putnam, R. D. (2001). *Bowling alone: The collapse and revival of American community*. Simon and Schuster.

less important.⁴

However, is this true in East Asia? Previous studies have mostly concerned in the western societies. Is there a decline of community participation in tandem with social capital in East Asia? This study attempts to answer this question by using survey data to analyze the social capital and community participation in East Asia.

The data we use are from East Asia Social Survey (EASS)⁵. The survey was made up of a series of General Social Survey completed by academic institutions in mainland China, Japan, Korea and Taiwan. In this study, the survey data for 2012 is used. The sample sizes are 5819 (China), 2333(Japan) and 1396 (Korea). The results of the analysis have been weighted according to the weight indexes.

II. Neighborhood relations

The survey contains three indexes of neighborhood relations: neighborhood interaction, neighborhood evaluation, and trust in neighbors.

1. Neighborhood interaction

Firstly, it asked respondents about the number of neighbors that they will greet if they encounter.

Table 1 Number of Neighbors: Greeting Terms

	China	Japan	South Korea
0	3.3%	6.3%	10.4%
1-2	11.8%	21.1%	19.3%
3-4	17.9%	29.3%	18.3%
5-9	15.6%	20.9%	16.9%
10 or more	51.5%	21.7%	35.2%
DK, refused	0.0%	0.9%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note: data source: East Asia Social Survey. author's calculation.

We can find that Chinese are closer with their neighbors, while Japanese and South Korean are more estranged (See Table 1). In China, 51.5% of the respondents say that they would greet 10 or more neighbors when they encounter. Yet in Japan and South Korea, about 30% say that they would greet no more than 2 neighbors, especially 6.3% of Japanese and 10.4% of South Korean say that they would greet no one.

Secondly, the survey asked the respondents “with how many neighbors could you ask for a favor when needed, such as watering plants, feeding pets, and giving an advice?”

⁴ Beck, U. (2002). Individualization: Institutionalized individualism and its social and political consequences (Vol. 13). Sage.

⁵ More details can be found on its website. <http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/series/00486>.

Table 2 Number of Neighbors: Asking for a Favor

	China	Japan	South Korea
0	15.1%	61.3%	21.4%
1-2	29.6%	26.6%	38.8%
3-4	20.9%	7.8%	22.0%
5-9	10.9%	0.9%	8.1%
10 or more	23.2%	0.9%	9.8%
DK, refused	0.3%	2.6%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note: data source: East Asia Social Survey. author's calculation.

Similarly, Chinese have more friends in their neighborhood. In China, 23.2% of the respondents say that they can find 10 or more neighbors to help them. Yet in Japan and South Korean, the situation is much worse. 61.3% of Japanese and 21.4% of South Korean have no friend in their neighborhood (See Table 2).

2. Neighborhood evaluation

Respondents' evaluation of their neighborhood proves that the Chinese have a much more helpful neighborhood. Firstly, the survey asked whether the respondents agree or disagree that "the neighbors are mutually concerned for each other".

Table 3 Neighborhood Environment: Mutually Concerned for Each Other

	China	Japan	South Korea
Strongly agree	27.5%	3.8%	9.1%
Agree	49.0%	17.7%	18.4%
Somewhat agree	17.0%	32.1%	29.4%
Neither agree nor disagree	4.0%	34.1%	22.8%
Somewhat disagree	1.4%	6.4%	11.9%
Disagree	0.8%	2.4%	5.0%
Strongly disagree	0.2%	1.5%	3.4%
DK, refused	0.1%	1.9%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note: data source: East Asia Social Survey. author's calculation.

Chinese respondents generally agree that the neighborhood is of mutual interest; 27.5% said they strongly agree, and 49% agree (See Table 3). Japan and South Korea are a bit worse than China, the most choices are "somewhat agree" and "neither agree nor disagree". Only 3.8% of Japanese and 9.1% of South Korean strongly believe that their neighborhood are mutually concerned.

Besides, the survey also asked the respondents whether they agree or disagree that "the neighbors are willing to provide assistance when I am in need".

Table 4 Neighborhood Environment: Willing to Provide Assistance

	China	Japan	South Korea
Strongly agree	23.6%	2.9%	10.7%
Agree	46.5%	14.0%	18.2%
Somewhat agree	19.3%	29.3%	29.0%
Neither agree nor disagree	6.2%	39.1%	25.2%
Somewhat disagree	2.4%	6.9%	9.5%
Disagree	1.5%	3.7%	4.4%
Strongly disagree	0.4%	2.2%	3.1%
DK, refused	0.2%	1.9%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note: data source: East Asia Social Survey. author's calculation.

The results show that Chinese have a much higher evaluation of their neighborhood. 23.6% of Chinese strongly agree on the description, while 46.5% say that they agree. Yet in Japanese and South Korea, the respondents show less confidence. Only 2.9% of Japanese and 10.7% of South Korean say that they strongly agree. Most of them choose “somewhat agree” or “neither agree or disagree” (see Table 4).

3. Trust in Neighbors

Trust is an important index of social capital. In the survey, respondents were asked “how much do you trust your neighbors”.

Table 5 Trust in Neighbors

	China	Japan	South Korea
A great deal	19.3%	5.1%	13.0%
To some extent	67.2%	56.4%	54.0%
Not very much	12.6%	30.3%	28.4%
Not at all	0.7%	6.1%	4.6%
DK, refused	0.2%	2.1%	0.0%
Total	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%

Note: data source: East Asia Social Survey. author's calculation.

We can find that Chinese trust their neighbors the most. 19.3% of Chinese say that they trust their neighbors a great deal. Japanese and South Korean, however, are more doubtful. 30.3% of Japanese and 28.4% of South Korean say they don't trust their neighbors very much (See Table 5).

From above, we can conclude that China has the closest neighborhood relations among the three countries. Chinese have much better neighborhood interactions, evaluations, and trust. Taking these as indexes of social capital, China has much more social capital in neighborhood than Japan and South Korean do. Thus, according to Putnam, such close neighborhood and abundant social capital should prompt China to have much more community participation. Yet, is this deduction true?

III. Community participation

The survey also conducted a thorough investigation of community participation. Thus it can help us analyze and compare community participation in the three countries. Relevant indicators include participation in social organizations, participation in community activities, and so on.

1. Participation in social organizations

Participation in social organizations is an important way for community participation. The survey asked the respondents the question that “are you a member of the following organizations or groups?”

Table 6 Participation in Social Association or groups

	China		Japan		South Korea	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Political Association	7.6%	92.4%	4.2%	95.8%	5.6%	94.4%
Residential/Neighborhood Association	4.5%	95.5%	57.2%	42.8%	22.2%	77.8%
Social Service Club (Volunteer group/ NPO)	3.4%	96.6%	7.0%	93.0%	16.7%	83.3%
Citizens' Movement/Consumers' Cooperative Group	1.8%	98.2%	14.9%	85.1%	7.0%	93.0%
Religious Group	2.5%	97.5%	9.7%	90.3%	28.3%	71.7%
Alumni Association	6.0%	94.0%	42.8%	57.2%	51.8%	48.2%
Recreational Association (Hobby and Sports)	4.6%	95.4%	29.7%	70.3%	42.5%	57.5%
Labor Union	8.2%	91.8%	11.3%	88.7%	8.5%	91.5%
Occupational/Professional/Trade Association	2.4%	97.6%	8.6%	91.4%	13.0%	87.0%

Note: data source: East Asia Social Survey. author's calculation.

The concerned organization is “residential/neighborhood association” in our study. We can find that Japanese and South Korean have a much higher participation rates than Chinese. 57.2% of Japanese and 22.2% of South Korean take a part in the Residential/Neighborhood Association. Yet only 4.5% of Chinese do. In terms of other social organizations, Chinese also have much lower participation rates than Japanese and South Korean (See Table 6).

Besides, the survey also asked the respondents among the organizations/groups we mentioned above, “in which of them did you participate most actively in the last 12 months?”

Table 7 Organizations Participated Most Actively in the Last 12 Months

	China	Japan	South Korea
Political association	5.5%	0.5%	0.3%
Residential/neighborhood association	2.5%	16.4%	7.1%
Social service club (Volunteer group/ NPO)	0.8%	2.6%	4.1%
Citizens' movement/ Consumers' cooperative group	0.5%	0.9%	0.9%
Religious group	1.9%	3.7%	14.7%
Alumni association	2.6%	8.1%	23.2%
Recreational association (hobby and sports)	2.8%	21.0%	20.8%
Labor union	4.2%	3.6%	1.4%
Occupational/ Professional association/ Trade association	1.0%	2.9%	4.1%
None of them	77.4%	36.9%	0.0%

Note: data source: East Asia Social Survey. author's calculation.

The results show that Residential/neighborhood association is one of the most popular organizations in Japan and South Korea. 16.4% of Japanese and 7.1% of South Korean say that they participated in Residential/neighborhood association most actively in the last 12 months. Yet in China, 77.4% of the respondents say that they participate in none of these organizations (See Table 7).

2. Volunteer Activity

Volunteer Activity is another important form of community participation. The survey asked the respondents the following questions: “Have you participated in the following activities of public interest during the last 12 months?” The activities listed include: volunteer activities to improve the community (improve environment, increase safety, revitalize the town, etc.), volunteer activities associated with sports, culture, arts, and/or scholarliness (sport coaching, promoting traditional culture, providing technical knowledge, etc), volunteer activities associated with socially vulnerable groups (disabled, children, elderly, etc), and activities associated with political issues (signed a petition, took part in a demonstration or protest, etc).

Table 8 Volunteer Activity in the Last 12 Months

	China		Japan		South Korea	
	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No
Improve Community	11.5%	88.5%	16.4%	83.6%	13.7%	86.3%
Sports, Culture, Arts	7.5%	92.5%	10.6%	89.4%	9.8%	90.2%
For Socially Vulnerable Groups	11.8%	88.2%	8.1%	91.9%	16.0%	84.0%
Political Issues	1.4%	98.6%	5.6%	94.4%	6.1%	93.9%

Note: data source: East Asia Social Survey. author's calculation.

All of those activities can be seen as community activities. We can find that Japanese and South Korean take part in community activities more actively than Chinese. They have higher rates in three of the four activities, including volunteer activities to improve the community, volunteer activities associated with

sports, culture, arts, and/or scholarliness, and activities associated with political issues. Among the three countries, Japanese participate the most actively (See Table 8).

In all, we can conclude that China's community participation is the least active, while Japan's is the most active. This result is contrary to the previous results that China has the closest neighborhood relations.

IV. Conclusion and Discussion

To sum up, we find that neighborhood relations and community participation in East Asia are not declining in tandem as in the West. In China, neighborhood relations are close, but community participation is weak; Japanese and South Korean are estranged with their neighbors, yet their community participation is very active. These results show that Putnam's argument that the decline of social capital accompanies the decline of community participation deserves more concern.

We inquire the reason why East Asia has such characteristic relationship between neighborhood relations and community participation and focus on the fact that East Asia's communities are quite different from Western ones. Western communities, like in the USA, usually take churches as their core. Social life revolves around religion and church. Thus their neighborhood relations and community public life are intertwined. Communities in East Asia, however, have distinctive organization cores. In China, it was family and clan before People's Republic of China. Later, China built up the system of Danwei (working unit). In the system of Danwei, people's social welfares and social life are all taken care by their Danwei⁶. Thus, they usually don't need any community participation. Besides, they had inadequate social rights before recent years' reform. So Chinese generally have close neighborhood relations, but they don't need or they don't have any community participation.

Japan's communities also have their unique organizations, like Theodore C. Bestor experienced in Miyamoto-cho. Bestor discovered that "in the vastness of Tokyo these are tiny social units, and by the standards that most Americans would apply, they are perhaps far too small, geographically and demographically, to be considered 'neighborhoods.' Still, to residents of Tokyo and particularly to the residents of any given subsection of the city, they are socially significant and geographically distinguishable divisions of the urban landscape. In neighborhoods such as these, overlapping and intertwining associations and institutions provide an elaborate and enduring framework for local social life, within which residents are linked to one another not only through their participation in local organizations, but also through webs of informal social, economic, and political ties." ⁷These "tiny social units" provides the Japanese with various and deep community participation while they keep an estranged neighborhood relation.

Our findings may also be an example for Han and Shim's theory "Dual Individualization in East Asia". They try to integrate both the dis-embedding and reembedding process of individualization, and show "dual individualization": a tendency of individualization of the west on one hand and characteristics of community-oriented individualization on the other in East Asia⁸. Thus, the differences we find among China, South Korean, and Japan, may be attributed to their different situation of individualization and

⁶ Walder, A. G. (1988). *Communist neo-traditionalism: Work and authority in Chinese industry*. Univ of California Press.

⁷ Bestor, T. C. (1989). *Neighborhood Tokyo*. Stanford University Press.

⁸ HAN, Sang-Jin and SHIM, young-hee. (2016). Dual individualization in East Asia: individualization in the society and in the family. In *Liberalism and Chinese Economic Development: Perspectives from Europe and Asia*, edited by Gilles Campagnolo. Oxford: Taylor and Francis.

reembedding.

Through the analysis of East Asia, this study has expanded the existing literature on community and social capital. Yet there are some limitations, such as the lack of in-depth comparison and analysis of the factors that affect neighborhood relations and community participation. With the further development of globalization, the communities in the East Asia gradually are expected to move the way to lose their uniqueness, become more like the West, and also lose close neighborhoods and active community participation in all. The issues are worth discussing seriously but will need empirical researches.

Participatory Community Planning in *Qinghe*, Beijing : A Third Way Exploration in Old Community Regeneration

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Abstract

Along with the rapid urbanization process in China, the focus of urban development has gradually transformed from new area development to urban regeneration, especially in the mega cities like Beijing. During the past two decades, urban renewal in Beijing has been centered in the shanty town areas in the Old City, mainly led by the government and driven by the market with large scale demolition and redevelopment. With the formulation and implementation of more and more strict conservation plans to the Old City, as well as fewer potential plot left, the focus of urban regeneration in recent years has transferred to the old communities, built before 1990 with multi-storey housing, and mostly distribute in the central urban area. These old communities have been for a long term mostly out of the sight of either the State or the market, and faced increasingly serious dual declines in both physical and social conditions, forming a "new poverty belt" surrounding the Old City. There emerges a trend that the State has returned to the territory management at the community level, and one typical example is the large scale old community comprehensive renovation project dominated by the Beijing municipal government with huge public financial investment and policy support. While the rocky path some pilot projects have experienced with the characteristics of engineering focused, project management model and government dominated is hard to popularize, nor sustainable. Besides the two main models of government dominant and market based, is there a third way in old community regeneration, to realize space renovation together with social revitalization? The paper takes the practical experiment of community regeneration in *Qinghe* area in Haidian District, Beijing, as an example. The experiment, called as "New *Qinghe* Experiment", is initiated since 2014 by an interdisciplinary group from Tsinghua University, including the teachers and students from the departments of sociology, urban planning and architecture, etc., with their work still going on till now. Through participatory community planning together with community governance innovation, taking advantage of the interactive reproduction of society and space, it has improved the community governance structure and public affair negotiation mechanism, promoted the community's abilities and belongs, and advanced the whole community improvement. Though unfinished, it may be regarded as an exploration and a demonstration of organic regeneration of old communities, by the way of government-led, community as the main body, with wide range of social participation, towards a comprehensive and sustainable development.

Keywords: Old Community Regeneration; Participatory Community Planning; Community Governance; *Qinghe* Area; Beijing

Globalization, Information Society and Individuality

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Abstract

This paper aims to find a subject and a theory of investigation of community reconstruction in contemporary Japan. After reviewing a history of sociological studies of neighborhood association in Japan, the paper reviewed a history of Seikatsu club, a voluntary cooperative movement in Japan and found characteristics, success and problem of a voluntary association in contemporary Japan. The paper also introduced the first national survey of neighborhood association conducted by Yutaka Tsujinaka and others, and showed universality of neighborhood association and importance of it in order to develop local governance.

The second part of the paper examined theories of community reconstruction. The paper claims that we are facing the end of modernity by informationalization, globalization and science-technological revolution. As a result of them, community of consensus was changed into community of dissensus. Therefore the paper proposed using new concepts, for example, singularity rather than individualization. The paper also found a change of social form of life into technological form of life. Therefore we must investigate main characteristics of life which are basis of our social system. by using a theory created by natural, political and cultural ecological thinking.

In conclusion, the paper claims that the main target of our investigation of community Reconstruction should be at town building by combination of neighborhood association with voluntary associations like Seikatsu club, and theoretically at creating a new theory of life.

Keywords: Neighborhood Association, Voluntary Association, Local Governance, Singularity, Technological Form of Life, Ecology, The End of Modernity

Introduction

The origin of the neighborhood association in the Japanese city can be traced back to the time of Taisho democracy. Unlike the common sense that the neighborhood association started with the five-person system as mutual monitoring system in the Edo period and constituted the end of domination, the neighborhood association of modern Japanese city was made by the residents of the town, in order to improve their lives. It was an autonomous organization in town. According to one study it is similar to the parish in England (Tamano Kazushi 1993).

Although the neighborhood association is sometimes thought like a cultural type which is difficult to be changed but it has historically changing social construction. When the militarization of the Japanese society progressed, after the era of Taisho Democracy, it was incorporated at the end of the controlling organization and was played the role of war cooperation. After the Asian-Pacific War, it has been banned as feudal institutions bequeathed from the past, by the American occupation army. It revived after concluding the San Francisco Peace Treaty, in turn, it was supposed to play a role of postwar democratization. Also, when industrialization reached the highest stage, and the era of NGO, NPO,

various civic organizations based on "dematerial value" came, the neighborhood association's relationship with those organizations was an issue to be discussed. Recently when the era of global society, information society and aged society comes, in response to the crisis of the nation state, neighborhood association's cooperation with various levels of government is required to overcome the crisis.

Investigations on neighborhood association in the postwar Japanese sociology concerned with (1) understanding of whether it is the end of the ruling apparatus or an autonomous self-governing body of residents, (2) verification that it is an autonomous organization by doing empirical research, and (3) finding the carrier of neighborhood association as history of neighborhood association clearly showed that it was carried by the prominent families in the town in the origin and afterwards replaced by the middle class (Tamano Kazushi 1993). Also, as new citizen organizations emerged in the area since the 1960s, the relation between the neighborhood association, self-governing association and those organizations was investigated, and furthermore, at the turning point to the 21st century, globalization, informationalization, aging and welfare problems have emerged. In order to cope with these problems, the state power needed cooperation and reorganization of regional and local organizations, responding to the crisis. Co-governance of regional, local organizations with various levels of government has become a main issue in social sciences.

Community like association to Voluntary Association: Seikatsu Club

If we understand community as "any area of common life (MacIver M. Robert 1917), neighborhood association was born from community. Association is organization which aims to achieve special interests of improving community life.

But the neighborhood association became like community after achieving its interest, of improving life conditions. It became community like association. When big problems come to its life, community like association is awakening.

Appealing to the desire of most housewives to buy goods at a cheaper price, a group of young activists, both male and female, brought together about 200 housewives in *Setagaya*, Tokyo began to collectively purchase 329 bottles of milk per day¹. This was in June 1965, and it marked the beginning of the Seikatsu club. Within only two years, the number of members had increased to 800 with a collectively daily purchase of 2000 bottles of milk. In November 1968, the Seikatsu Club which was based on a voluntary organization of consumers became officially incorporated as the Seikatsu Club Consumers' cooperative (hereafter referred to as the Seikatsu Club).

While on the one hand, the Seikatsu Club strove to expand the products it purchased from milk to include rice, chicken, pork, beef, eggs, fish, vegetables, miso, soy sauce, processed foods, clothes, and household's goods, it emphasized at the same time product safety. Housewives joined the Seikatsu Club because it gave them access to safe and reliable products at a reasonable price.

¹ Sato Yoshiyuki, "Women and the Consumers Cooperative movement" (paper presented at seminar on "Environment, Development and Women" organized by the JICA in 1996) which was included in his book Sato Yoshiyuki 1996, Chapter 11. I used his sentences in this article, because he is the best person who studied the Seikatsu Club closely and got trust from people in the movement. I did not change sentences. It is necessary to do so, because I must introduce the movement without any distortion.

Seikatsu Club does not sell products to the members but rather acts as their purchasing agent. For this reason, they use the word “seikatsu-sha” not shohisha or consumer as the key word in their title. The word seikatsu-sha” literally means someone who lives or who makes a living. This word also expresses citizen’s desires to consciously and collectively create a new lifestyle. as well as protest against the evils of commercialism as opposed to remaining passive isolated consumers, absorbed in their own selfish pursuits. Through collective purchasing, the Seikatsu Club members have gradually progressed from being mere consumers at the mercy of a commercial market to becoming responsible people consciously working with others to take charge of their own lives.

The basic unit of the collective purchasing of the Seikatsu Club is the “Han2, subgroup of about 7-8people. Each subgroup submits the order forms of its individual members, Orders received from these subgroups are combined at the main office and submitted to the producers as the total collective order. The producers supply the ordered goods, staff at the distribution center divided them into subgroups on the basis of the previously submitted order forms, delivery trucks convey the goods to the appropriate locations, and the subgroups distribute the goods among their members according to the order forms.

“The subgroup is not only the basic purchasing unit. It is also an independent core group which makes many decisions concerning the Seikatsu Club itself. Subgroup activities help foster harmony between the consumer and producer, and ordering system results...”. “In addition, the subgroup provides housewives with a forum for information exchange. It also serve as an intermediary in forming human relationships, establishing a spirit of mutual cooperation and providing housewives with an opportunity to look at society as a whole. The subgroup is also a place where each member's ability for self-management, the very basis of democracy, could be developed.”

“The subgroup is chosen as the basic unit of activity because it is seen as a means to establish one grassroots alternative to an industrial society. The commons sector or cooperative sector consists of non-profit economic enterprises which use tax revenue as its main source of funds to carry out public works”.

“The commons sector represents ‘social economy’ a system of economy which takes into consideration the welfare of each individual, society and the environment. • • • • The Seikatsu Club supports a variety of social movements and activities, operating on the principle of this collective, cooperative style of economy, aiming to expand the non-profit civil sector and create an alternative democratic society...”

The Seikatsu club has been doing environmental collective purchasing from the beginning. But when it studied Minamata disease through exchanging with producers in Minmata, it realized that collective purchasing through Seikatsu Club was not enough. “Until then, we had ourselves been accomplices of the very society we were protesting against. • • • We realized that until we add the phrase, ‘stop being an accomplice’, problems will not be solved.” .

The Seikatsu Club “commenced its drive to switch from synthetic detergent to pure soap products in 1974.” “Through soap movement as well as efforts to reduce the amount of garbage, the Seikatsu club members realized that city council and government administration were too caught up in bureaucracy to be receptive to the demands of the citizen.” The first representative was elected to the ward of Nerima in 1979. In April, 1995, 109 female representatives from Seilkatsu Club have been elected.

By 1993, “the Seikatsu Club movement spread to twelve prefecture, and total number of members

exceeded 220,000, with annual supply volume of 74.1 billion yen, and a staff of 900 people.²

Seikatsu clubs are developing steady cooperative projects and campaigns in the fields of environment, welfare, education, women's liberation, peace, etc. until today. However, when entering the 21st century, In Seikatsu Club aspects of business became dominant. The dailyization of the movement progressed, and in some cases stagnation came to be pointed out. Why did it happen? First of all, a cause will be understood by focusing on the fact that Seikatsu Club was the movement with a housewife as a major player. The high economic growth from late 1950's produced a distinct type of family that only one person mainly husband could earn economic resources to support family and mainly housewife stayed at home to take care of family. Housewife realized many problems in local societies and participated in the movement.

However, when high economic growth was over and globalization progressed, this full-time housewife group was declining. If the housewife does not work, the family cannot maintain the standard of living. The movement is unable to successfully change generations of a major player and will have a big problem.

In addition, the housewife who took a gender division of labor for granted and, waked up to the problem in the process of the movement. The movement brought about the results of asking her premise, and she fell into a sort of dilemma. At the same time, a major player of the movement is tackling with the theoretical problem of unpaid work which is one of the most important problems of female labor and in the midst of a theoretical stagnation (kunihiro Yoko 2006).

The center of the movement was borne by the "Han" (group). However, when housewives came to work, it became difficult to maintain the group itself (Nishikido Makoto 2008: Chapter 6).

Although the movement used the neighborhood association and the local organization as information sources, it spread horizontally to the outside of narrow areas rather than having relations with them. Also in the movement, people concentrate on their own issue and tend to lack close connection with different issues even in the movement.

The movement advanced to politics through environmental problems. It was able to advance to local politics of municipalities unit to some extent. But further advancement is difficult and it hits the traditional political wall which is extremely strong at prefectural and national level.

In addition, the central government of Japan and national politics which were keen on the advancement of women into society since the 1990s have been steering the direction toward strengthening the activities of elite women, along with the progress of globalization and neo-liberalization, and the grassroots gender equality has lost policy and political support.

Neighborhood Associations

A research group which was headed by a political scientist Yutaka Tsujinaka conducted national survey of associations including neighborhood associations, NPO and nonprofit social organizations in order to understand the present stage of self-governance, social capital, social networks and local governance, in 2006.

² Several English books on Seikatsu club are available. Leblanc M. Robin 1999 and Iwao Sumiko 1995: Chapter 9 are among them.

It sent a questionnaire to neighborhood associations and NPO (the total number is 23403) and got 5118 responses. It also sent questionnaire to 91101 non-profit social organizations and got 15768 responses.

This survey shows³ that (1) neighborhood associations closely cooperate with local government, (2) they include the active participation of tens of millions of citizens, (3) they help growth of social capital, (4) they provide local services, and (5) they function as the nexus of networks of local organizations. As a result of this astonishing ubiquity of neighborhood associations they are also the most comprehensive in formal membership. They encompass a large majority of Japanese citizens. 98 % of local governments closely collaborate with neighborhood associations in their daily work.

This study found that neighborhood association's contribution to governance in four ways. First, neighborhood associations serve as vehicles for the creation and sustenance of social capital. Second, neighborhood associations function as a nexus or hub for local organizations. Third, neighborhood associations support local government activities through information dissemination and coordination. Fourth, neighborhood associations themselves engage in direct service provision.

Conclusions of this study include a problem of the Japanese civil society which can be found through understanding the relationship between various levels of government and neighborhood associations. Neighborhood associations' close relation with governments is a part of the largest mobilization system of social service. In exchange, government realizes the request from neighborhood associations. They mediate administration with citizen, and at the same time they mediate civil society and political society. Neighborhood associations put their legs on both the administration and civil society. They also achieve interest inter-mediation function (Tsujinaka Yutaka, Pekkanen Robert and Yamamoto Hidehiro 2009: 195). One of members of this study group, B.L Read calls the Japanese civil society as stranding civil society (Tsujinaka Yutaka, Pekkanen Robert and Yamamoto Hidehiro 2009: 195). Especially the central government of Japan has been tokening local societies quite seriously. The central government's policy has been regulating greatly local societies. Pekkanen pointed out this problem as statism in the Japanese civil society (Pekkanen Robert 2006).

One of the most important characteristics of this study is that it includes comparative study on this issue. It compares the Japanese civil society with Korea, China, Germany and the United States of America.

In the survey of Korean civil society / profit organization, organizations that correspond to the neighborhood association of Japan are not at the center of consideration. Rather, one of conclusions of the survey is that how influences of political parties, economic organizations, bureaucrats, mass media, large enterprises, cultural people and scholars constituting the system after 1987 can root in the community is a problem (Tsujinaka Yutaka and 廉載鎬 2004)

How about China? In China, there are district (社区) that are similar with the neighborhood associations of Japan, and the number of associations (社团) that are voluntary associations of Japan is increasing. They are subject to this comparative study. However, a conclusion is that the leadership of the ruling party, the Communist Party, is still dominant, and how to promote cooperation is a problem (Tsujinaka Yutaka, 李景鹏 and Kojima Kazuko 2014).

³ I used the research team's sentences to present research findings to avoid distortion of findings. Yutaka TSUJINAKA, Robert PEKKANEN and Hidehiro YAMAMOTO 2009: 255-256.

The problem Structure of the Research

Capitalism crisis deepens in the process of globalization. The process of relativeization of state power is progressing. In this process, each nation state is under pressure to solve various problems of aging population and social welfare. It has to deal with environmental problems, disasters, risks and various social problems. Participation by grassroots citizens and local residents is indispensable for solving these problems. Although Japan, Korea and China differ in characteristics of social formations, they share the problem of local governance and are asked about reconstruction of the relationship between nation state and civil society.

Then, how to precede our investigation of social governance in each country? First of all, we have to clearly understand a historical and social background of the problem.

We are in the stage of low growth rate of capitalism for a long time. This is a new stage of history of capitalism. It may be a sign of the end of capitalism, as a Japanese economist is advocating it (Mizuno Kazuo 2017). As a sociologist, I am modestly thinking this stage as the end of modernity.

The United States lost her hegemony of global economy in 1970's. But she regained hegemony of global economy by creating and using science-technology revolution. Globalization and neo-liberalization of economy gave her advantage over EU and Japanese economy. But we have to understand an irony of this victory, that is, globalization based on information-technology revolution has made basic concepts (time and space) of modernity out of order. The core institution of modern society, modern family is going to be broken down.

The concept of time in modernity is the watch time. But it still has duration which reflects the movement of nature. The concept of time now a day in information age is digital dot, no reflection of nature. The concept of space in modernity is space which has inside, outside and boundary. The concept of space in the age of globalization is global or planetary space, no inside, outside and boundary. (Melucci Alberto 1996)

According to Emiko Ochiai, a family sociologist, modern family investigated by social historians has the following 8 characteristics. (1) Separation of inside field of family from outside public field, (2) mutual strong emotional relations among family members, (3) child centered family, (4) gender division of labor, (5) strengthening of family's collective ties, (6) decline of sociality and the rise of privacy, (7) exclusion of non-kinship members, (8) nuclear family (Ochiai Emiko 1994). Modern family today is losing many characteristics of it.

Especially nuclear family which was misunderstood as universal in the history of human being has experiencing nuclear sprit of nuclear family.

If we are entering in to the era of the end of modernity, we cannot use traditional concepts used in the age of modernity. Therefore we have to deconstruct modern concepts and reconstruct most-modern concepts. How can we do it? We should pay attention to the concept of globalization and individualization. In the process of globalization, the individual has been experiencing radical individualization and molecule revolution and becoming the new individual which we should not call it as the individual but should be called as singularity. We need to reconstruct the concept of community and create a new form of life.

Introduction

As many researchers have acknowledged, when asked to assign a characteristic to sociology as a discipline, a significant number of sociologists answer “praise for community.” Since its inception, sociology has recognized community as the foundation for solidarity, trust, and autonomy. Sociology has also demonstrated that community has been supplanted by society throughout the modernization process Yasuyoshi Hayashi calls the following new relationship between neighborhood association and voluntary association as “a social stratum for the regional independence.” (Hayashi Yasuyoshi) The community development and welfare of the Seikatsu club cooperative society played an important role to form the stratum. As the name suggests, this organization has combined social strata and social fields by linking and mediating many civil society organizations. The local neighborhood association also made it possible for the local residents to open outwards. How these formations enhance the community power has already been demonstrated by a research.

According to law, the ward has to make a long plan of over the ten years to come and a mid-term plan of five years.

The analysis of the social strata and analysis of this planning process will clarify the present stage of a present day local governance.

Also in this planning, the participation method of residents is adopted, the wards publicly invited committee members of the formulation committee, those committee members also joined, after vigorous discussion, planning strong desire for a community remains in the background, even in the modern age. There is no doubt that the relationship between community and society is like a thick red thread that weaves throughout sociology. In the late-modern, post-modern, and globalization eras, people began to explore the concept of community once again. As a result of the globalization-triggered crisis faced by modern states, which has enabled the “loss of society” that is a consequence of modernization, attention is once again focused on the community that once provided solidarity, trust, and autonomy.

This stands to reason. But, due to the departure from the traditional culture, customs, morality, and associative principles of community, that which is sought cannot be the old, traditional form of community. The new form of community should be formed by global processes, such as technology, knowledge, images, and the like. This being the case, communication in the new form of community is conceptual and non-verbal, which makes it impossible to fulfill the role that community once played. Moreover, this new theory of community fails to address the theory of the state. This is due, in part, to the unknown impacts of globalization on the modern state and questions surrounding the creation of a political society.

In short, a new theory of community needs both context and meaning in present times (G. Delanty, 2000, 2003). This thesis is an attempt to examine the various theories of community presented today and to provide them with meaning and context.

Toward Theoretical Hypotheses branch

1. Community of Consensus

In sociology and other fields, when considering community problems, it is common to investigate examples found in regional communities or urban communities. In this paper, however, we have

selected the university community, often regarded as a model for regional and national communities, as the subject of consideration. With regards to this issue of university community Bill Readings, a Canadian English literature scholar, has conducted a basic inquiry. Using Readings' inquiry as a base, we have developed our discussion. J. G. Fichte, F. Schelling, F. Schleiermacher, and K. W. Humboldt developed the concept of the university community theory, which forms the foundation of the modern German university.

Readings defines the university community as the "community of consensus." He chose this definition because the university community is formed from pure social ties manifested through the pursuit of ideas without concern for private interest. Although it was not a model for local, urban, or national community, the university community envisaged in this way was actually considered to potentially be a model of community as a whole.

Thus, in modernity (a shorthand term for modern society, or industrial civilization, according to Anthony Giddens), the university was a model for social ties linking individuals that have a common relationship with the nation state. The essence of this community can be seen in I. Kant's judgment and Fichte's communication and transparency, which enables ties between students and lecturers. Community, as defined in modernity, was based on individual's autonomous decision to communicate with each other as the subjects of the state, that is, as civilians (Bill Readings, 1995, pp. 180-183).

Furthermore, characteristics of "community based on consensus" can be broadly divided into the following two categories: first, the freedom of a subject to participate in a community when the autonomy of a subject is conditioned by the fact that the subject is subordinate to the state. In other words, all interactions are mediated by the abstract concept of the state. Secondly, the ground level of consensus, which is the guiding principle of the modern community, is such that the characteristics of the social ties are subject to rational discussion and are guaranteed by agreement between subjects.

However, it goes without saying that the discussions, disputes and agreements that were necessary for modern communities were absent and inadequate in reality.

2. Singularity and Community of Dissensus

In the post-modern era, many writers have criticized the theory of a "community based on consensus." Such individuals include J. Derrida and J.F. Lyotard (J.F. Lyotard, 1984). They fundamentally objected to the premise of community theory. That is, they argued that communication is not transparent and that communities are not strengthened by or founded on a common cultural identity. J-L Nancy's theory of "La Communauté désœuvrée" (The Inoperative Community) (J-L.Nancy, 1983) was also symbolic. Therein, he made the criticism that "[c]ommunities inevitably collapse on their own due to the self-assertion of their members and conflict among members who try regulate the community. The members of the community experience it as an obstacle to their direction" (Nancy).

In this way, many philosophers have stated that "community is the experience of losing community." As a result, community theory has naturally undergone fundamental reexamination of the basic concepts and the epistemology that has supported the discussion of community, such as individuals, subjects, communication, and social ties. The main idea that has arisen from this reexamination is that community is not created by individual subjects, but rather, it is created by "singularity" (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 185-193).

The concept of "singularity" has been used by G. Deleuze (Gilles Deleuze, 1968), F. Guattari (Felix

Guattari, 1996), Derrida, Lyotard, Jean-Luc Nancy, A. Badiou (Alain Badiou, 2004), and K. Karatani (Kojin Karatani, 1984). Singularity is now used in sociology in France and the UK and getting recognition in social science. This concept assumes that “there is no longer a subject-position to function as a site of consciousness synthesis of sense-impression” (Bill readings, 1996, p.115) (Descartes's “I think, therefore I am”; the thinking individual being the subject; the subject as a self-awareness that considers itself in contemplation). This is already impossible, and the assumption of a universal recognition, which is not marked by ethnicity, gender, or class, is an error that tries to treat existence in a new form.

The term “Singularity” now has a variety of meanings and methods of use, but Deleuze and Guattari use it in the sense of “capacity to consider the transversal emergence of entities as the result of a relation of forces.” They called the process of “response to and redirecting of standardized, entrenched habits towards new, different modes of living” as singularization (Birgit Mara Kaiser, p. 157). What is produced is not a single individual or a unique object. It is a “singular” that resembles nothing else and is not pre-determined.

Thus, the concept of “singularity” arose to question the category of subjects and ascertain individuals in different ways. In other words, “singularity” is a concept that recognizes the individual, not as the subject, but as having fundamental heterogeneity. Singularity does not assume what individuals share with one another beforehand, but rather, it attempts to grasp “agglomeration of matter, history and experience, whatever, you just are not someone else” (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 115). Therefore, singularity can be said to be “minimal node of specificity” (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 116), neither sharing independence by communication nor being self-aware. It cannot be said that it is “free radical” in and of itself. It may become the subject, but it has so far been homogenized in popular culture and can now only become the subject for the first time (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 116).

If community is perceived using the concept of singularity, community cannot assume subjects, self-awareness, shared independence, transparent communication, or the sharing of cultural identity. Therefore, negotiation of individuality, conflict, confrontation, and miscommunication is perceived, and community can only be perceived as a minimal knot of individuality. Readings calls this community the “community of dissensus” in contrast with “community of consensus.”

However, the concept of “singularity” as explained above risks inviting the misunderstanding that it is only for denial of understanding and analysis on the premise of subjectivity or that singularity is a negative concept that does not have positive and autonomous function. In order to avoid this misunderstanding, it is necessary to emphasize the concept of “singularity” is “captured in a network of obligations that individual cannot master” (Bill Readings, 1996, p.185), and that the idea of “a network of obligations is not entirely available to subjective consciousness.” According to this idea, a social tie is considered not to be a property of a subject made by the subject, but rather, a social tie is something constantly new that transcends the individual and is created by complex social relationships, including the process of “singularization,” negotiation, and conflict.

In short, according to this idea, the social ties in today's community go beyond the awareness of the modern rationalist subject, and because there is no consciousness of it, individuals cannot overcome the liabilities, responsibilities, and subordination they experience in an appropriate manner to be completely released and become free. For example, J. Agamben states that the community of today's “whatever-singularity” (J. Agamben, 1990, p. 8, 27-33) is a “temporary” community that has been accumulated according to the conditions of things, although it has no commonality. The human subject is no longer a unique reference point; rather, it is believed that the condition of things has become that.

To summarize thus far, there are two contrasting communities according to Readings. “Community of consensus” is intended to create social ties through the rational communication of human subjects. It is intended to create a self-justifying, autonomous society using unified concepts of nation and identity. On the other hand, “community of dissensus” casts doubt on the social ties itself and aims for a society tolerant of differences without resorting to the unified concepts of nation and identity.

3. The University as a [community of dissensus]

Next, I would like to discuss the university as a representation of a community of dissensus in order to clarify the characteristics of such a community, discuss problems typical of such a community, and deepen the understanding of community of dissensus.

Given (1) Kant's modern university theory, whereby a university is founded on communication based on reason and, at the same time, protected by the state because it provides human resources to the state, which creates conflict between the two, and (2) Heidegger's university theory, and (3) the presentation of an alternative to such a communicative and modern university while learning from Derrida's unique modern university theory, which discusses the problems of modern universities, Readings questions whether the alternative to modern, communication based university is a world of an “inability to speak to one another” (Lyotard), whether it is a “world of atomistic subjects who clash by night in absolute ignorance of each other” (Bill Readings, 1996, p.185). This is not the case. Questioning the alternative to modern communication based university today should frame the issue as a new social tie that differs from social ties, such as kinship, land, control, and contracts. Universities do not comprise subjects. Rather, they comprise “singularities.” The university has conditions placed on it by various systems and, at the same time, is primarily composed of teachers and students. The members of the university are always beside other members, pledging to tell the truth and constantly inquiring into the relationship between the “inside” and “outside” of the university. In addition, the university must be a “university without condition” (Jacques Derrida, 2001, p.13), characterized as “a venue where nothing can escape reconsideration.” Furthermore, while modern universities have tried to achieve a unified purpose, such as the “production of a universal subject of history, to the cultural realization of an essential human nature” (Bill Readings, 1996, p.185), they must be considered as “communities with loose objectives.” Thus, universities comprise “singularities.” A “singularity” cannot be conscious of all its liabilities. In other words, it is not possible for everyone to be an autonomous free model individual. A relationship in which the lecturer is always the speaker and students are unilaterally taught as listeners is not possible. An interpersonal or social relationship in which teachers and students are equal peers must be considered. The social ties in the university are not a property of the subject and must be fundamentally reconsidered. The social ties formed and derived from “singularity” and “singularization” are generally perceived to be diluted, temporary, or fragmented. However, according to Readings, singularization may conversely be perceived to “deepen” social ties. Because forming agreements and giving answers to the questions surrounding social ties leads to loss of difference, heterogeneity, and diversity, maintaining the questions surrounding social ties without reaching consensus results in continuing to question social ties without “creating a dominant power or authority in an authoritarian manner” (Bill Readings, 1996, p. 187). According to this way of thinking, the community comprises “uncertain experiences that exist together” (Bill Readings, 1996, p.188), and it is not determined or shut in by any authority. These experiences may bring about historically new social ties. Alternatively, extending these arguments may be related to creating another rationality (Scott Las, 1999) that is different from the objective rationality that has been dominant thus far.

Technological Form of Social Life

An English sociologist, Scott Lash analyzes information or information society from the perspective of “the technological forms of life” (Lash Scott 2002: 13-25). We understand the world through technological systems. We operate interfaces of humans and machines. We are combination of technological systems with organic systems. Without technological systems we cannot function well. We are a man-machine interface.

When life, form of life, social form of social life becomes technological, form of life becomes life “at-a distance”. More importantly, form of life becomes “nature at-a-distance”. S. Lash gives us an interesting example of “nature-at-a-distance” as follows. “The Human Genome Project and the various human DNA databases are nature at a distance. What was previously internal and proximal to the organism is stored in an external and distant database as genetic information”. In technological forms of life, body which was relatively closed systems cannot make social body.

“When individual or social bodies open up, their organs are often externalized at a distance”.

Then what follows? S. Lash understands that technological form of life changes form of life, social form of social life it is flattened. It becomes non-linear. It becomes lifted.

The technological form of like is changing radically from the physical-organism, personality, politics, economy, societal community and cultural system. It is changing even the ultimate reality and theology. I cannot get into details of this change except his concept of power and politics. As the technological form of life is flattened, and non-linear and lifted out, “power works through less exploitation than exclusion”. Intellectual property is the best example of a power in information society. Access to means of invention and means of production is the most important source of power. In the technological form of life, power is no longer pedagogical or narrative but performative. Nation works through performativity of information and communication rather than through ideology and reflexive argument.

In conclusion, according to S. Lash, the technological form of life means a shift from “the register of meaning to the register of operationality”. Beings reproduce. Beings involve meaning. The social transmits meaning from one generation to the next generation. The symbolic has meaning. Ideology has meaning. Discourse has meaning. “The reproduction of the social and the symbolic are dependent on meaning”. But what happens when the symbolic is in fragments? What happens by the big shift from meaning to operationality? The question is not what does it mean but how does it work. In the end, human being and technology work the same logic of operationality.

Ecologies

Even if technological forms of life become dominant in society, a human being cannot help being a body, an organic time and space, and language. Albert Melucci described reality which we are analyzing and facing today as follows.” Daily life is scored by marks of an unresolved tension between, on the one hand, the dynamic impulse to continuously create the new space and contents of experience, and, on the other hand, the need to observe the natural confines of experience itself” (Alberto Melucci 1996, p.2). We are living in tension between global field of social action and its physical boundary.

How to challenge to this unresolvable ambivalence, conflict, contradiction? According to Melucci, it is necessary for us to pay attention to the inner planet. The inner planet consists of “the biological, emotional and cognitive structure”. To do so is not for solving the problem, but for changing the way

of we look at the things. The reason why ecology has become an issue is that environmental destructions are visible on all sides and that “profound change in our cultural and social perception of the reality in which we live in” (Albert Melucci, 1996, p.58).

The ecological issue is “a systemic problem.” It reveals “the phenomenon of planetary interdependence and creates “new frontiers of human consciousness.” We must include in our field of observation “the purposes, the affects, and the fragility of the observer (Alberto Melucci, 1996, p.58).

As Alberto Melucci told us, ecological question is cultural dimension of human action. The ecological issue clearly shows that the key of survival is no longer the system of means based on purposive, instrumental rationality. We culturally construct our reality. Culture also has capacity to give meaning to objects and relations. The symbolic codes organize everyday life.

It is an ability to alter the symbolic codes that produces effective action on things.

Alberto Melucci points out two more dimensions of ecological issue. The first one is individual dimension. That is, ecological issue affects individual qua individual.” It means that ecological issue affects individual “not as a member of a group, a class and a state” (Alberto Melucci, 1996, p.59). The second dimension is physiological dimension. When we face to ecological question, we immediately understand that “conflict is a physiological dimension of complex systems.” Therefore “Conflict cannot be eliminated but only managed and negotiated” (Alberto Melucci, 1996, p.60).

Conclusion

What is a basic structure of question on our analysis of community and family today? After investigating various phenomena of revival of community today, G. Delanty gave us the following conclusion: “these new kinds of community---have not been able to substitute anything, other than aspiration for belonging, for place” (G. Delanty, 2003, 2010, p.158).

Therefore, “whether community can establish a connection with place, or remain as an imagined condition” is an important question for community (reflexively organized social network) for research. Our previous investigation leads us to accept his conclusion. Our previous investigation also gives us an analytical focus of our community research. We cannot start from the concept of subject or individual. We better use the concept of singularity as “minimal node of specificity”, “agglomeration of matter, history and experience, whatever, you just are not someone else.” We have to deal with singularization of community and family. In order to establish community with place other than aspiration for belonging for place, local community has a special advantage. It can concern with the following issues: (1) basic issue, taking back of natural time, space and language, (2) need and identity issue, giving radice of identity, (3) body issue, dealing with health and sick. (4) care issue, caring other, (5) difference issue, understanding difference and solidarity with other, (5) environmental issue, inhabiting with earth and so on.

Kiyoshi Morioka, the head of *Setagaya* Policy Research Institute is conducting various empirical researches on *Setagaya*. He has investigated the collective effects of social capital to local community. It was a statistical sample survey which was carried out for 10000 residents in *Setagaya*-ward in 2009. The hypothesis was that social capital held by residents is a resource to make desirable community.

This research gave us four important points. First, he determined the components of social capital. He thought that social capital of residents was composed of bonding network, amount of bridging network,

amount of supportive network, amount of local participation, and amount of community reliance. Five elements were converted to quantitative variables and social capital was calculated by adding up scores.

Second, he examined the relationship between social capital scores and community morale, voting behavior, intention of mutual aid to resolve community problems. Analytical investigation suggested that social capital heightened community morale, accelerated the voting behavior, and enhanced the intention of residents trying to resolve common community

problems by mutual aids. Third, he pursued the relation social capital with community characteristics. Setagaya-ward has set 27 district centers corresponding to the junior high school district throughout the ward, and he calculated the average scores of social capitals of residents for each district center. He found that 3 centers characterized by relatively wealthy middle class, traditional family type which includes three generations family and established good residential area got the highest scores of social capitals.

Finally he concluded that his hypothesis, that is, social capital held by residents is a resource to make desirable community, was verified (Morioka Kiyoshi 2011).

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Study on *Setagaya* Experience of Social Governance

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1. Introduction

Since the late 1970s, *Setagaya* City, Tokyo, has been aiming for resident-driven *Machizukuri* (Community-building) with increased civic participation as a central goal. *Setagaya* Machizukuri Center, *Setagaya* Machizukuri Fund, and the Machizukuri House addressed in this report have been discussed since the 1990s. These were attempts to create a system that would truly advance Machizukuri initiatives among City residents.

Setagaya City is located in the southwest of the Tokyo Metropolitan Area and has a population of approximately 900,000 people, the largest among Tokyo. Famous luxury residences areas are sprinkled throughout the City, the percentage of residents in white-collar positions is 61%, and the proportion of residents educated beyond the university level is 44%. The City boasts a relatively high percentage of high-status individuals among its residents.

Setagaya Machizukuri Center is an intermediary support organization that empowers civic activity, particularly on the citizen side, in order to form bridges between administrators with different levels of seniority and influence and citizens. *Setagaya* Machizukuri Fund is a mechanism to provide financial support to efforts to discover and cultivate civic activity, which was quite limited during the 1990s. Two highly-specific aspects of these *Setagaya* City initiatives are that not only did the Machizukuri fund provide financial support, but the Machizukuri center also assumed the role of mentor with respect to the accompanying civic activities. As a result of these measures, various civic activities have been launched in *Setagaya* City by a variety of parties, and continue to become more widespread. In the following sections, after considering the background circumstances surrounding efforts to foster participation of citizen in local governments in Japan, we will consider the particulars of the system and initiatives of *Setagaya* Machizukuri Center and *Setagaya* Machizukuri Fund and discuss the elements essential for effective governance.

2. Calls for greater citizen engagement and the state of regional communities

Japanese society is experiencing a declining birthrate and rapidly aging population that cause it to stand out among other nations. According to the results of the 2015 population census, of the 127 million people that make up Japan's population, there are approximately 34 million people aged 65 and older (26.6%), giving rise to what has come to be called a "super-aging society." Japan's social security system, which has, as a general rule, been founded upon mutual social aid, has become difficult to maintain for the future generation as the number of people who must provide this support has decreased while the number of people requiring support has increased. In order for Japan's elderly, who are among the most long-lived in the world, to maintain their health and wellness in old age, reliance should be placed not on the state or institutions, but rather on local social capital.

At the same time, Japan has suffered many natural disasters since the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake of 1995. In this year alone we have seen the Osaka Northern Earthquake in June, the torrential rains and

flooding in western Japan in September, the damage and shutdown of Kansai International Airport caused by Typhoon 21 occurring during the preparation of this report, and the Hokkaido Eastern Iburi Earthquake. As a result of the torrential rain in western Japan, there were 225 deaths and 11 missing people. Every time a disaster occurs, the importance of regional and community bonds is highlighted, but the decline of local community involvement in Japan has accelerated since the latter half of the 1960s, and communities have been striving to promote engagement for many years.

While local organizations known as “*chonaikai*” have existed in Japan since before WWII, after the war, they were criticized for their role in participating in wartime social activities and were seen in a negative light. During the 1960s, *chonaikai* were considered to be in decline as they were seen as a kind of pre-modern organization because, for example, *chonaikai* could force people to participate if they merely lived in the organization’s jurisdictional region. Instead, the formation of an ideal “community,” through which residents could subjectively perceive of local issues and address them, has been the goal of many initiatives since the 1970s. Calls for this sort of social direction have been made by central governmental institutions, and in response, community formation has come to be regarded as a subject of research even in the field of urban sociology. At this time, “political participation” was emphasized in the policies of both the national and local governments, as well as academically. The aim was for residents to actively participate in the development and implementation of local government measures. A policy that encourages “resident participation” is referred to as “community policy.”

However, in the policy framework decided on by the local government, “resident participation,” where residents express their approval of the many actions of the local government, or where residents implement certain components of policy packages, have come to be used. This framework does not differ greatly from the way in which *Chonaikai* had been criticized as an administrative subgroup. In addition, there were many areas where a member of a *Chonaikai* was the party that actually carried out “resident participation.”

Meanwhile, after the late 1970s, civic activities aiming to solve a single problem gradually became more common. People participating in such civic and volunteer activities entered the public eye particularly following the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Up to that point, although many local volunteers were already gathering in the area, it was believed that volunteer activities would not take root in Japan; 1995 has been called Japan’s first year of volunteering.

Regional communities in Japan today involve the activities of “*Chonaikai*,” extragovernmental community organizations serving to address local concerns, and civic organization that spread after the late 1970s. These organizations are often considered to be in an adversarial position, but their role today is to facilitate collaboration to address regional issues.

3. Application of collaborative policies and the importance of governance

Japan’s economy was booming during the bubble economy period spanning the latter half of the 1980s, a time when much of Western society was in the midst of a recession. However, the national and local governments’ budgets have tightened since then, and policies were implemented to shift public projects to the private sector. In the 1990s, when the bubble economy ended and Japan entered a long recession period, Japan began advancing decentralization initiatives aimed at reforming centralized institutions and policies. Following the passage of the Omnibus Decentralization Law in 2000, local governments, to which policy had been uniformly dictated by national agencies, gained the ability to advance their own policy initiatives tailored to local conditions. However, due to the lack of sufficient budget

allocation, local governments became increasingly frugal. With this background, unless private companies and citizens take the reins of public enterprises, these enterprises will fail. For this reason, many local governments are working to establish collaborative measures aimed at carrying out public welfare activities driven by citizens and private companies. The citizens referred to here include both local organizations, such as *chonaikai*, as well as problem-solving civic activity task forces.

Collaboration can be defined as a way for various stakeholders to bring resources from an equitable position with the aim of solving regional problems. However, in reality, local governments, who have chronically tight budgets, often utilize non-profit organizations (NPOs) as low-cost subcontractors. In such cases, policies and projects are decided on by the governmental entity as in the past, but citizens and citizens' groups can only receive minimal remuneration for their work. What is important in collaboration is to realize an environment where problems can be raised by local residents and citizens, and these problems must be addressed in an equitable fashion that includes the local government as well as regional businesses. In other words, the manner of coordinating stakeholders with different views and objectives in the actual course of problem solving is important, and governance is a critical task.

However, the problem here is that the balance of power between public administrative entities and large enterprises, and individual citizens and citizens' groups reveals major inequities, and the latter entities also require the know-how and competence necessary for carrying out public operations. Attempts to solve this issue is the mission of *Setagaya Machizukuri Center* and *Setagaya Machizukuri Fund*, which will be discussed further in this report.

4. Establishment of *Setagaya Machizukuri Center* and *Setagaya Machizukuri Fund*

Setagaya Machizukuri Center was established in 1991 from within the various extragovernmental organizations operating in the *Setagaya City* of Tokyo. In 1992, *Setagaya Machizukuri Fund* was established as a public trust. *Setagaya City* was aiming for the mode of citizen-driven Machizukuri that had been the subject of various policies from the late 1970s under the innovative leadership of the City Mayor. There have been several success stories resulting from the significant involvement of public officials in areas such as the designation of model areas and budget management. However, administrative authorities could not invest such resources in all areas and activities. In addition, it was not common for citizens to actively participate in the management of Machizukuri programs. Citizens left administrative obligations to officials as a matter of course, and officials too were not excluded from the arrangement of giving directions to citizens. In order for many citizens to engage in a variety of diverse volunteering activities, a support mechanism for citizens was needed. The "Machizukuri Center Concept" was proposed as a *Setagaya City* basic policy in 1987 as a potential mechanism for this type of support.

The Machizukuri center was positioned at the center of a triangle comprising of citizens, businesses, and public administration, and was conceived as the core of collaborative efforts between the three parties. Even though citizens and local governments are focused on collaborations where resources are shared in order to solve problems with each party acting from equitable positions, there is a significant difference between citizens and administrative entities. For that reason, the Machizukuri Center needed to have a bridging function connecting these stakeholders from the standpoint of the citizen. In addition, after the Machizukuri Center was established in the early 1990s, the number of subjective activities performed by citizens themselves was small. Thus, it became necessary to foster activities starting with raising citizens' awareness and small-scale initiatives. It was for this reason that the Machizukuri Fund

was formed as a public trust. A public trust is a mechanism through which investors cannot voice opinions or make decisions about grant recipients. The grant recipients are determined not by the governmental entities that contribute large sums of capital, but by the fund steering committee that is comprised of citizens such as academic experts. With the Machizukuri Fund, citizens' initiatives became freely able to obtain funds for activities without administrative review (sometimes in opposition to governmental projects). Organizations that received assistance were also able to gain the trust of the local government and pipelines to public institutions by connecting to the Machizukuri Center. The first group of Machizukuri Fund recipients, included a group that places flowers at children's playgrounds, a group that creates and develops resident plans for rebuilding housing estates managed by public housing, and Machizukuri House, among various others. Fifteen groups were subsidized by these grants, which amounted to a total of 5 million yen.

The Machizukuri Fund and the Machizukuri Center had complementary functions. In response to the lack of citizen initiatives at the time, the Machizukuri Fund provided support and helped to develop small-scale ideas proposed by citizens. Meanwhile, since citizens conducting such small-scale activities often lack the kind of know-how and skills to present them to authorities, the staff of the Machizukuri Center, who are Machizukuri experts, accompanied the execution of these activities and provided a support network. Officials at the Machizukuri Center, who had been learning techniques to foster citizen participation at workshops in the United States, used the techniques learned at these workshops to better reflect the opinions of citizens in the policies and operations of local governments and large businesses. For example, there was no expert such as an architect present in the group that developed resident proposals for reconstruction projects pertaining to housing estates managed by public housing. Therefore, the Machizukuri Center introduced a planner, who is also an architect, and the former staff explained the plan visually using wooden stakes, ropes, balloons, and other tools so that the residents themselves could also gain a grasp of the project particulars, and they too assisted in the creation of the draft plan. When this citizen proposal was presented to the Housing Authority, a change occurred in a public corporation that had never before listened to the opinions of residents. With the cooperation of experts, the residents' ideas materialized, which had a strong influence on the outcome of the rebuilding of public housing. Such a result demonstrates the capacity of the Machizukuri Center to distill ideas and serve as a bridge between citizens without specialized skills and know-how and local governments and industry.

In addition, the Machizukuri Fund originally had no mechanism to allow it to interact with grant recipients, but opportunities for such communication have been made by having the Machizukuri Center coordinate. For example, grant decisions by *Setagaya* Machizukuri Fund are made through an open review process. Applicants organize a brief presentation about their activities followed by questioning by the steering committee members, but these procedures are open to the public. How and where the steering committee votes are also left open. At the voting location, residents and the group applying for funding can learn about the types of activities occurring in the area. Organizations that have decided to pursue funding are also obliged to participate in the interim reporting meeting occurring at the midpoint of the fiscal year, as well as the activity status reporting meeting held after the grant period. At the Fund's inception, citizens were not accustomed to taking action after receiving grant funding in this way. By understanding the successes and failures of other organizations, citizens could later apply this knowledge to their own activities. In addition, citizens shared advice with each other, actual support was provided in areas they excelled in, and interactions between people, such as the sharing of information and movement between different projects, became more common. In this way, by undertaking these operations, the Machizukuri Center not only functioned as a bridge between citizen and local governments, but also as a bridge between similar civic activities. However, this bridging

function was not originally envisioned to be possessed by the Machizukuri Center alone. The original conception was that the “Machizukuri House,” which is the target group of the Fund, would be responsible for the functions of this intermediary. The following section will examine the particulars of the Machizukuri House.

5. Empowerment of civic activity by intermediate support organizations: Tamagawa Machizukuri House

As discussed previously, the Machizukuri Center played the role of an intermediary, but it was thought that citizens would also play this role. What was expected in this role was an intermediate support organization that empowered civic activity, referred to as a “Machizukuri House.” Originally, this intermediate support organization would be launched in each region or for each project theme, and the houses were supposed to connect administrative and individual citizen activities. If this were to proceed as expected, the function of the Machizukuri Center would gradually become more limited, the Machizukuri House would become the nexus of the network encompassing public administration and industry, and the story of citizens supporting citizens would then be completed.

Therefore, the Machizukuri Fund included a section to subsidize the activities of the Machizukuri House with an upper limit of 1 million yen. This amount was set as twice the amount earmarked for other general activities. However, in reality, only a few Machizukuri House activities were successful. One of these activities was “Tamagawa Machizukuri House,” which will be discussed further in the following paragraphs. The Machizukuri House is a name that was used specifically in *Setagaya* City and denoted a nonprofit, community-centered organization operated by experienced citizens and experts in Machizukuri that would be neither public nor private and would serve to promote Machizukuri activities by citizens. One member of Tamagawa Machizukuri House had proposed such a way of thinking to the *Setagaya* City municipal government, and an ideal Machizukuri House could be realized.

The roles of this ideal form of Machizukuri House are as follows: (1) to link residents and the local government so as to reflect the ideas of the residents in Machizukuri activities, (2) to promote planning activities with residents and practice pathways towards their realization, and (3) to consult with local people about local problems concerning Machizukuri that they are familiar with. Regarding funds, there was a strong awareness from the outset of the need for volunteered funding, such as membership fees for projects such as workshops and events, book publications, and bazaars, in addition to the grants provided by *Setagaya* Machizukuri Fund.

The core members of Tamagawa Machizukuri House include one city planner and two architects. “Tamagawa Machizukuri House” was established in 1991 because these three individuals happened to live in the same town of Tamagawa Den-en Chofu, located within *Setagaya* City. The following sections will discuss in detail the case of “Nekojarashi Park,” a representative example of a project in which Tamagawa Machizukuri House promoted resident participation, and subsequent collaboration with the local government resulted in the park’s construction.

Citizen participation in the construction of Nekojarashi Park

Nekojarashi Park is a public park located at the southeastern end of *Setagaya* City. People who visit the park are often surprised to see that “there is such greenery in the middle of the city.” This park can be said to be Japan’s first park to be created with the full participation of thorough planning workshops.

Tamagawa Machizukuri House, serving as a Machizukuri expert, studied how to proceed with planning while including residents, designers, and public administrators in preparing plans for the construction of the park. While following a trial and error pattern, the House held a total of five workshops starting in 1991, and in 1994, Nekojarashi Park was born. Subsequently, the local residents who participated in the workshops formed a steering committee and proceeded to manage and maintain the park on a daily basis after concluding a management agreement with *Setagaya* City.

Around 1986, residents who learned that a site formerly used for materials storage for *Setagaya* could become a park submitted proposals that the site become a heated pool, but their efforts were unsuccessful. However, their interest in what kind of park the area could become persisted. Members of Tamagawa Machizukuri House became involved in this movement as residents, and connected the administration and the residents including themselves. In 1991, after the park construction plan began to move forward and *Setagaya* Machizukuri Center was preparing to begin operations, the newly-opened Tamagawa Machizukuri House asked for the cooperation of the Center. *Setagaya* Machizukuri Center also felt that it was time to seek out ways to form a “bridge between residents and the local government” and was cooperative with the request from Tamagawa Machizukuri House. Due to the overlapping of these conditions, in August 1991, the park designers provided a summary of the construction plan, and they demonstrated active understanding of parks created through cooperation between residents and the local government. In September 1991, participants of the local residents’ association, designers, the *Setagaya* City residential area building division in charge of establishing the Machizukuri Center, and Tamagawa Machizukuri House each participated in the “park discussion group,” and the group’s first meeting was held. Thus, while involving the Machizukuri Center and the Machizukuri House, an attempt to incorporate the opinions of residents into the construction of a public facility was accomplished by applying the workshop approach. Approximately 50 people including staff participated in each workshop.

In the first workshop dubbed the “Mini Walk Rally” held in October 1991, the aim was to have as many participants as possible. The workshop involved walking around the planned park site and having participants interview townspeople to obtain useful information for the next workshop. Next, at the second workshop titled “Design Game No. 1,” held in December 1991, participants created a plan for the park, and four ideas based on the ideas provided by residents were completed. The third workshop, titled “Design Game No. 2” was held in February 1992. After sharing a rough plan previously drafted by the designers referred to as “Design Language” with the participants, a rough placement plan was discussed with participants, and its contents was examined using an even larger model and drawings. During the fourth workshop, titled the “Full Experience Tour—Best Facility Selection Game,” held in June 1992, participants confirmed the actual size of the park construction site and the basic plan that had been largely solidified after the previous workshop. The participants checked the design plan by confirming the size by placing a bicycle in the place where a toilet was to be installed and then checking the flow of running babbling water with vinyl tape. In addition, regarding important issues that could not be decided on during prior workshops, participants were divided into groups and then carefully examined each issue and reached a conclusion. In this way, the design to be implemented was finalized in August 1992, and the first phase of park construction was initiated.

In June 1993, after completion of the first phase of construction, a fifth workshop, dubbed “Operation and Management Brainstorming,” was held for participants to consider ways for the park to be utilized in the community. At this final workshop, participants discussed the creation of an organization for the residents to be involved in the management of the park, and the result was the formation of “Nekojarashi Group.” Thus, by utilizing the workshop technique and reflecting the opinions of residents, public

administrators, urban designers, and residents were able to collaborate to complete the design plan, and the *Setagaya* municipal Nekojarashi Park opened in April 1994.

Since the completion of Nekojarashi Park, examples of cases where residents participate and create parks following the workshop format have begun appearing throughout Japan. There were many inquiries and inspections both before and after the pioneering opening of Nekojarashi Park. Subsequently, although inquiries decreased to an extent as the “community-driven Machizukuri” workshop format became more widespread, participants in Nekojarashi Park’s construction and management have been increasingly asked about why the resident-driven management of the park was so successful. While there have been other parks created through resident participation via this workshop approach, there are few cases like that of Nekojarashi Park in which resident-driven park operation and management has succeeded even after the opening.

The roles of the Machizukuri House and Nekojarashi Park project

What are the elements of the success of the “Nekojarashi Park” project? In the beginning, being a “park formed through the input and participation of residents in a workshop format” carried great significance. This was because, at the time, there were hardly any similar cases in Japan. However, in the case of Nekojarashi Park, it should be noted that this is not the end. In the final round of the park-development workshops, the participants discussed the management of the park after it was completed, and as many as 40 people contributed to the establishment of a residents’ organization. Although there were situations where the number of members did not increase much even after 20 years or more, the park continues to be maintained. Over 20 years, various problems have occurred every year, every month, and every week, but these issues have been dealt with one by one. This process reveals the importance of residents’ subjective involvement in governance and the gravity of their responsibilities.

Tamagawa Machizukuri House sought a way for residents to participate in the construction of parks, and initially utilized the workshop approach so that the opinions of residents who lack specific expertise could be reflected and be involved as a Machizukuri expert group. However, in the following 20 years, one of the members became involved as a member of the Nekojarashi Group as a resident. It is here that the major features of Tamagawa Machizukuri House, as an intermediate support organization in the area, are on display. The activities related to Nekojarashi Park seem to have fulfilled each of the three roles attributed to the Machizukuri House. Regarding the first role, “linking residents and the local government so as to reflect the ideas of the residents in Machizukuri activities,” at the outset of this activity, members of the Machizukuri House realized the creation of the park with the participation of residents while integrating the roles of other municipal office divisions in cooperation with the staff of the *Setagaya* Machizukuri Center which was still in its preparatory stages. Regarding the second role, “to promote planning activities with residents and practice pathways towards their realization,” the members utilized the workshop method experimentally as a way for residents who are not experts to also be able to submit their opinions. As for the third role, “to consult with local people about local problems concerning Machizukuri that they are familiar with,” they also became members of the Nekojarashi Group, which maintains the park and has been active for a long time, and took over the secretariat role that the residents could not fulfil. After the period where the residents alone were insufficient, the residents themselves have now become able to manage the park for themselves. The fact that the region’s expert group always provided support was very important in the timeline of the “Nekojarashi Park” project.

Activities by Tamagawa Machizukuri House were present not only in the Nekojarashi Park example, but also with respect to other projects in the area. The characteristic of Tamagawa Machizukuri House to become involved in regional activities is to introduce new ideas, to help launch them, and to help foster the self-sufficiency of the groups running the activities. The stakeholders from the area initiate the activity, and the House continues to provide support behind the scenes in roles such as secretariat, and so forth. As a result of this approach, the House's activities will continue to foster the development of new programs, but will continue to be rooted in the local community without terminating activities that have been previously initiated. The key difference from outside experts, Machizukuri consultants, and the like is that these entities become actual members of the secretariat and join the group executing the activity and continue their involvement in this capacity.

The activities of Tamagawa Machizukuri House have been carried out as in the description of the ideal form for a Machizukuri House described previously. The House has long strove to stay in tune with the intentions of local residents regarding their activities, provide expert advice, act as a real group member, and serve as an intermediary support organization for Machizukuri in the community. As was also the case with the Machizukuri Center concept, if such intermediary support organizations exist in each region, the Machizukuri Center could have assumed the role of coordinator. However, why did this not occur? Part of the reason may have been the lack of a system to support this Machizukuri House. It can be said that there was a naïve assumption on our part as to how intermediate support organizations that do not actually operate income-generating businesses themselves would procure operating expenses. Certainly Tamagawa Machizukuri House, in addition to having received Machizukuri Fund grants for the longest period of three years, has also undertaken training and requests for lecturers while receiving other grants. However, as this was a group operating from the outset, major components of it were feasible, and it was also difficult for other organizations to secure voluntary financial resources. Long-term support is needed for intermediate support organizations that do not operate income-generating businesses. In order for citizens to establish a framework under which they can support other citizens, it is necessary to consider a system that also supports intermediate support organizations.

6. Future of *Setagaya* Machizukuri Center and *Setagaya* Machizukuri Fund

As mentioned above, the idea that the Machizukuri House serves as a bridge between the citizens and the local government, and through which citizens support other citizens, encountered obstacles (apart from Tamagawa Machizukuri House, these houses generally fail and close down), and did not become established. The Machizukuri Center has long served as a bridge between citizens and local governments. However, due to the harsh financial situation faced by *Setagaya* City and the change in City Mayor, a review of extragovernmental organizations was conducted, and the urban development corporation, the parent firm of the Machizukuri Center, was merged with other foundations. As a result, in 2006, the organization became a foundation called *Setagaya* Trust and Community Design. Although to date support for the Machizukuri Fund and for providing funding to organizations has been a major part of the work performed by the Machizukuri Center, among the new organizations, the fund has been involved with one of the many other projects, and as a result, their relationship with the fund actually declined. Since the Machizukuri Fund was originally a mechanism established by the trust bank and the steering committee, it can be said that this is closer to its original form. Despite the fact that officials no longer deeply commit to each grant recipient, the open examination method, intermediate meetings, and report meetings have continued, even though their purpose and procedures have changed.

When the Machizukuri Fund celebrated its 20th anniversary in 2012, an investigation of the current

activities of Fund subsidy recipients was conducted. By 2012, there had been 276 groups that received Fund subsidies, with 517 individual subsidy disbursements and grants totaling 175.2 million yen. Over 3,000 people were affiliated with the organizations receiving grants, reaching a total of 6,200 people. The Fund started with three divisions: the “Machizukuri Activity Division,” the “Machizukuri House Division,” and the “Machizukuri Exchange Division.” However, as the number of applications for funding declined in 1994 and 1995, shortly after the fund began, in 1996 the “*Hajime no Ippo* (‘first steps’) Division” was established in order to reduce the barriers for submitting applications. Parties are eligible to apply to this division for subsidies only once, and the grant amount is small at 50,000 yen, but the application review process is simplified, making it a more approachable and less intimidating option at the early stages of launching a new group. Additionally, the division has been changing according to the needs of the times, and in 2006, the Machizukuri House Division was also abolished. Recently, a “Disaster Countermeasures/Reconstruction Machizukuri Division” and a “Teen Machizukuri Division” were established in 2012, and a “Support Twinkling Star Community Division” was established in 2013.

The main themes of the activities of the more than 40 groups that have received Fund subsidies thus far have included “Learning, preservation, and utilization of *Mizu to Midori* (water and greenery),” “Establishment of spaces for children and childcare,” “Sharing of culture, art, media, and information,” and “Creation of regional bases.” The scope of activities of the groups is that 60% of the activities are geared towards specific districts (ranging from towns to individual city blocks) and base facilities. Of the groups, 20% were comprised of three to five people, 40% were comprised of six to ten people, and 60% were comprised of ten or fewer people. In narrow regions, it was found that more than half of the groups consisted of small numbers of people.

Approximately 50% of the 133 groups continued their activities after receiving a Fund subsidy. Among these groups, there were 28 groups organized as NPO corporations, and there were also several groups that operated as for-profit companies. Regarding their relationships with *Setagaya* City, there were 11 groups conducting collaborative projects with the City between 2009 and 2011, and the City outsourced operations to nine groups. An example of one of these projects is the “Nozawa 3-chome Playground Creation Group (NPO).” During the initial phase of this project, the group received grant funding from the Machizukuri Activity Division for three years. After that, the City’s model was outsourced, and currently the “*Odekake Hiroba* (‘outing plaza’)” project is being outsourced by the City. This kind of outsourcing relationship with the City can prove difficult during the initial phases without actual results, and we found that a framework in which operations are carried out with fund subsidies is established, resulting in the operations gaining recognition by the City. It can be said that Machizukuri Funds that do not restrict activity content have led to the creation of footholds that nurture various regional activities from their inception, allowing them to develop and mature into sustainable regional organizations.

7. Future outlook for *Setagaya* Machizukuri Fund

The Machizukuri Fund, a public trust, steadily expanded the scope of civic activity thanks to its system for making grant decisions that is not influenced by the intent of the investors. However, the trust assets of the fund will bottom out around 2025, and *Setagaya* Machizukuri Fund is about to close down.

Initially *Setagaya* Machizukuri Fund aimed for a neutral position independent of the local government and was launched as a public trust for fundraising that seeks donations from the local government as

well as from businesses and residents. The target balance of the original fund was 500 million yen in 10 years. However, the donations collected from residents and companies at first amounted to approximately 10 million yen. When the Machizukuri Center concept was first developed, considerable donations from companies were expected as complement to the bubble economy, but in reality, such donations did not arrive. As such, we contributed 50 million yen as trust assets together with *Setagaya* City and Toshiseibikosha (urban development public corporation) during the Fund's first two years. Nevertheless, because the fund could not reach its target balance, the local government and the Machizukuri Center have covered the amount used each year. The rate of cash burn to date has been approximately 6 million yen annually. Regarding income, approximately 1 million yen has been generated through trust asset management, approximately 2 million yen has been received each year through gifts and donations until around the year 2000, and approximately 1 million yen has been received from other sources. However, in 2011, corporate and individual donations fell to about 20,000 yen, creating a crisis situation. From the beginning, additional trust capital has been added by the City and the urban development corporation to cover the shortfall. The amount was approximately 5 million yen. However, due to the decision by *Setagaya* City, which is also facing financial difficulties, additional trust capital will not be added after 2011. For this reason, we are currently utilizing a structure to withdraw trust assets each year to conduct operations, and these assets will soon be exhausted.

The "Twinkling Star Community Support Division" established in FY2013 has set a maximum grant amount of 3 million yen, with a maximum grant amount of 1 million yen for one group, aside from the 5 million yen maximum total subsidy set for other Fund divisions. Moreover, as the fund will grant up to 3 million yen separately for the second year, this project will considerably shorten the lifespan of the fund.

This department was established with the intention of "Creating a community to support those engaged in Machizukuri projects." The first goal of this concept is "to create a model Machizukuri group for *Setagaya* City." This will involve supporting organizations that can become models and symbols for Machizukuri in *Setagaya*. In consideration of Machizukuri activities in *Setagaya* 20 years from now, we are aiming to create an environment where goals for activities exist, and to intentionally create model activities by providing intensive support to potential grant recipients with growth potential. The second goal involves "creating a community" to support these model groups. This aim involves establishing a welcoming place to provide support for people who undertake community development activities in *Setagaya* City. Moreover, the goal here is to cultivate "an ecosystem where diverse people who support Machizukuri activities can gather." Even after such groups use up their grant funding, our division's wish is that these groups that lead Machizukuri activities, like shining stars and the diverse people that support this community in the mode of an ecosystem, will continue their Machizukuri activities in the future.

It is important that the organization that has been funded by the division is self-sustaining and that its operations are ongoing, and that emphasis is placed on these operations. It is difficult to receive subsidies from this division with an income and expenditure plan that will make continuing as a going concern after receiving the grant troublesome. To enable the organization to continue their activities, it is important to create a framework under which income can be generated.

A major feature of this division is that it not only provides financial support, but also provides human support. "Mentors" who support activities are assumed to be volunteers who provide professional support pro bono, and three to five mentors are assigned to each grant recipient. Such a system diverges from the usual public trust mechanism, but the external affiliated organizations of the Fund arrange for the mentors, and these mentors accompany the funding organization.

The aim of this division can be said to be a framework under which citizens support other citizens in a manner different from the framework envisioned as the Machizukuri Center concept in the 1990s. The most prominent difference is that, first, as background, the citizens themselves considerably strengthen themselves and can play the role of providing pro bono specialized support and that such human resources are accumulated in *Setagaya* City. In fact, in 2014, during the first year of the division's operations, more than three people volunteered as mentors for five groups that passed the primary review. Mentors are members with diverse backgrounds, such as Machizukuri consultants who have been involved in *Setagaya*'s town planning activities, university researchers, and employees of major companies. There is a soil in the *Setagaya* City where people with such expert knowledge participate as a volunteer. In the Machizukuri Center concept of the 1990s, experts were needed to serve as intermediaries between public administrators and residents, but they have been able to enter the governance space with the power of the residents themselves.

8. Conclusion

The Machizukuri Center concept sought to develop a mechanism for citizens to support the activities of other citizens. However, many were not concerned about the region, and in some cases, the difference between the people themselves and the challenges of administrative policy/enterprise was too great. Therefore, we aimed at increasing activities involving many citizens while also building citizens' ability to manage programs and organizations. The former has seen concrete progress through funding activities aimed at various organizations. Regarding the latter goal, Machizukuri Centers and Machizukuri Houses have engaged in communication with citizens, administrators, and enterprises. Currently, it is thought that citizens are capable of developing and assuming management roles in projects such as those referred to as "pro bono" projects.

However, as ideas favoring social individualization and rationalization progress, many people's involvement and interest in their local communities are becoming increasingly diluted. Moreover, with the rise of neo-liberalism and the trend towards conservatism, the power of the national government, policies, and industry can be seen as increasing in strength. The process that *Setagaya* followed was a big step forward in terms of overcoming the first challenge, but this was not a complete solution. Rather, the problem can be seen as growing as "risk society (Beck 1986)" is spreading. *Setagaya* Machizukuri Center, the Machizukuri Fund, and the Machizukuri House have reviewed the processes and results achieved by citizens once again. We wonder if we should reconsider the mechanisms by which the results of citizens' activities can be utilized.

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Who Supports Community Participation?

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1. Introduction

This paper is aimed at studying who participate and/or support the community reconstruction. This question is important because we should know where the energy for community reconstruction comes from in order to continue the community reconstruction efforts. In this regard, it focuses on the relationship between individualization and community participation through an empirical research. More specifically, the question is whether the negative consequences of individualization will lead to community participation. There are studies which show the social governance or neighborhood community reconstruction efforts in East Asia such as *Seongmisan* in Seoul, *Qinghe* in Beijing, and *Setagaya* in Tokyo which started with the risk and negative consequences of individualization (Han, 2018; Shim, 2018; Han, Shim, Kim, 2018; Li, Zheng, Wang, 2018). However, most of these studies dealt with the relationship through a literature review and not through empirical studies. Thus further studies are needed to show the relationship through empirical researches such as survey research and/or case studies. This study attempts to fill such a gap. The theoretical resources I will use is Beck's theory of emancipatory catastrophism (Beck, 2015; Han, 2015) and the data to be used were collected in a risk survey conducted to 1,123 citizens of Seoul in April, 2018.

Research questions are as follows. The first question is whether there is a relationship between individualization and community participation. In general, they show reciprocally opposing relationship. This refers to a factor which pushes the individuals to opposite direction. Thus the question is: is an experience and/or anticipation of negative consequences of individualization related to citizens' positive attitude to do something to change the situation? More specifically, does the risk of individualization bring forth community participation? If so, how? It is expected that the higher the risk of individualization, the higher the community participation or support. The second question is about a mediating factor which pulls individuals toward community participation. Even though individuals are pushed out from individualization, they are not automatically lead to community participation. There must be some meaning work for them pulling to community participation/support. Here I formulate such intermediate variables as evaluation of government policy and attitude toward future urban development as the pull factors.

2. Theoretical Background

2.1 Beck's Theory of Emancipatory Catastrophism and Metamorphosis

I will use Beck's theory of emancipatory catastrophism and metamorphosis (Beck, 2015, 2017) as theoretical framework. What Beck calls metamorphosis (*Verwandlung*) is a double process unfolding. The two processes include the production and distribution of goods on the one hand and the production and distribution of bads on the other. "First, there is the process of modernization, which is about progress. It is targeted at innovation and the production and distribution of goods. Second, there is the process of the production and the distribution of bads" (Beck 2015: 78). According to Beck, "both

processes unfold and push in opposite directions, but they are interlocked”. The point is that this interlinkage is not produced through the failure of the process of modernization or through crises but through its very success. Beck says that “the more successful it is, the more bads are produced. The more the production of bads are overlooked and dismissed as collateral damage of the process of modernization, the greater and more powerful the bads become”. (Beck 2015: 78)

Thus metamorphosis is not social change, not evolution, not revolution, not crisis, not war. According to Beck, “it is a mode of changing the mode of change. It signifies the age of side effects. It challenges the way of being in the world, thinking about the world and imagining and doing politics”. And it calls for “a scientific revolution from ‘methodological nationalism’ to ‘methodological cosmopolitanism’”. The metamorphosis of the world is about “the hidden emancipatory side effect of global risk” (Beck 2015: 78).

Then what is emancipatory catastrophism? Emancipatory catastrophism, according to Beck, is not about the negative side effects of goods but the positive side effects of bads. They are producing normative horizons of common goods. The driving force here is global risk. Global risk may be destructive nationally (‘working institutions fail’) but creating opportunities globally (‘new normative horizons’ and the emergence of unwritten but imperative norms) (Beck 2015 77-78). Beck emphasized that in the cosmopolitan turn the common sense of problem, the historical rationality, is constituted and transformed by global risk (Beck 2015: 85). And what keeps the cosmopolitized fragmented generation together is “the reflexivity and reflection produced by global risk”. This reflexivity and reflection in the face of global risk, i.e. in the face of the existential threat to humanity, stands for what Mannheim calls ‘entelechy’ (Beck 2015: 85), which can be translated as social catharsis or paradigm shift, the essence of emancipatory catastrophism.

Furthermore, as Han (2015) pointed out, Beck made a decisive attempt to move into the action-theoretical arena by addressing Hurricane Katrina, which swept the coast of Louisiana, USA in August 2005. In this context, he suggested three conceptual lenses: sacred (unwritten) norms of human survival, anthropological shock, and social catharsis (Beck 2015: 79). Han (2015: 117) formulated an empirical proposition from this: ‘the more deeply shocked by a disaster destroying the norm of human survival and justice, the greater the energy for cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity’. In other words, it can be said that anthropological shock is a driving force, pushing toward social catharsis changing the negative energy into a positive one, while social catharsis is a positive factor for action and movements. Han claims that in this way Beck defends ‘an empirical analysis of the normative horizon of the self-critical world risk society’ which differs from all normative approaches in terms of conviction and value judgment.

However, anthropological shock does not automatically turn into social catharsis or cosmopolitan sympathy. Some “meaning work” is needed to bring forth the social catharsis, the paradigm change. According to Kurasawa (2007) “The social catharsis, however, must not be misunderstood as something that automatically happens and is inherently caused by the event as such. It is the product of carrier groups engaging successfully in ‘cultural work’, in ‘meaning-work’, in transformative work of activists in witnessing the (distant) suffering of others (Kurasawa, 2007)”. It could be interpreted as ‘meaning work’ which Beck mentioned. According to Beck (2015:81) “This meaning-work was to provide answers to the following questions: what is the nature of the threat? Is it death, health, economic breakdown, moral devastation? Who are the victims? How do they relate to the publics involved? Who is made responsible? And last but not least, what should the global community and individuals, communities and organizations, wherever they are now, be doing in response?”. This meaning work can work as a pull factor which can turn the anthropological shock into social catharsis. Shim tried to apply

this in explaining the transnational marriages in Korea (Shim, 2015) and the metamorphosis of the Korean comfort women (Shim, 2017)

To apply this theory to empirical data, I tried to operationalize the conceptual scheme as follows (figure 1).




Figure 1 Conceptual Scheme

2.2 Research Question based on the Operationalization of the Concept

In order to utilize Beck's theory with empirical data, it is needed to operationalize the key concepts. Violation of sacred norms of human existence can be operationalized into occurrence of a catastrophe such as the Fukushima incident. This kind of catastrophe brings forth an anthropological shock which can be interpreted as global risk. Global risk is here operationalized as risk perception of catastrophe in this paper. Particularly risk perceptions of individualization were dealt with.

This global risk or risk perception is a strong push factor for emancipatory catastrophism. It is a bad thing, but it can bring forth a good thing such as energy for positive action. Social catharsis is such a paradigm shift. When a big catastrophe occurs, people at first are shocked, but later think that it should occur 'no more' and thus their way of being, of thinking, and of acting are also changed. Particularly, cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity arises. Support and/or participation in community reconstruction can be considered as such an example, since it is something going beyond national boundaries.

In relation with cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity we find two aspects: on the national and on the international level, since Beck mentioned that global risk may be "destructive nationally but create opportunities globally". That is, it could give rise to critical and negative evaluations of government risk management, but could give rise to positive attitude towards the need of international cooperation. Here we can interpret that the social catharsis on the international level could be more directly related with cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, while that on the national level could be a sort of "no more" or a moment of paradigm shift.

The actions and movements can rise based on cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity. We can consider whether people participate or are willing to participate in actions or social movements. The above description on operationalization is shown in the following table 1.

Table 1 Operationalization of the Theoretical Concept of Emancipatory Catastrophism and Metamorphosis

Theoretical Concept	Operationalized Variables
Violation of Sacred Norms	Global risk, individualization, Catastrophe (eg. Fukushima accident)
Anthropological Shock	Risk Perception of Catastrophes, individualization, global risks
Social Catharsis	Paradigm Shift, domestic and international --“No More”, Criticism on government risk management, --Cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, (e.g. Change in evaluation and/or need for national and international countermeasures)
Actions/ movements	Actions by Risk Actors based on Cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, support and/or participation in community reconstruction

Based on the above discussion, the research question “Does the global risk or the bads bring forth emancipatory catastrophism or the goods?” can be rephrased as follows using the operationalized variables: 1) does risk perception work as push factors for community participation? 2) does risk perception work as push factors for social catharsis?” 3) does social catharsis work as pull factors for actions and movements?” More specifically, the hypothesis will be: 1) the higher the risk perception, the stronger the action/movements; 2) the higher the risk perception, the stronger the social catharsis; and 3) the stronger the social catharsis, the stronger the actions/movements based on cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity. In order to answer the question, we will raise some sub-questions. For example, what is the extent of anthropological shock or risk perception? How is risk perception related with evaluation and need of national and international countermeasures? How is a way of thinking related with way of thinking?

The first question is about to the relationship between anthropological shock (risk perception) and action/movement, about whether the risk perception work as push factors for action/movement; the second questions is about the relationship between anthropological shock and social catharsis, whether the risk perception works as push factors, and the third one is about the relationship between social catharsis and action/movement, that is, about whether the social catharsis works as pull factors for action/movement (Shim, 2015b). I tried to divide Beck’s question into three, while comprising Beck’s problem consciousness based on my push-pull paradigm (Shim and Han, 2010; Shim 2015b). Since Beck developed the concept of metamorphosis beyond emancipatory catastrophism, I wanted to go one step more for cosmopolitan action.

3. Data and Method

In order to utilize Beck’s theory of emancipatory catastrophism, particularly cosmopolitan solidarity, I used questionnaire surveys conducted to 1,123 people in Seoul in 2018¹. I will not talk about the detailed methodological issues here. I just would like to mention that in order to discuss emancipatory

¹ The survey in Seoul was carried out as an online survey by Hankook Research in April, 2018 based on its master sample.

catastrophism, I tried to measure anthropological shock, social catharsis/cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, and metamorphosis. Here anthropological shock is considered as an independent variable, and community participation/support as metamorphosis are considered as dependent variables, social catharsis and/or paradigm shifts through meaning works such as attitude toward future urban development, toward government policy, and toward international cooperation are considered as mediating variables.²

In order to discuss emancipatory catastrophism, we tried to measure the violation of shared norms of human existence/anthropological shock, social catharsis/ cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, and metamorphosis.

First, in relation with anthropological shock, that is, risk perception of individualization, I focused on two related risks: first, everyday life anxiety as a context of family risk perception; second, seriousness of family risk as a main focus as a specific example. These variables were measured as follows: In relation to “everyday life anxiety”, we asked participants the following question about four statements: “How strong a feeling do you have about the following everyday life anxiety?” The four statements were: (1) “I feel anxious that I might fall behind because the competition is too severe in our society” (anxiety over competition), (2) “I am worried whether I could manage it if a member of the family get sick or encounters an accident”(worries about family accidents), (3) “I am worried if my home economy becomes needy due to economic crisis” (worries about household living due to economic crisis), and (4) “I feel lonely and desolate because I have no one who understands me” (loneliness and heartlessness). These questions are designed to determine the relative importance of work-related (the first question), family-related (the second and the third questions), and relation-related³ anxieties (the fourth question). For the comparison the points were converted to scores on a 100-point scale.

In relation with “seriousness of various family risk,” we asked the following questions about seven items, “How serious do you think the following family-related risks are in our society?” The seven items are: (1) divorce, (2) low fertility, (3) decrease in the parent’s role in home education, (4) isolation and suicide of the elderly, (5) individualist tendency, (6) decrease in mutual help in the family, and (7) conflict in the property distribution. They were measured in Likert scale (from 1 “not serious at all” to 4 “very serious”). For the comparison the points were converted to scores on a 100-point scale.

Second, in relation with social catharsis or ‘no more’ and turn to cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, I focused on three intervening variables: communication as meaning work, the evaluation of government polity, and attitude toward future urban development. As mentioned above, anthropological shock does not automatically turn into social catharsis or cosmopolitan sympathy. Some “meaning work” is needed to bring forth the social catharsis, the paradigm change. The meaning work involves a qualitative process and is very difficult to measure in a survey. Here I tried to measure it indirectly through communication with significant others, since the communication with significant others can be considered as part of meaning work. We can expect that the higher the communication, the stronger the community participation. The questions on communication are as follows: “How well do you think you communicate with the following people around you”? and 1) family members 2) friends, neighbors, and 4) colleagues at the workplace were presented. And the responses were measured in Likert scale (from 1 to 4). The scores were added so that the higher the score, the better the communication.

² Meaning work variables were not included in this analysis, since they involve more qualitative aspects.

³ Here relationship could mean pure relationship. Pure relationship refers to a relationship for itself, not for material or other interests (Giddens, 2001).

As to the evaluation of government policy the question is as follows: “Overall, what do you think about the government’s management of risks?” And the responses were measured in Likert scale (from 1 very well, 2 quite well, 3 not that well, 4 not well at all). As to the attitude toward future urban development the question is as follows: “for the future development of Seoul city, which direction of development do you think is more important?” and four issues were presented: 1) city government as a center of good policy *versus* citizens’ participation for good city, 2) contemporary city fitting to the global standard *versus* a city with Korean cultural characteristics, 3) city with high-rise apartment *versus* city with lively alleys and neighborhood communities, 4) rational and effective city *versus* city with affection and intimacy. And the responses were measured in Likert scale (from 1 to 5). The higher the score, the more in favor of neighborhood community and participation. For the comparison the points were converted to scores on a 100-point scale.

Third, in order to measure actions and/or movements of risk actors based on the cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity, we asked participants the two levels of questions on the general level and on the more specific level. The question on the general level is as follows: “These are questions on neighborhood community. To what extent do you agree to the following statement? 1) As the market competition gets intensified, the function of neighborhood community weaker and weaker. 2) Restoration of the functions of neighborhood community is important today. 3) If there is an opportunity to make neighborhood community newly, I am willing to participate in it.”

The questions on the specific level are as follows: Neighborhood community making projects are activities in which residents participate in such activities as community child-rearing, maeul community festival, maeul community academy to increase not only jobs but also feeling of belonging to the community. 1) How much do you know about the community reconstruction projects? (extent of knowledge) 2) Do you think the community reconstruction projects are necessary? If so, how much? (necessity of community projects) 3) “Are you willing to participate in a community reconstruction project, if there is such an opportunity?” (willingness of participation) 4) Are you willing to recommend participation in community projects to residents? (willingness of recommendation) 5) Are you now participating in a community reconstruction project (participation)? They were also measured in Likert scale (from 1 “I do not agree at all,” 2 “I do not agree,” 3 “I agree, 4 “I fully agree.”). And they were converted into scores out of 100 points.

Fourth, in addition, socio-demographic factors such as sex, age, education, and stratification were also measured. They were measured as follows: high school graduation, and college students and over in the case of education: low, middle and high in the case of subjective stratification. The socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents are as shown in table 2.

Table 2 Socio-demographic characteristics of the respondents (Seoul, 2012, 2018)

		Seoul	Seoul
(unit: Total frequency)		(512)	(1123)
Sex	Men	49.4	49.1
	Women	50.6	50.9
Age groups	Twenties	19.5	18.6
	Thirties	22.7	18.7
	Forties	21.1	19.6
	Fifties	18.4	18.8
	Over sixties	18.4	24.3
Education	High School & lower	26.2	20.4
	College & higher	73.8	79.6
Standard of living	Upper class		2.7
	Middle class	59.3	60.1
	Lower class	40.6	37.2
Marital status	Single	28.9	30.9
	Married	64.8	61.7
	Divorce/separation	6.3	7.4
Total percentage		100.0	100.0

4. Distribution of Risk Perceptions and other key variables

4.1 Risk Perceptions as Anthropological Shock

Questions on citizens' risk perception were asked as a substitute measure for anthropological shock. As to people's risk perception, we asked questions on two related risks, one on everyday life anxiety as a context of family risk perception and the other on seriousness of family risk as a main focus as a specific example. As to everyday life anxiety, the four aspects of anxiety measured turned out to be quite high: 1) anxiety over competition, 64.0, 2) (worries about family accidents) 72.7, (3) "worries about household living due to economic crisis, 71.5, and (4) loneliness and heartlessness 52.4 in 2018. They were all increased compared with points in 2012 (60.0, 70.3, 70.3 and 49.9 in 2012 respectively). All the four items put together, it was 65.2 point in 2018, somewhat higher than 62.6 point in 2012. (figure 2)

As to the seriousness of family risks, the seven aspects of family risk turned out to be quite high: (1) divorce, 64.0 (2) low fertility, 79.6 (3) decrease in the parent's role in home education, 69.7 (4) isolation and suicide of the elderly, 78.8 (5) individualist tendency, 71.2 (6) decrease in mutual help in the family, 64.1 and (7) conflict in the property distribution 65.7 in 2018. Among the seven items, three items, i.e., low fertility, isolation and suicide of the elderly, and conflict in the property distribution, increased, compared with 2012 (75.1, 76.5, 63.0 respectively in 2012), while the rest four items decreased. All the seven items put together, it was 70.4 in 2018, slightly lower than 71.5 in 2012. (figure 3)

Thus both everyday life-related anxiety and seriousness of family risks can be considered both quite high. I used seriousness of family risks for path analysis, because these fit better for risk of individualization.




Figure 2 Perception of Everyday Life-related anxiety in Seoul, 2012, 2018




Figure 3 Perception of Family-Related Risks in Seoul, 2012, 2018

4.2 Paradigm Shift as Social Catharsis

As mentioned above, social catharsis is a paradigm shift in which the anthropological shock changes into a positive energy for cosmopolitan sympathy and solidarity. Beck says global risk may be destructive nationally (working institutions fail) but creating opportunities globally (new normative horizons). Thus we asked question both on two levels. One is on the evaluation of government polity and the other is on attitude toward future urban development, together with questions on communication with significant others.

As to citizens' self-evaluation of communication with significant others, it turned out that citizens do relatively better communication with friends (67.1), family members (64.6), and colleagues at

workplace (55.9), while communication with neighbors (39.1) turned out to be not so good. The four aspects added together, the communication index turned out to be 56.7 (figure 4).

As to citizens' evaluation of government's risk management, the point is only 37.5 out of maximum 100 points (figure 5), which means relatively negative evaluation of the government risk management. This is significant, because it could mean a turn of citizens' attitude from an unconditional support for government policy toward a more critical one. The fact that citizens are critical and not satisfied with the government crisis management could mean that they might search for some alternatives.

As to the attitude toward future urban development for Seoul, it turned out that citizens prefer more participation and more community-friendly city development. Citizens' attitude toward four specific issues turned out to be relatively high with 62.9 point out of 100 in 2018 (figure 5). Points for the specific four times turned out to be as follows: 1) city government as a center of good policy versus citizens' participation for good city,000 2) contemporary city fitting to the global standard versus a city with Korean cultural characteristics, 000 3) city with high-rise apartment versus city with lively alleys and neighborhood communities, 000 4) rational and effective city versus city with affection and intimacy. I used the summation of all four items for path analysis.




Figure 4 Communication as an Intervening Variable




Figure 5 Average of mediating variables

4.3 Community Participation as Metamorphosis

Social catharsis or paradigm shift is still at the level of thinking and we need to know whether these changes in the thinking is related with actions and movements. The questions are asked at the two levels: one more general and the other more specific: The question on the general level was as follows: “These are questions on neighborhood community. To what extent to you agree to the following statement? 1)

As the market competition gets intensified, the function of neighborhood community weaker and weaker.2) Restoration of the functions of neighborhood community is important today. 3) If there is an opportunity to make neighborhood community newly, I am willing to participate in it.” I used this question on the general level for path analysis.

The community participation on the general level, that is willingness to participate in community reconstruction turned out to be quite high, with 60.2 points out of 100. The answers to more specific levels turned out as follows: extent of knowledge 30.4; necessity 62.1; willingness of participation 58.5 (only among those who are not participating in community reconstruction now); willingness of recommendation 52.3; participating now 9.8.




Figure 6 Willingness of Neighborhood Community participation

5. Factors Influencing Community Participation

In the above we have seen the distribution of key variables of emancipatory catastrophism. Now it is time to see how emancipatory catastrophism operates. The first question is whether and how anthropological shock or risk perception is related to community participation. In this regard we assume that if the risk perceptions work as push factors, they will show a positive influence or relationship on the community participation. The second question is whether and how intermediate variables such as attitude toward government risk management and attitude toward future urban development are related with risk perception on the one hand and community participation on the other. In other words, whether and how risk perception influences people's way of thinking as push factors and social catharsis works as pull factors for community participation. For this I conducted analysis based on a path analytic model. The variables I used are as follows: for independent variables I used risk perceptions of individualization such as everyday life anxiety and seriousness of family risks; for mediating variables, I used communication with significant others, evaluation of government crisis management and attitude toward future urban development, and for dependent variable, I used community participation, or more particularly, the willingness of community participation on the general level.

Risk perception as Push Factors

First, let us see how the risk perception of family risk and community participation works as push factors for the support of community participation. Questions on citizens' risk perception were asked as a substitute measure for anthropological shock. As to the relationship between such risk of individualization as everyday life anxiety and family risk and community participation, the dependent variable, it turned out to be 0.22 and statistically significant, meaning that the higher the family risk perception, the higher the willingness to participate in community projects. (Among the two risk perceptions, that is, everyday-life anxiety and family risks, family risks show stronger relationship with community participation. Thus I used the family risks for analysis.) This means a push effect of risk perception as anthropological shock. Thus it can be said that the hypothesis is supported.

Paradigm Shift

Second, let us see the relationship between perception of family risk and intervening variables. As to the relationship between family risk and communication, it turned out that the influence of family risks seems strong with 0.24, while that of everyday life anxiety is not snow significant (0.04).

When we consider the intervening variables such as attitude toward government risk management on the one hand and attitude toward future urban development, however, the picture looks somewhat different. Everyday life anxiety which showed no significant relationship with community participation, now works as push factors to community participation via negative relationship with communication (-0.23) and positive relationship with community-friendly future urban development (0.11). Family risks still works as push factors to community participation via community-friendly future urban development (0.13). As to the relationship between risk perception and intermediate variables, the relationship with government crisis management turned out to be negative even though weak, while the relationship with future urban development turned out to be positive.

This is a result as is expected. As to the former the result can be interpreted that the higher the risk perception, the more negative the attitude toward the government policy. As to the latter the result is that the higher the risk perception, the more positive the attitude toward the future urban plan. More specifically, the higher the risk perception, the more strongly citizens agree to the community-friendly future urban plan. Once the paradigm shift is done, this can be easily expected. Those who have preference for community-friendly urban development are more likely to participate in community reconstruction projects.

The turning point or paradigm shift can be seen in the negative relationship between the risk perception and the attitude toward government crisis management on the one hand and the positive relation between risk perception and attitude toward urban plan.⁴ Usually, those who are not satisfied with or criticize the government risk management are more likely to dream a different future. Those who are more dissatisfied or critical of the government crisis management tend to prefer community-friendly future city development. It is natural that these people who prefer community-friendly city development are more likely to participate in community reconstruction project.

⁴ This result is better seen when we conduct path analysis with family risk, government crisis management, future urban development, and community participation.

Social Catharsis as Pull Factor

Third, let us see whether and how social catharsis as intervening variables works as pull factors for community participation. The relationship between communication with significant others and community participation turned out to be 0.11, that between attitude toward government risk management and community participation 0.04, and that between attitude toward future urban development and community participation turned out to be positive, 0.16. That is, the relationship between the intervening variables and community participation are positive except that of government crisis management. This is a result as expected. As to the former the result is that the better the communication with others, the higher the willingness of community participation. As to the latter the result is that the more positive the attitude toward the future urban plan, the higher the willingness of community participation.




Figure 7 Path Analysis for Willingness of Community participation (with communication variable)




Figure 8 Path Analysis for Willingness of Community participation (without communication variable)

6. Conclusion

In this paper I tried to study who participate and/or support the community reconstruction utilizing Beck's theory of emancipatory catastrophism and metamorphosis. In this regard, it focuses on the relationship between individualization and community participation through an empirical research. In other words, the question is whether and to what extent the negative consequences of individualization will lead to community participation. Using the terms of Beck's theory of emancipatory catastrophism, the basic research question was: does the global risk or the bads bring forth emancipatory catastrophism or the goods? More specifically, we asked two research questions: 1) Does anthropological shock or risk perception work as push factors for metamorphosis or community participation? 2) Does risk perception of individualization work as push factors for social catharsis? 3) Does social catharsis work as pull factors for actions and social movements? The first and the second are about the influence of anthropological shock (risk perception) on metamorphosis and social catharsis, and the second is about the relationship between social catharsis and action/movement. The findings are as follows:

First, as to the relationship between anthropological shock (risk perception) and metamorphosis, most of risk perceptions are positively related with community participation. As to the relationship between risk perception as risk of individualization and community participation, it turned out that family risks rather than everyday life anxiety which work as push factors. That is, the higher the family risk perception, the higher the willingness to participate in community projects, and everyday life anxiety works as push factors only indirectly via intervening variable. Anyway, this result means a push effect of risk perception as anthropological shock and it can be said that the hypothesis is supported.

Second, as to the relationship between risk perception and intermediate variables such as communication with significant others, attitude toward government risk management, and attitude toward future urban development, the relationship with communication and government crisis management turned out to be negative, and the relationship with future urban development turned out to be positive. As to the former the result is that the higher the risk perception, the worse the communication with significant others, and the more negative the attitude toward the government policy. As to the latter the result is that the higher the risk perception, the higher the attitude for community-friendly urban development.

The turning point or paradigm shift can be seen in the negative relationship between risk perception and the attitude toward government crisis management and positive relationship between risk perception and attitude toward urban plan. Usually, those who are not satisfied with or criticize the government risk management are more likely to dream a different future. Those who are more dissatisfied or critical of the government crisis management tend to prefer future urban plan oriented to community-friendly city development. It is natural that these people with this kind of orientation are more likely to participate in community reconstruction project.

Third, as to the relationship between the intermediate variables such as attitude toward government risk management on the one hand and attitude toward future urban development on the other and community participation, the dependent variable, the former turned out to be not significant and the latter turned out to be positive. As to the latter the result is that the more positive the attitude toward the future urban plan, the higher the willingness of community participation.

In sum, Beck's main hypothesis of emancipatory catastrophism and metamorphosis that the global risk

or the bads bring forth emancipatory catastrophism or the goods, is supported, as expected. However, we have to be cautious because the intervening variables work in a complex way, and also because the research was done on the willingness level of community participation, and not on the action level.

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